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This thesis considers the operation of corrective System Protection Schemes (SPS) in 
electricity networks. Such systems have the potential to greatly enhance the utilisation 
of the network, but malfunctions may expose the system to blackouts. Choosing the 
optimal operational strategy is therefore subject to a cost-benefit trade-off between the 
benefits of increased system utilisation and the risk of outages.  
This thesis proposes to formulate the problem in three different phases, namely steady-
state, SPS action and response and impact assessment. This is used to formalise the 
objective of the network operator from a system perspective: minimising the operational 
costs considering unreliable SPS operation. This thesis also presents a generic modelling 
framework for SPS failure modes and related impact assessments.  
From an optimisation perspective, the problem presents two major difficulties. First, the 
computation of the load-shedding impact may require the analysis of a complex 
dynamical system. The second barrier is that the set of possible SPS outcomes is 
potentially large, and depends on the decision variables (generator dispatch and SPS 
configuration).  
The problem is firstly addressed in a simple system which serves to illustrate the salient 
properties of the problem at hand. It is demonstrated that the optimal SPS configurations 
are always part of a finite set of “candidate solutions” that are associated with the 
provision of security against specific outcomes scenarios of the SPS (including its failure 
modes). The same network is used to investigate SPS operational benefits and risks in a 
year-round basis.  
Next, this thesis proposes a heuristic method to address the two complexities described 
above. The method is tested on the RTS 24-Bus IEEE System. Impact assessments are 
performed in a basic cascading simulator which provides a range of possible impacts 
from SPS malfunction scenarios. The method is shown to provide an optimised balance 
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The security of a power system refers to its ability to survive sudden disturbances 
without interruption to the costumers [1]. This capacity to ensure continuity of supply is 
codified in security standards that establish how the system must be operated and 
planned. The traditional security standards are deterministic, stipulating that the 
transmission infrastructure must be resilient to a set of credible contingencies. For 
example, the common ‘N-2’ standard requires that the system is able to withstand a loss 
of one or two circuits without threatening the integrity of system operation. Historically, 
this security has been provided exclusively through redundant transmission 
infrastructure, which forces system operators to constrain the transmission capacity 
that can be used by network users, thus increasing operational costs as generators are 
dispatched out of merit order. In the planning time frame it further requires large 
investments in transmission infrastructure to avoid transmission constraints. This so-
called preventive approach to security should be combined with the concept of 
corrective security: the ability to take rapid automatic actions to keep the system’s 
variables within operational bounds after a contingency occurs [2]. There is strong 
evidence that corrective security could reduce both operational and planning costs of 
conventional preventive security standards [3-5].  
The potential benefits of corrective security are especially evident when large amounts 
of remote wind power resources are connected to the grid, which requires costly 
transmission investments within the traditional security paradigm [6]. Such is the case 
in Great Britain (GB) where the overall planned transmission investment to 
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accommodate new wind power projects amounts to approximately £15 billion (2010-
2020)[7]. Yet, this situation is not exclusive to Great Britain and many countries around 
the world such as the U.S. or Spain are currently planning large investments in 
transmission infrastructure to accommodate renewable resources in their energy 
matrixes [8].  
Against this background, a few jurisdictions around the world (e.g. BC Hydro, Hydro 
Quebec, Brazil, Southern California Edison Company, Chile, etc.) are pioneering the use 
of corrective control to make a better use of the existing networks by the so-called 
SPS/SIPS/RAS (System Protection Scheme/System Integrity Protection 
Scheme/Remedial Action Scheme) [9, 10]. McCalley et al. [10] define an SPS as “a system 
designed to detect abnormal system conditions, typically contingency-related, and 
initiate pre-planned, corrective actions to mitigate the consequence of the abnormal 
condition and provide acceptable system performance”. SPS actions rely on ICT 
infrastructure and their actions typically include changes in load, generation, or system 
configuration. These corrective systems maintain acceptable system stability and power 
flows in post-contingency scenarios without the need for pre-constraining the network. 
As such, SPS represent an efficient way to defer investments in transmission networks 
[7, 9]. It is therefore not surprising that a recent survey by IEEE and PSRC [11] on global 
experiences with SPS shows an increase in the use of such schemes, especially in the form 
of generation rejection schemes that rapidly disconnect a pre-defined amount of 
generation (i.e. intertripping capacity) upon the occurrence of a trigger event.  
Of course, SPS actions are not infallible in practice, and relying on them means exposing 
the system to additional hazards resulting from SPS malfunction. If such failures occur 
they may drive the system far outside its regular operating regime, potentially triggering 
harmful blackouts. In a 1996 survey by IEEE-CIGRE [12], respondents from the power 
industry sorted the cost from SPS failures in the highest cost category, which is not 
surprising given the historical relationship between SPS malfunctions and power supply 
shortages [10]. Moreover it should be noted that SPS malfunctions are not as infrequent 
as one may think. The NERC System Disturbance Reports from 1986-1995 [13, 14] 
indicates that of the 30 cases that involved the operation of SPS, 21 were reported as 
successful operation of SPS, while 9 involved operational failures. SPS malfunctions have 
also played a role in more recent cascading outages [15], as happened in the Nordic 
network in 2005 [10]. Therefore, the increasing use of these schemes needs to be 
accompanied by a better understanding of their true impact, as undesirable SPS 
operations may result in a deterioration of the overall system reliability. 
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Ideally, operational decisions should be based on a risk assessment that includes a 
component-based analysis of SPS, tracing the response from the initiating signal to the 
final action, and modelling of complex impacts related to SPS failures including cascading 
outages. The risks due to unreliable SPS operation should be then embedded in a system-
level cost benefit analysis, so that it is correctly accounted for in operational decisions 
regarding dispatch and the loading of transmission lines. Ultimately, such a full cost-
benefit analysis seeks to help system operators in making operational decisions and, 
jointly with regulators, in developing novel risk-based security standards. 
1.2 Scope of the work  
The research area of this thesis is the operation of power systems considering system 
protection scheme malfunctions and complex impact assessments, including cascading 
outages. The traditional network security framework is questioned, as this thesis 
investigates corrective security strategies to release extra transmission capacity in 
operational timescales.  
The problem of minimising operational costs under unreliable SPS is addressed, with the 
focus on the operation of one of the most common type of SPS: the generation rejection 
scheme (also known as intertripping scheme). Dependability-based failure modes (i.e. 
failure to operate upon demand) of such schemes are modelled and assessed considering 
the cascading outage problem. A palette of risk management strategies is then 
investigated to counteract operational risk. In particular, the benefits stemming from the 
commitment of redundant SPS configurations (i.e. power and number of generators 
disconnected) are investigated to partially neutralise SPS misoperations. The system 
operator may also manage operational risk by optimally allocating frequency response 
resources. These two measures are combined with the traditional preventive paradigm 
to security in which generators are pre-constrained to reduce the loading at critical 
points of the network. It is shown that these three risk management controls can 
significantly decrease the system’s operational costs, if considered together on a risk-
benefit assessment. Optimal operational decisions are based on different system 
parameters such as available wind output, weather conditions, availability prices of 
frequency response and SPS reliability levels. Operational tools developed in this thesis 
are embedded in an annual cost-benefit assessment to determine the optimal number of 
intertripping contracts according to an array of different operating conditions. When 
applied to large systems, all the above presents two major difficulties. Firstly, the impact 
assessment may require the analysis of complex dynamic power system mechanisms. 
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Secondly, the number of possible SPS outcomes is potentially large, and depends on the 
decision variables such as the generator’s dispatch and SPS configurations. These two 
barriers are assessed through a heuristic optimisation method which presents 
satisfactory results to balance benefits and risks associated with SPS operation. 
1.3 Research questions 
The questions addressed in this thesis are presented below.  
1. What are the benefits and risks of System Protection Schemes (SPS)? 
System Protection Schemes (SPS) have a number of benefits in the context of 
decarbonising power systems around the word. In this light, Chapter 2 reviews 
SPS practices in some of the leading jurisdictions in this flied. It also 
determines the main failure modes and impacts associated with the SPS. 
2. What is an appropriate representation of an SPS (including its failure modes)? 
SPS are based on “secondary infrastructure” to the power system and are 
composed of key components. As SPS can fail, an appropriate characterisation 
of failure modes is required. This is addressed in Chapter 3. 
3. What is the appropriate problem statement for operation with unreliable SPS? 
The main benefits and risk associated with SPS must be included in a problem 
statement. Chapter 3 provides the description of the problem of operating 
power systems with unreliable SPS. 
4. What are the properties of optimal strategies to hedge against SPS 
malfunctions? 
The key concern regarding the utilisation of SPS is with respect to its ability to 
deliver fast response upon outage events. Therefore, it is relevant to 
investigate strategies to manage sources of operational risk. Chapters 4, 5 and 
6 develop and apply risk managing techniques for SPS malfunctions. 
5. How do SPS improve utilisation of the transmission network? 
The traditional security standards have been governing power system 
operation for many decades but have associated low levels of transmission 
utilisation. SPS can improve the levels of utilisation of the networks. Chapters 
4, 5 and 6 provide an insight into the capacity of SPS to increase the power 
transfers. 
6. How to determine optimal operational strategies in large power systems? 
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The problem of operating unreliable SPS exponentially increases with the size 
of the network. Chapter 6 specifically proposed a method that can be applied 
to large power systems. 
7. What is the risk profile associated with the operation of SPS? 
SPS malfunction scenarios present different failure modes and impact 
associated. This determines a broad range of outcome scenarios that are 
associated with a risk profile. Chapter 4, 5 and 6 provide SPS risk profiles.  
8. How do system and SPS parameters affect optimal operational strategies? 
The power system and the SPS are subject to a number of parameters (e.g. 
utilisation prices, SPS reliability levels, etc.) that should affect operational 
strategies. Chapter 4, 5 and 6 investigate optimal operating strategies under a 
range of system parameters. 
1.4 Original contributions of this thesis 
As shown in Figure 1, the original contributions of this thesis are presented in chapters 
3, 4, 5 and 6.  
 
Figure 1: Thesis contributions roadmap 
Chapter 3 describes the problem of operating power systems considering unreliable SPS. 
This includes an abstraction of the operational timescales and underlying costs in three 
different phases, namely steady-state, SPS action and response and impact assessment. 
This is used to formalise the objective of the network operator from a system 
perspective: minimising the operational costs, considering the threats related to 
unreliable SPS operation. The operational cost is divided in three components: 
generation (𝐺 ), protection (𝑃 ) and risk (𝑋 ). Chapter 3 also presents the general 
1. Problem statement 
and modelling 
assumptions (Chapter 3)
2. Simple representation 
of the Anglo Scottish 
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modelling framework proposed in this thesis to perform risk-benefit analysis of 
unreliable SPS operation. Models and their related assumptions are described for 
conventional power system elements (e.g. generators, branches, buses, etc.), SPS failure 
modes and impact assessments, including cascading outages. An important originality of 
this thesis resides in its effort to connect all these ingredients in a full risk-benefit 
framework for power system operation. Chapter 3 also presents the technical challenges 
associated with this thesis. 
Chapter 4 presents a bottom-up analysis of the impact of SPS reliability on system 
operations. This analysis is performed in the context of a simple model system that is 
inspired by the situation in the Anglo-Scottish corridor. This minimal model serves to 
illustrate the salient properties of the problem at hand and allows us to identify the 
optimal solutions analytically. It is demonstrated that the optimal SPS configurations are 
always part of a finite set of candidate solutions that are associated with the provision of 
security against specific outcomes scenarios of the SPS (including its failure modes). 
These ‘partial security’ candidates constitute an important contribution of this thesis, as 
they may be relied on in the development of heuristic optimisation methods. Optimal 
operational strategies are derived considering variations on parameters such as 
available wind output, weather conditions and SPS reliability. This exercise illustrates 
that the optimal solutions highly depend on the reliability of the SPS, especially when 
bad weather conditions are considered.  
In chapter 5, the electrical network and SPS model from chapter 4 are used to investigate 
SPS operational benefits and risks in a year-round basis. The results presented in this 
case study show evidence of the relevance of investigating the acquisition of redundant 
intertripping schemes to handle SPS malfunctioning. Contracting multiple intertripping 
schemes is associated with important annual benefits when compared with system 
operation under the (N-2) security standard. One may expect that increasing the number 
of intertripping schemes will reduce the expected load not served (i.e. risk) in the year. 
However, this case study shows that this is not necessarily true, as the system operator’s 
willingness to take risk increases with the number of intertripping schemes connected 
to the SPS. 
In Chapter 6, a heuristic method to optimise power system operation with unreliable SPS 
is proposed. The method addresses two main complexities. First, based on the concept 
of “candidate solutions” from Chapter 4, it considers that the computation of the load-
shedding impact may require the analysis of complex dynamical processes (e.g. 
cascading outages). Secondly, it addresses the potential exponential growth of the 
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problem that is associated with large power systems and SPS topologies. This method is 
tested on the RTS 24-Bus IEEE System. An SPS is linked to a set of critical contingencies 
to allow further power transfers. The SPS includes different hierarchical levels of SPS 
failures, namely at the logic controller, the communication link and the circuit breaker 
associated with the generators. Impact assessments are performed in a basic cascading 
simulator which provides a range of possible impacts from SPS malfunction scenarios. 
The method is shown to provide an optimised balance between benefits and risks, 
including the risk profile associated with multiple SPS failure modes and impact 
assessments in the form of cascading outages. 
This thesis has been elaborated in collaboration with Dr. Simon Tindemans. In particular, 
he contributed with a cascading simulator used in Chapter 6, and assisted in the 
formulation of the problem and methods in Chapter 4 and 6. 
Chapters 4 and 6 present content that has been submitted to peer reviewed journals as: 
 Chapter 4: J.L.Calvo, S.H. Tindemans, G. Strbac, “Optimal operation of 
unreliable system protection schemes" submitted to the journal Sustainable 
Energy, Grids and Networks, Elsevier, Under Review. 
 Chapter 6: J.L.Calvo, S.H. Tindemans, G. Strbac, “A method to balance benefits 
and risks of system protection schemes" Submitted to IEEE Transactions on 
Power Systems, Under Review.  
 Chapter 5 “Cost-benefit analysis of unreliable system protection scheme 
operation” will be presented at IEEE Power Tech 2015 
1.5 Thesis structure 
This thesis is organised in seven main chapters as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents the context of this thesis in detail. It describes the benefits and risks 
associated with the incorporation of System Protection Schemes (SPS) in power system 
operation and planning. To this end, this chapter reviews the concepts related to security 
in power systems in the current context of decarbonising the power systems worldwide. 
It also describes the technology of SPS, its main failure modes and impacts in the power 
system. This chapter therefore provides the notions to the research questions related to 
the problem statement and modelling.  
Chapter 3 firstly presents an extensive literature review on the methods and models 
related to the problem of operating power systems with unreliable SPS. Secondly, this 
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chapter presents a three-stage statement of the problem and the overall modelling 
framework that is used in this thesis.  
Chapter 4 provides a simple analysis of the impact of SPS reliability on system 
operations. This chapter provides an insight into the main economic trade-offs related to 
SPS operations. It also provides the main economic implications of running a power 
system under the ‘N-2’ security standard, and the basics on risk management measures 
to manage operational risk from SPS malfunctioning. In relation with the solution 
methods, Chapter 4 gives rise to the concept of “candidate solution” which will be further 
used to develop a heuristic optimisation method in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 5 presents an annual assessment of the simple system of Chapter 4. This chapter 
responds to the system operator’s question of how many intertripping schemes should 
be contracted considering different operating conditions over the year. This chapter also 
analyses annual risk profiles associated with different numbers of intertripping 
contracts in order to determine the impact of purchasing redundant intertripping 
schemes in the operational decisions of the system operator. 
Chapter 6 presents the proposed heuristic method to optimise large systems with 
unreliable SPS operations. The method is tested in the IEEE 24-Bus Test System in which 
it is performed studies that include complex SPS topologies and a range of possible 
impact outcomes related to cascading outages.  
Chapter 7 summarises the conclusions of the thesis and discusses further work.
20 
2 SECURITY STANDARDS AND SYSTEM 
PROTECTION SCHEMES 
Power systems around the world have been traditionally operated and designed relying 
on redundant infrastructure to withstand a set of credible contingencies (i.e. 
deterministic security standards). These long-established standards typically ignore the 
concept of corrective security: the ability to take rapid automatic actions to keep the 
system’s variables within operational bounds after a contingency occurs. Hence, the 
network has associated low utilisation rates which may increase operating costs as 
generators risk to be dispatched out of merit order. In the long run the traditional 
approach to security requires large investments in redundant infrastructure, in order to 
allow for new connection of generating and demand units without threating the 
reliability of the system. This situation is especially evident in the context of 
decarbonising power systems around the world, as significant amount of remote 
renewable sites are expected to be connected to the electricity networks. System 
Protection Schemes (SPS), also known as System Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS) or 
Remedial Actions Schemes (RAS) are the key technology to implement efficient 
corrective actions as in the form of rapid disconnection of generation upon the 
occurrence of a contingency. Yet, such corrective systems may present failure modes that 
may result in high-impact cascading failure scenarios, potentially leading the power 
system into more frequent and harmful blackouts. Therefore, the increasing use of these 
schemes needs to be accompanied by a better understanding of their true benefits and 
risks. 
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This chapter presents the context of this thesis in detail. In section 2.1, it begins by 
defining the concepts related to the traditional deterministic standards. The main 
characteristics and consequences of such security rules are described first, to then 
analyse the importance of taking into account corrective security. Section 2.2 evidences 
the urgency of this change in the context of decarbonising power systems around the 
world. In section 2.3 a few examples of recent developments are described, in order to 
show how modern operational and design strategies account for corrective measures. 
The fourth section describes SPS in detail and concepts and international experiences on 
the use of SPS are shown. Next, this chapter focuses on the reliability analysis of these 
systems and their related malfunction consequences. SPS failure modes are explained 
and a historical review of SPS malfunction cases is presented. The chapters ends by 
reviewing the nature and attributes of historical blackout examples. 
2.1 Traditional deterministic security standards  
The International Council of Electricity Systems (CIGRE), in a review of the current status 
of tools and techniques for risk-based and probabilistic planning of power systems, 
defines security as “the ability to survive sudden disturbances without interruption of 
customer service” [1]. This capacity to ensure continuity of supply is codified in security 
standards that significantly impact the operation and design of power systems. 
Traditionally these standards have been deterministic, stipulating that the transmission 
infrastructure must be resilient under a set of credible contingencies. For example, the 
common ‘N-2’ standard requires that the system must be able to continue delivering 
electricity during the loss of one or two circuits, by means of redundant infrastructure. 
The system operator relies on large security margins to avoid post-contingency 
violations of power system technical limits (e.g. no overloading in transmission lines), 
which has been commonly referred as preventive security [16]. Figure 2 shows the 
application of the N-2 deterministic security standard to the power transfer between 
two nodes connected through four identical transmission lines. If a double-circuit failure 
occurs, the power transfer between the two nodes is not interrupted and instead directly 
flows through the remaining two transmission lines. To comply with the N-2 security 
standard, the pre-fault transfer is limited to 50% of the physical transmission capacity, 
as otherwise a double-circuit fault would overload the two residual lines in the 
transmission corridor. Note that the power system is not resilient against the loss of 
three transmission lines. In order to achieve that, the pre-fault power transfer would 
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have to be limited to 25 % of the maximum transmission capacity (i.e. 100 MW), which 
would be equivalent to running the power system under the ‘N-3’ security standard.  
 
Figure 2: Example of N-2 deterministic security standard practice  
In the planning timescales, the transmission network is designed based on the same 
deterministic standards and the procedure usually involves the following five steps [1]: 
1. Selection of the future demand scenarios and the loading conditions to be 
analysed (peak, partial peak, minimum demand, etc). 
2. Selection of the network configuration and generating unit outputs 
3. Selection of the set of credible outage events 
4. Simulation of the outage events subject to the power system conditions given by 
1 and 2 
5. Identification of preventive solutions for any outage event resulting in the 
violation of the performance criteria 
2.1.1 Main characteristics of deterministic security standards 
The deterministic security framework explained in the previous section is characterised 
by:  
 Non-use of corrective security. The term corrective security is opposed to the 
preventive security concept as it refers to the availability of taking post-
contingency actions in order to keep power system components within their 
Maximum transfer allowed 
under ‘N-2’=200MW
Pre-fault state
Maximum transfer capacity=400MW (4x100MW)
Post-double circuit fault state
Remaining transfer capacity=200MW (2x100MW)
Power transfer =200MW
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technical limits [2]. These can be in the form of adjustments on transformers, 
changes on the network configuration or automatic disconnection of generating 
units, with the objective of keeping the power system operating within its 
technical limits. The use of corrective security actions permit the system 
operator to increase power transfers at the expense of controlling the power 
flows in post-contingency states. Continuing with the example presented in 
Figure 2, the network operator may allow power flows beyond the ‘N-2 limit’ (i.e. 
200 MW), to then rapidly reduce the power transfer right after an outage occurs 
in the transmssion system. Let us imagine that a double circuit outage occurs in 
the tranmission system, then it may be possible to trip generation in the 
exporting node (left) and make use of unused generation capacity in the 
importing node (right), in order to reduce the power flow to values below the 
remaining transfer capacity (i.e. 200MW), thereby avoiding post-contingency 
overloading in the two remaining lines. The fact that traditional deterministic 
security standards completely disregard the use of corrective security is a barrier 
to efficiently operate and design electricity networks [4].  
 Equiprobable likelihood of contingencies. The deterministic criterion to security 
effectively treats all contingencies as equiprobable disregarding their individual 
likelihood of occurrence [17]. For example, it is well known that long 
transmission lines are more likely to suffer outages than transformers, or that 
weather conditions strongly affect the failure  rates of transmission lines [8] (e.g. 
lighting, high winds). As the deterministic security rules do not consider any of 
these probabilistic variations, it forces the system operator to reserve the same 
redundant transmission capacity in all operating conditions and to treat all 
power system components evenly, regardless their probability of failure and 
consequences. 
 Binary measurement of risk. Under the traditional security framework, it is 
assumed that the power system is not exposed to risk as long as the set of 
credible contingencies (e.g. N-1, N-2, N-3, etc) do not result in violations of 
operational technical limits. On the contrary, if any of these contingencies may 
cause the infringement of technical limits, the system is considered to operate at 
an unacceptable level of risk. Therefore, security standards based on 
deterministic rules consider a strict binary measurement of risk, which may 
result in operational rules that are too conservative [8].  
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2.1.2 Negative implications of deterministic security standards 
In accordance with the characteristics discussed in the previous section, deterministic 
security standards present a number of negative implications as follows: 
 High constraint costs including wind curtailment. Due to the strict limitation on 
the levels of network utilisation, system operators may have to constrain the 
transmission capacity released to network users, which often results in an 
increase of the operational costs as generators may be dispatched out of merit 
order. As reviewed by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in the 
U.S, some jurisdictions such as ERCOT (Electric Reliable Council of Texas) and 
MISO (Midwest Independent System Operator) have experienced significant 
amounts of involuntary wind curtailments in order to avoid violations of their 
reliability and security standards [18, 19]. Following with the example in Figure 
2, the system operator may have to constrain low cost generation at the left node 
and dispatch more expensive generation at the right node, in order to reduce the 
power flow in the interconnector and avoid post-fault overloading scenarios. 
 Large network investments and delays to connect new generation projects. Since 
the security rules do not change for the planning horizon, electricity networks 
require large investments in transmission infrastructure in order to avoid 
transmission constraints. This causes delays of new generation projects because 
of the lack of transmission capacity for new connections [8]. 
 Increasing frequency and impacts of blackouts. One may expect that deterministic 
security standards would be associated with very low blackout rates. However, 
it is not guaranteed that these standards will continue delivering reliable power 
system operation in a deregulated market framework. As explained by Kirschen 
and Strbac [5], increasing the capacity of the transmission network does not 
necessarily improve the security of the power system by reducing the risk of 
blackouts. This inconsistency arises because the level of security of a system is 
determined by the rules that govern its operation. Network investments benefit 
the producers and consumers whose ability to obtain better energy prices is 
limited by congestion in the transmission network. Therefore, if the transmission 
capacity is expanded without any modification in the security rules, more power 
is transferred and nothing is gained from a security standpoint.  
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2.2 Integration of renewable energy resources and security 
standards 
It has been already argued that traditional security standards allow connecting new 
generating units only when there is enough transmission capacity margins to cope with 
a set of credible contingencies (e.g. N-2 security standard). If this is not the case, 
generation capacity projects are delayed until new investments are deployed in order to 
expand the existing capacity of transmission assets. New generation projects are not 
likely to be rapidly connected, as building new transmission lines is difficult because of 
the need to acquire new rights-of-way, adapt the terrain and erect the towers [20]. As a 
side effect, this can critically affect the expected decarbonisation of the heat and 
transport sectors, which electrification is expected to greatly increase electricity demand 
[8]. Therefore, the need to reconsider the rules that have traditionally governed power 
system security is even more manifest in the context of large-scale deployment of 
renewables and other low-carbon generation technologies.  
Furthermore, the fact that renewable resources are often located far away from demand 
centres exaggerates this situation, requiring considerable investments in transmission 
infrastructure. In the United Kingdom, under the ‘N-2’ deterministic security standard, 
the Climate Change Act has set a CO2 emissions reduction target of 80% by 2050, when 
compared to 1990 levels [21]. Renewables and especially wind generation will play a key 
role in achieving this target. Scotland has a large wind power generation potential, but 
most of the electricity demand is concentrated in England. The current Scotland-England 
transmission corridor consists of two AC double circuits which have low utilisation rates. 
Nevertheless, because of the ‘N-2’ and dynamical constraints these will be 
complemented by two off-shore HVDC transmission lines to increase the power transfer 
into the south of the country [22]. The total planned transmission investment required 
to accommodate new wind power projects amounts to approximately £15 billion (2010-
2020) [7].  
The United Kingdom is just one of many countries that have strongly committed to 
extend low carbon generation technologies by means of large investments on redundant 
infrastructure. For instance, the European Commission Directive of March 2008 [23] set 
a legally binding target of 20% of the energy consumed in the European Union must come 
from renewable energy sources by 2020. In the US, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 [24] included about $70 billion in spending and tax credits 
related to the support of clean energy. Developing countries such as Brazil and China 
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have also started investing in  large-scale deployment of renewable generation [8]. As a 
result, the power industry has globally identified substantial future investments in 
transmission infrastructure. For example, companies in the US, have identified that 
approximately $40 billion in transmission investment will be required by 2021 in order 
to facilitate the integration of renewable energy [25]. For similar reasons, the European 
Commission in 2010 allocated €910 million for 12 electricity interconnection projects as 
part of its European Economic Recovery Plan [7]. Other reports such as [26, 27] estimate 
that transmission investment cost of around €182 billion will be required in Europe by 
2050 in order to support renewable integration.  
2.3 Evolution on security standards 
The wide decarbonisation of power systems is likely to continue to cause large 
investments in transmission infrastructure, unless the traditional rules to security are 
carefully reviewed. However, most electricity networks are currently operated based on 
the traditional deterministic security standards [8]. This statement applies to countries 
such as France, Spain, Ireland, Belgium, Japan and United Kingdom, despite all adverse 
consequences associated with the conventional security principles.  
Nevertheless, some jurisdictions have taken the lead on updating the security rules that 
govern most power systems today. The main concern resides in the levels of network 
redundancy that these standards demand, and for that reason Sweden has directly 
relaxed their security standards from N-2 to N-1 [8].Yet, changes of security standards 
are not limited to reducing the order of outages against which the power system is 
secure, but they also incorporate the use of corrective security principles. This is the case 
in North America where the North American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) 
instructs jurisdictions in the US and Canada to apply deterministic security standards 
but the use of corrective actions is explicitly allowed [28]. Some jurisdictions under 
NERC, such as British Columbia Transmission Corporation (BCTC) or the California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO), combine deterministic and probabilistic 
methods for operating and designing their electricity networks [10]. 
In the BCTC approach to security there is no conflict between deterministic and 
probabilistic approaches. The BCTC system planning process includes societal, 
environmental, technical and economical assessments while probabilistic reliability 
evaluation is a part of the whole assessment process. System criteria violations are 
identified by deterministic methods then probabilistic methods are used to select the 
best alternative solution, including corrective security [29]. The NERC transmission 
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performance standards thus allow SPS to be applied in order to ensure that the 
performance requirements are met for credible contingencies. However if SPS are 
required to ensure acceptable system performance under these conditions, they must 
meet stringent reliability requirements [28].  
CAISO applies probabilistic methods to particular single contingency events making use 
of the fact that the NERC criteria allow for load disconnections at radially-fed substations. 
In many cases, this has deferred construction of an additional second circuit when it 
would have been built based on simple deterministic rule-of-thumb criteria (e.g., add a 
second source when load exceeds 100 MW). On the other hand, if the probability and 
economic consequences of a substation outage are found to be severe enough, 
construction of a second transmission source into the substation may in fact be advanced 
under this standard. In at least one case the methodology was also used to justify 
construction of a third transmission source to a substation already supplied by two 
radial circuits because it was determined that the probability and economic consequence 
of the double-contingency event were severe enough to justify a third circuit [29]. 
A few jurisdictions outside North America such as New Zealand, Victoria (Australia), 
Brazil and Chile are also innovating in security solutions. For example, The Victorian 
Energy Networks Corporation (VERCON) uses a two-step hybrid approach in developing 
transmission plans. The first step involves a deterministic analysis of the coming ten-
year period. This analysis is used to identify points on the shared transmission network 
where there might be deterministic reliability criteria violations. The second step uses 
probabilistic methods to further evaluate the system and refine proposed solutions to 
the criteria violations during the coming five-year period. In the first five years of the 
planning horizon, probabilistic planning methods are applied to alternative solutions to 
the criteria violations found in the first step [29]. The European Union has also shown a 
special interest to explore probabilistic security standards, mainly to facilitate a cost 
effective integration of new renewable energy resources (e.g. [30]). 
In Chile, the security standards are very pioneering since network investments are only 
justified when their associated improvements in the expected costs of unsupplied 
demand are larger than the corresponding investment costs. This procedure involves 
assessing network outages considering their probability of occurrence and impacts in 
terms of demand curtailments at a Value of Lost Load (VoLL). Network investments are 
thus analysed in a full probabilistic fashion [8], where a key ingredient is the 
consideration of corrective security measures. Figure 3 shows the deployment of the 
security standards in Chile. 
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Figure 3: Security criteria of transmission network in Chile [8] 
The Chilean power system is divided in different security zones. In zones categorised as 
N or N-0, a single network fault results in controlled volumes of demand shedding. N-1r 
zones can accept network overloads after a single outage during the first 15 minutes, 
when generation is re-dispatched in order to alleviate overloading of the affected 
transmission lines. Other zones named N-1 can withstand single outages without 
executing corrective actions.  
2.3.1 Conclusions 
It is evident that the levels of redundancy demanded by traditional security standards 
can hardly be maintained. Consequently, transmission security standards are evolving 
to considering corrective security actions in order to achieve efficient power system 
operation and design. Some jurisdictions in North America, where NERC reliability 
standards apply, have included corrective security measures combined with 
probabilistic methods in order to deliver deterministic security requirements. Similar 
security principles have been applied in other countries such as Brazil, New Zealand or 
Australia. Chile goes a step forward and applies a full probabilistic cost-benefit analysis 
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to operate and design its power system. This implies that the cost of new investment 
must be always justified with a benchmark on the unexpected unreliability costs in terms 
of expected unsupplied demand. 
2.4 System protection schemes  
As seen in previous sections, factors such as the significant growth in demand, the 
evolving of market conditions and the advent of renewable generation resources have 
highlighted the convenience of considering the use of corrective security. The so-called 
SPS/SIPS/RAS (System Protection Scheme/System Integrity Protection 
Scheme/Remedial Action Scheme) are systems designed to sense abnormal system 
conditions, typically contingency-related, and initiate pre-planned, corrective actions to 
mitigate the consequence of the abnormal condition and provide acceptable system 
performance [10]. Therefore, such systems are suitable to support operational 
corrective security measures. 
SPS actions typically include changes in load, generation, or system configuration. SPS 
are deployed to protect the integrity of the power system or strategic parts of it, as 
opposed to unit protection that is dedicated to protect a specific power system element 
(e.g. transmission lines, transformers, etc.)[11]. Often, these systems have been 
conceived to provide extra security against high order outage events, or during planned 
outage network outage conditions due to maintenance, as in the Anglo Scottish boundary 
[31]. A term that is often used to describe SPS is “safety net”, which indicates that a 
scheme is used to prevent uncontrollable blackouts or cascading outages under very 
severe or unusual multiple contingencies [28]. As SPS actions rely on ICT infrastructure, 
the development of new protocols such as the IEC. 61850 protocol [32] has notably 
facilitated further SPS deployment and control in large-scale networks. The Power 
Systems Engineering Research Centre (PSERC) presents results from three surveys on 
the numbers of SPS utilisation over the last 20 years, which indicates significant growing 
reliance on such systems[10]. These are shown in Table 1. 
1989 Survey 1996 Survey 2009 Survey 
Respondents Schemes Respondents Schemes Respondents Schemes 
18 93 49 111 110 958 
Table 1: SPS survey studies 
Today SPS offer an incontestable opportunity to develop sophisticated power system 
operational rules based on corrective security actions, minimising the need for pre-
30 
constraining the network, thereby deferring large investments on primary infrastructure 
in planning timescales. SPS are directly linked to the provision of corrective security and 
can facilitate efficient power system operation and design strategies. It is therefore not 
surprising that jurisdictions such as BCTC, Hydro-Quebec or Chile formally include such 
systems in their security standards.  
2.4.1 General structure and types 
Fig. 4 shows the general structure of a system protection scheme.  
 
Figure 4: General structure of a system protection scheme [10] 
SPS read information related to the occurrence of disturbances in the power system, 
make decisions based on such input and execute the corresponding corrective actions 
back into the power system.  
Measurement inputs can be arming levels and thresholds, power system frequency and 
voltage values, breaker status, control signals from HVDC and SVC converters among 
others. SPS can be classified as response-based or event-based. Response-based SPS act 
in response to measured electric variables such as voltage, frequency or current. These 
systems react indirectly to disturbances when such measurements values reach the 
trigger values. The two most common response-based SPS are under-frequency load 
shedding and under-voltage load shedding [10]. Event-based SPS are designed to directly 
operate upon the recognition of a particular combination of events such as transmission 
line contingencies. One of the most common event-based SPS is the Generation Rejection 
Scheme (GRS), also known as intertripping scheme, which trips one or more generating 
units upon activation [9]. The practice of generator tripping is used on all kinds of units 
but especially on hydro and wind generating units. This is because they are quite rugged 
compared to thermal units and the risk of damage to the unit from a sudden trip is not 
as great. Generation rejection is normally used in contingency states to rapidly reduce 
power transfers on certain parts of a transmission system and thus solve overload or 
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stability problems. Generation trips create a temporal imbalance between generation 
and demand. It is a common practice that generation and demand are rebalanced by 
increasing the output of online generators units in high demand areas, to offset the 
power previously tripped (i.e. spinning reserve). However, event-based SPS are not 
limited to rejecting generators, and there are other types such as load rejection, system 
separation or turbine valve control among others. As extensively explained in a Task 
Force on defence plan against extreme contingencies by the International Council of 
Large Electricity Systems (CIGRE) [9], the selection of the most appropriate type of 
action is generally based on the type of vulnerability to counter.  
SPS can be designed based on a centralised or distributed architecture. In a centralised 
architecture, the information from remote stations is gathered in a central location 
where the decision-making process is implemented, whereas in a distributed design the 
controllers take independent decisions at different locations. The operating times of an 
SPS depend on the phenomena to cope with and its architecture. As illustrated in Fig, 5, 
SPS that intend to provide very low latency fast actions upon very critical local 
phenomena (e.g. loss of synchronism) may reside in stand-alone intelligent electronic 
devices (IED) or communicate decisions and actions through extremely fast 
communication networks. On the other hand, systems that involve actions on a wider 
area (e.g. angular instability) normally have larger operating times because of longer 
communication delays. When operating times are not very critical (in the range of 
minutes), SPS can be part of Energy Management System (EMG) of a control centre, 
enjoying a view of the whole system to detect longer term phenomena (e.g. long term 
thermal rating). 
 
Figure 5: Relationship between SPS residency and operating times [33] 
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2.4.2 Internal composition 
The internal composition of an SPS typically includes [10]: 
 Sensors that measure power system variables such as current, voltage or power 
flows. They are typically included in relays and breaker/switch status detectors. 
Relays may be of current, voltage, power, frequency, rate of change of each of 
these, out-of-step, generator power output level, line loading power level, etc.  
 Breakers which are the tripping equipment that interrupt the current flow in 
circuits. 
 Communication equipment that communicates the condition of a power 
system from the sensors to the logic solver, and the logic solver output finally to 
the actuating elements. Traditional communications for protection have been 
circuit-based, characterised by point-to-point deliveries of messages [34]. 
However, modern SPS make use of packet-based protocols such as GOOSE IEC 
61850 [10]. 
 Logic solver and logic solver software that performs one or more logic 
functions used to execute the SPS application logic and initiate corrective actions. 
It is normally a programmable electronic (PE) system such as a microprocessor 
[10] , micro-controller, programmable logic controller (PLC), or application-
specific integrated circuit (ASIC).  
 Auxiliary equipment such as power supplies and monitoring devices. 
2.4.3 International experiences on the use of system protection 
schemes 
This section provides a brief summary on international SPS which have been deployed 
to better operate and design power systems.  
2.4.3.1 BC Hydro 
BC Hydro operates its power system on a sophisticated SPS infrastructure which has 
proved to increase both the levels of utilisation and the reliability of the network. The 
arming of SPS is performed automatically at the transient stability assessment function 
(TSA) included in the energy management system (EMS) at the control centre [33, 34]. 
SPS arming is done either immediately after any network configuration change or at 
systematic intervals of 4 minutes. The power system limits are accordingly updated 
automatically at regular intervals. Figure 6 shows a portion of the TSA display showing 
a snapshot of the generation shedding pattern per contingency. 
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Figure 6: A portion of TSA Display showing real time generation shedding arming 
pattern. Based on [10].  
 
Figure 7: BC Hydro central SPS arming system [10] 
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Figure 7 shows the patching matrix of each SPS, which serves as the interface between 
inputs (multiple contingencies) and the outputs (SPS actions such as generator shedding, 
line tripping, shunt switching etc.) to improve transient, voltage or thermal stability. 
2.4.3.2 Hydro-Quebec 
Hydro-Québec’s power system is one of the most extensive and complex in North 
America and its main infrastructure, made up of more than 11,000 km of 735-kV lines, 
largely relies on a system-wide protection system. Shunt compensation, series 
compensation and automatic corrective actions form part of this system to maximise the 
use of the network as well as its reliability and security. All the automatic measures that 
ensure preserving the Hydro-Québec system, during extreme contingencies are part of 
an overreaching defence plan, which was fully operational in 1998. It is the ultimate 
protection against the total collapse of Hydro-Québec’s system. It is entirely automatic 
and relies mainly on [9]: 
 An under-frequency load-shedding system installed in about 150 distribution 
substations which can access over 13,000 MW of load; 
 Automatic shunt reactor systems (called MAIS [2-3]) installed in twenty-two 
735-kV substations which control about 15,000 MVAR; 
 An SPS involving generation rejection, load shedding and remote reactor tripping 
at 735-kV. Called RPTC [2-2] this SPS is designed to detect multiple line losses or 
series compensated capacitor bank tripping in 15 strategic 735-kV substations; 
 An undervoltage load-shedding system able to shed 1500 MW of load, mainly 
found in 735-kV substations in the Montreal area. 
It is worth noticing that the total cost of this complex system is less than 1% of the total 
transmission system assets [9]. One of the main problems encountered in developing 
such a scheme is to ensure the coordination of the various measures used. The Hydro-
Quebec system-wide protection system does not require outside coordination, as each 
sub-system of the defence plan is independent and is able to act as a function of its own 
contingencies; yet the combination of actions makes it possible to preserve the stability 
of the power system.  
2.4.3.3 Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) 
BPA (Bonneville Power Administration) have installed SPS to protect their 500KV lines. 
When there is a line outage, a transfer trip signal is sent to the control centre, from where 
control signals are sent to power plants and substations [37]. These schemes are 
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designed to be highly redundant using two out of three voting schemes. Moreover, the 
overall reliability is improved as SPS send information to two independent control 
rooms. Generation rejection schemes can trip a maximum amount of generation tripping 
of 2700MW, in order to avoid frequency instability [38]. BPA co-ordinates with Pacific 
Northwest and California to maintain wider system integrity.  
2.4.3.4 Southern California Edison (SCE) 
Due to aggressive renewable generation expansion and demand growth, Southern 
California Edison (SCE) is facing rapid growth of SPS in its footprint [8]. The number of 
SPS deployed in this power system has raised extra operational complexity. As a result, 
SCE is introducing a centralized remedial action scheme (C-RAS) to coordinate the 
operation amongst all SPS. The Southern California Edison uses the modern 
communication protocol IEC 61850 GOOSE (Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event) 
[15] to perform all functionalities, beginning from the detection of events at remote 
locations, transmitting the alarm signal over WAN for about 460 miles, then processing 
it and deciding suitable control actions, and finally executing the control with the help of 
SPS IEDs at the remote locations. The usage of such a digital communication technology 
ensures the whole process takes place within 50 milliseconds, which is very fast 
compared to traditional methods of transmitting control messages. 
2.4.3.5 Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) 
The Midwest independent system operator (MISO) in the U.S.A has about 15 SPS 
installed in its network area. The status of SPS is monitored and send to the control room 
personnel through ICCP (Inter Control Centre Protocol) points, who take decisions on 
real-time information displayed on the EMS [30]. The RTCA (Real-time Contingency 
Analysis) tool includes the operation of most of the SPS in its analysis. This tool [31] can 
be either scheduled to run at uniform intervals (e.g. every 5 minutes) or triggered based 
on a contingency event or by an operator. 
2.4.4 SPS failures  
SPS significantly improve system response following a contingency, and thus can 
increase the levels of utilisation and reliability of electricity networks. However, the 
failure of SPS to accurately detect the defined conditions, or to carry out the required 
pre-planned corrective actions, can lead to serious and costly consequences in the form 
of cascading failures. This section will focus on the analysis of SPS failure modes and its 
consequences in power system operation.   
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2.4.4.1 Malfunction types  
System protection schemes are normally designed with redundant components to be 
highly reliable. SPS, however, are not free from malfunctions and can suffer from two 
different types of misoperations [15]: 
 Dependability-based misoperation refers to the absence of SPS operation 
when intended. Dependability is a component of reliability and is the measure of 
a device’s certainty to operate when required. 
 Security-based misoperation occurs when an SPS operates when it is not 
intended to do so. Security is a component of reliability and is the measure of a 
device’s certainty not to operate inadvertenlty. 
Misoperations related to protection system dependability typically receive the most 
attention in protection system design and system studies, because failure of a protection 
system to operate when required may have significant consequences [35]. Note that SPS 
are intended to work in very stress conditions of the power system, typically after a 
contingency in the transmission network occurs.  
SPS malfunctions are caused by reasons of different nature. Hardware failures happen 
when some physical stress exceeds the capability of one or more installed components. 
Faulty design logic may take place as a consequence of deficient study during the design 
stage. Software failures result from errors in vendor written and user written embedded 
software. Human errors can be classified according to whether they are associated with 
construction, operation, or maintenance [10]. Other failure modes include failure to arm 
(any failure of an SPS to arm itself for system conditions that are intended to result in the 
SPS being armed), unnecessary arming (any arming of a SPS that occurs without the 
occurrence of the intended arming system condition(s)), and failure to reset (any failure 
of a SPS to reset following a return of normal system conditions if that is the design 
intent)[10]. 
The fundamental design requirements[15] for an SPS can be summarised as: 
 Dependability: certainty that the SPS will operate correctly when required. 
 Security: certainty that the SPS will not operate when not required (does not 
apply the emergency control actions when there is no disturbance in the power 
system). 
 Selectivity: ability to select the correct and minimum amount of actions to 
perform the intended function. 
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 Robustness: ability of the SPS to provide dependability, security and selectivity 
over the full range of the expected steady state and dynamic system conditions. 
2.4.4.2 Review of power system disturbances due to SPS malfunctions 
The importance of SPS malfunctioning is confirmed in a survey by IEEE-CIGRE [36] 
which suggests that the cost of SPS failure can be very high, as most of the respondents 
selected the highest cost category when asked to estimate the cost of an operational 
failure of SPS. Panteli [15] reviews the NERC System Disturbance Reports from 1986 – 
2009 [37] and identifies 26 SPS malfunctions including dependency-based, security-
based and delayed operations. The majority of these are security-based misoperations, 
whilst four and one event led to dependency-based misoperations and delayed operation 
respectively. The main causes of SPS misoperations can be separated in two main 
categories: human errors (9 cases, 35%) and ICT failures (11 cases, 42%). It is also 
worth-noting that eleven of these cases (42%) resulted in customer disconnection.  
The Power Systems Engineering research Centre (PSERC) presents some detailed 
examples of disturbances due to SPS malfunctions [10] from 1986-1995 [13, 37], 
indicating that of the 30 cases, 21 were reported as successful operation of SPS, while 9 
involved operational failures. The reasons for these failure cases include flaw in logic 
design, software failure, hardware failure, incorrect setting, and inadvertent failure to 
arm. In particular, the following events are summarised below:  
 WSCC - Northeast/Southeast Separation Scheme - April 4, 1988: 
o Scheme: System separation. 
o Reason: Flaw in design (the scheme was susceptible to misoperation due 
to short bursts of communications circuit noise). 
o Consequence: 1902 MW of generation was lost and 253 MW of load was 
interrupted. 
o Failure type Faulty design logic. 
 NPCC - Hydro-Québec - April 18-19, 1988: 
o Scheme: Load rejection. 
o Reason: Hardware failure. 
o Consequence: System wide blackout. 
o Failure type: Hardware failure. 
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 NPCC - Hydro-Québec - November 15, 1988: 
o Scheme: Load rejection. 
o Reason: Hardware failure. 
o Consequence: 3950 MW of load was interrupted. 
o Failure type: Hardware failure. 
 WSCC-British Columbia Hydro/TransAlta Separation - January 7, 1990: 
o Scheme: Controlled opening of lines. 
o Reason: Not armed (inadvertently). 
o Consequence: It caused 230 kV Cranbrook-Nelway circuit to trip on the 
subsequent swing and resulted in separation (islanding) of the eastern 
part of the BCHA/TAUC system from the Interconnection. 
o Failure type: Human error. 
 WSCC-Garrison - Taft 500 kV No.1 and 2 outages - January 8, 1990: 
o Scheme: Var Compensation (trip two 500 kV bus reactors). 
o Reason: Flaw in the logic design. 
o Consequence: It caused the unnecessary dropping of generation at 
Hauser, Morony, and Ryan (119 MW) as well as the loss of customer load 
(25 MW) in Helena. 
o Failure type: Faulty design logic. 
 WSCC-SE Idaho/SW Wyoming Outage - September 12, 1991: 
o Scheme: Generator rejection. 
o Reason: Hardware failure (telemetry that automatically arms this scheme 
was out of calibration). 
o Consequence: It caused the loss of a second 345 kV line which led to 
further loss of transmission by overload and out of step conditions. 
o Failure type: Hardware failure. 
 WSCC-Pacific AC Intertie Separation - November 17, 1991: 
o Scheme: System separation. 
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o Reason: Software failure in PG&E SPS programmable logic controller 
caused the delay in initiating remedial actions (also maybe hardware 
failure). 
o Consequence: Fail to separate WSCC system into two islands, but did not 
produce any severe problems (it was expected that there would be load 
lost and out of-step conditions). 
o Failure type: Software failure and/or hardware failure. 
 WSCC-Minnesota - Wisconsin Interface 69 kV conductor burn down - October 13, 
1992: 
o Scheme: Controlled opening of lines. 
o Reason: Incorrect setting. 
o Consequence: Two 69 kV lines in the Northern States Power and 
Dairyland Power Cooperative service burned open causing the lines to 
fall to ground and trip out. 
o Failure type: Human error. 
 MAPP & MAIN - Eastern MAPP-Western MAIN Interface Separation -November 
6, 1997: 
o Scheme: Controlled opening of lines. 
o Reason: Flaw in design (opened the circuit at an ampere level below its 
setting, possibly due to an unbalanced load.). 
o Consequence: Resulted in low voltages in the south-western Wisconsin, 
eastern Iowa and western Illinois (Cordova), heavy loading of parallel, 
lower voltage transmission systems, and a large phase angle across the 
open tie at Arpin. 
o Failure type: Faulty design logic. 
2.4.4.3 Features of blackouts 
Therefore some historical SPS malfunctions have caused power supply disruptions. This 
section aims to provide an insight into the main nature and features of historical 
blackouts. McCalley and Dobson [38] perform an extensive analysis of the blackouts 




Figure 8: Blackout Impact [38] 
 
Figure 9: Nature of Blackout [38] 
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As summarised in Figure 8, blackouts are normally associated with consumer 
disconnections that may last for a few hours, or even days, and may be related to a wide 
range of large economic costs (from $2.5 million up to $1 billion). 
In Figure 9, it is possible to note different collapse times (time when the sequence of 
events finish from the initial contingency event) associated with blackouts, ranging from 
a few seconds up to 14 hours. Likewise, the number of successive events involved in the 
sequence varies from a few to many. 
Therefore, the nature of blackouts with respect to time can be classified as either fast 
(less than three minutes) or slow. As for the blackouts that are categorised as ‘slow’, 
there is always a cascading outage sequence involved. There are four typical stages of 
such cascading sequences [38]: 
1. Initiating contingency 
2. Steady-state progression (slow succession) where: 
o The system becomes stressed with heavy loading on lines, transformers 
and generators. 
o Successive events occur, typically the trip of other components with 
fairly large inter-event time intervals. 
3. Transient progression (fast succession) where: 
o System goes under-frequency and/or under-voltage; 
o Large number of components begins tripping quickly. 
4. Uncontrolled islanding and blackout 
Importantly, the events that occur in stage two are typically dependent events in that 
their occurrence depends on the occurrence of one or more earlier events. It is noted that 
the probability of occurrence of successive events increases dramatically following the 
occurrence of an initiating contingency. 
2.4.5 Main conclusions 
System Protection Schemes (SPS) have shown to be the key ingredient to enhance the 
utilisation of the electricity networks, as they provide a rapid response upon the 
occurrence of contingencies. However, they suffer from occasional malfunctions and 
their consequences are associated with cascading outages, as in Hydro-Québec in 1988, 
when a hardware failure in the SPS caused a total system-wide blackout. SPS present 
different failure modes that result in undesirable scheme operations (security-based 
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misoperation) or failures to operate (dependability-based misoperation). Historically, 
the majority of SPS malfunctions have been security-based misoperations. Yet, 
dependability-based misoperations typically receive more attention in protection 
system design and system studies, as they occur when the power system is in stressed 
conditions (i.e. after a contingency triggers the SPS). Blackouts are normally associated 
with consumer disconnections that may last for a few hours, or even days, and may be 
related to a wide range of large economic costs. Moreover, they have associated different 
collapse times (i.e. time when the sequence of events finish), ranging from a few seconds 
up to 14 hours, and the number of dependent events (e.g. tripping of transmission lines) 
involved in the sequence may vary from a few to many. 
 
 3 POWER SYSTEM OPERATION WITH 
UNRELIABLE SYSTEM PROTECTION 
SCHEMES  
The previous chapter has shown the context of this thesis in detail, thereby showing 
benefits and risks associated with the operation of System Protection Schemes (SPS). It 
is therefore relevant to develop decision-making methods that quantify and manage 
sources of operational risk before SPS can be extensively relied on. In operational 
timescales, the objective of the system operator is to minimise the sum of the different 
costs involved in power system operation (e.g. generation costs, reserve availability fees, 
etc.) plus the value of the expected load non served (i.e. the risk.) 
In this light, this chapter first presents a literature review of mathematical methods and 
models related to the scope of this thesis, including both the fields of security constraint 
optimal power flow (SCOPF) and risk assessment of power system operation. The former 
is indispensable as it determines optimal operation within security constraints. The 
latter is also essential in order to quantify risks caused by increasing reliance on SPS. The 
literature review will allow us to describe the technical challenges associated with the 
problem of optimally operating power systems with unreliable SPS operation and 
cascading outages, which is the focus of this thesis. 
Secondly, this chapter presents the first contributions of this thesis. The conceptual 
framework and model conventions that will be used in further chapters are introduced. 
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The problem statement of operating power systems with unreliable SPS is introduced. 
The resulting problem is an optimisation characterised by three-phases: steady-state 
operation, SPS action and response and impact assessment. The general modelling 
framework proposed in this thesis is then described in different subsections. This 
includes modelling of conventional power system components, stochastic SPS failures 
and response, and impact assessment including cascading outages. 
3.1 Review of related mathematical methods and models  
3.1.1 Security constrained optimal power flow 
The security constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF) is an optimal power flow that 
takes into account constraints arising from the operation of the power system under a 
set of postulated contingencies. It is therefore the codification of the security standards 
into a decision-making model. Under the traditional rules to security, the SCOPF 
determines the level of redundant infrastructure required to cope with a set of credible 
contingencies (e.g. N-2), whilst this is accomplished at the minimum cost [17].  
In accordance with the deterministic security standards, conventional SCOPF models 
have been essential tools for system operators around the world for many years. 
However, there are needs not only to reformulate the essential foundation of power 
system security but also to develop a generation of innovative operational tools. A 
number of issues make the new SCOPF much more challenging: the significantly larger 
size and complexity of the problem, the need to handle more discrete variables 
describing control actions and the variety of corrective control strategies in post-
contingency states [17].  
Initial research in this field included the use of corrective control within the conventional 
formulation of SCOPF. The classical SCOPF formulation becomes a two-stage decision 
making problem. In the first stage, the decisions (i.e. preventive controls) are applied on 
a fully known operating state, and have a direct effect on the operational cost function. 
The second stage decisions correspond to corrective actions which are executed upon 
the occurrence of contingencies. These actions are typically modelled as “zero cost” 
decisions considering that they have to be activated only rarely. The set of “second 
stages” is finite and is assumed known a priori (e.g. all single and double faults).  
It is important to note that under this formulation the optimisation continue being purely 
deterministic, presenting the following drawbacks [17]: 
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 contingencies have no probability associated which disregards their individual 
likelihood of occurrence 
 it optimises only the cost of pre-contingency state controls, disregarding the 
costs of post-contingency corrective actions, assuming thus that the likelihood of 
their use is small and that in the long run their cost will remain negligible 
 it does not model the social and economic cost of blackouts that may result from 
the failure of corrective actions.  
Because of the new complexities of power systems, static and equally weighted 
contingency lists of deterministic security standards are no longer appropriate to model 
uncertainty, and such lists should become dynamic to exploit all the information 
available at the moment of taking decisions. In other words, the set of post-contingency 
scenarios and the weight given to each of these scenarios should be optimised at the first-
stage of the decision making process. In connection with this, some works [8] claim that 
this formulation does not completely cover the needs encountered in today’s operation 
and operational planning situations. According to Capitanescu et al. [17], in further 
developments a larger (in theory uncountable) contingency set should be considered to 
model the uncertainty between successive decision stages. It is also very likely that a 
two-stage reduction of the optimisation problem will no longer be sufficient. Instead, a 
multi-stage modelling framework could be required in which the couplings between 
decisions and uncertainties induced by adverse scenarios over longer time horizons 
could be modelled better. Several researches have introduced stochastic concepts into 
the SCOPF problem [3, 4, 40], which have resulted in novel operational methods based 
on multistage stochastic programming. The main innovation resides in the incorporation 
of the expected costs of corrective security in the objective function, thus defining a 
trade-off between preventive and corrective security characterised by:  
 relying on probabilities of disturbance occurrence which often depend on the 
circumstances (e.g. adverse weather conditions or terrorist threat) 
 a difficulty to estimate of the cost of corrective actions, especially in severe cases 
(e.g. cascading thermal overloads, voltage intability scenarios) 
 the need of more than two stages to cover the whole spectrum of uncertainties 
At this point further research on the algorithmic side is needed, in particular to discretise 
the set of uncertain scenarios in order to build tractable approximations of the mother 
problem [17]. Moreno et al. [4, 6]  propose a full probabilistic cost-benefit framework for 
the development of future efficient operating and design strategies and network security 
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standards considering corrective security. The authors optimally balance the costs of 
network constraints with various operational measures composed of preventive and 
corrective control actions, including expected unsupplied demand. The optimal network 
capacity released to network users in the operational timescales is determined 
depending on system parameters such as different weather conditions and wind 
penetration scenarios, and considering potential outages in the network. Figure 10 
illustrates the ‘O+X’ problem that is composed of two cost terms. First, the problem 
includes the costs ‘O’ which are the operating costs from both the expected use of 
corrective control and the constraint costs (see section 2.1). Secondly, it considers the 
cost ‘X’ which denotes the risk in terms of expected unsupplied demand. Note that there 
are increasing (e.g. expected unsupplied demand, corrective control and losses) and 
decreasing costs (e.g. constraint costs) associated with further levels of network 
utilisation. Under a pure cost-benefit framework, the available capacity of the network 
in operational timescales should be increased up to the point that the cost associated 
with such levels of utilisation exceeds the benefits.  
 
Figure 10: Balance to determine optimum transfer in a single transmission link [8]  
Figure 11 illustrates the ‘T+O+X’ problem which considers optimal levels of network 
infrastructure investment in planning timescales. The extra cost term ‘T’ is attributable 
to the investment and maintenance in the network (e.g. wires, transformers, etc.). Note 
that further investments reduce the cost of constraints, the expected unsupplied 
demand, the expected use of corrective control and the losses, at the expense of 
increasing the investment costs and its maintenance associated. This problem states that 
network investments should continue up to the point that the cost associated with such 
investments exceeds the benefits [8, 41, 42]. 
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Figure 11:  Balance to determine optimum transmission investment in a single 
transmission link [8] 
The authors presented an initial investigation of the impacts from SPS malfunctions, yet 
their analysis was restricted to a crude model of SPS failures and its effects. Accordingly, 
it does not model the social and economic cost of blackouts (e.g. Value of Lost Load of 
£30000/MWh) that may result from failures of corrective actions. However, this work 
anticipates important benefits from the use of system protection schemes, especially 
under scenarios of high wind penetration. Hug [43] continues to explore the trade-offs 
between generation cost and operational risks as opposed to formulating a traditional 
security constrained economic dispatch, but disregards SPS malfunction scenarios.  
3.1.2 Risk assessment of power system operation considering 
unreliable SPS 
The question whether ignoring sources of risk associated with SPS is acceptable today 
remains open [17]. In general terms, risk involves an exposure to a chance of injury or 
loss, being defined as a combination of probability (chance or uncertainty) and cost 
(injury or loss). Therefore, a risk assessment generally involves both the characterization 
of uncertainties associated with a problem and the estimation of the costs associated 
with deleterious outcomes. 
𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 = ∫ 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 × 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒄𝒕
𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔
 
In the context of unreliable SPS operation, it involves the characterisation of operational 
SPS uncertainties (e.g. SPS failure modes) and their impacts in the power system (e.g. 
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loss of load). The next subsection is intended to review existing literature on risk 
assessment related to SPS. After that, it is presented another subsection reviewing works 
with the focus on the characterisation of cascading outages, which can result as a direct 
consequence of SPS malfunction. 
3.1.2.1 SPS modelling 
Anderson and LeRevere [36] conducted a survey to determine the experience with 
special protection schemes (SPS) regarding their reliability performance. Questions 
were directed to the reliability criteria and analytical methods used at the design stage. 
The majority of the respondents admitted that they did not use any reliability models to 
ensure reliable SPS actions: the operational rules for SPS have historically been 
determined based on deterministic techniques combined with expert judgement [10].  
In recent years, there have been significant efforts to develop robust rules for SPS 
operation based on a sensible coverage of operating conditions and events. Some of the 
jurisdictions leading the use of corrective security have increasingly used probabilistic 
analysis to address uncertainties in operating conditions (e.g. demand levels, outages, 
variable generation, etc.). Hydro-Quebec [44, 45] has performed simulations based on 
historical snapshots and made use of techniques such as data mining and combinatorial 
optimisation to optimise the settings of generation and load shedding protection 
systems. Similarly, Hsiao et al.[46], and Wen-Ta and Chao-Rong [47] perform simulations 
under different operating conditions to optimise SPS settings in the Taiwan power 
system. Another example is BC Hydro [48] which has implemented an arming scheme 
for multiple SPS such as generation intertripping using off-line Monte Carlo simulations. 
These works intend to optimise SPS settings by considering a broader range of possible 
operating scenarios. However, dependable SPS operation has commonly been assumed 
for these studies.  
Against this background, The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 
and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) are currently developing 
standards and policies [49, 50] to provide guidelines for effective review of SPS and its 
fundamentals related to reliability (e.g. SPS design, maintenance schedule and 
performance history). The research community has also proposed and applied a number 
of probabilistic techniques to perform SPS risk assessment studies, as summarised in the 
next paragraphs. 
As identified by Southern California Edison and Hydro-Quebec (see chapter 2), installing 
SPS for a large number of contingencies augment the complexity and the installation 
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costs of such systems. In this context, Hsiao et al. [51] developed a risk-based 
contingency selection method for SPS in order to maintain the cost, complexity and 
reliability at an acceptable level. This method takes into account the uncertainty of 
contingency occurrence and their impact in order to provide a set of contingency 
candidates for SPS implementation. This method reduces the number of SPS in service, 
which consequently reduces the probability of SPS malfunctioning. 
McCalley and Fu [13] recognised the risks from the increased reliance on SPS and 
discussed the importance of developing systematic and comprehensive reliability 
frameworks to account for it. Several works have elaborated reliability assessment 
methods to SPS based on fault tree analysis (FTA), failure mode and effect analysis 
(FMEA), network modelling, Markov modelling and Monte Carlo simulations (MCS). 
Most works have concluded that Markov modelling is suitable for SPS reliability studies 
because it can incorporate independent and common cause failures, partial and full 
repairs, maintenance, and diagnostic coverage. The main advantage of Markov modelling 
is its flexibility [13]. FTA can produce similar results as Markov modelling, and it may be 
simpler to model large and complex systems. MCS are more appropriate to model 
complex configurations and conditions of SPS, especially in cases for which it is 
complicated to provide an analytical solution. The main disadvantage of MCS is that a big 
number of samples may be needed to achieve high accuracy, which entails significant 
computational time [13, 15].  
Based on Markov modelling and failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), Weihui et al. 
[52] propose a generic procedure to perform risk-based assessments of SPS. Such 
method is applied to a generation rejection scheme (GRS) connected to a portion of the 
IEEE Reliability Test System [53]. Besides, the authors propose a technique for 
simplifying large Markov models, thereby reducing the complexity of the initial model. 
The optimal arming point of the scheme is estimated by comparing the risk with and 
without the SPS in operation. The authors conclude that the traditional way of 
determining the arming point using the worst-case scenario may increase the overall 
system risk. In view of this finding, Panteli and Crossley [15, 33] calculate optimal arming 
points that balance the risks stemming from a lack of dependability (failure to operate 
when required) and accidental activations. 
Tsun-Yu et al. [54] propose a risk informed design refinement of SPS and apply it on a 
local event-based SPS deployed by Taiwan Power Company. Fault tree analysis is used 
for this analysis. Due to the uncertainty related to the reliability data used for the 
numerical illustration of the proposed method, uncertainty and sensitivity analyses are 
 50 
performed to determine the impact of the assumed data on the risk. Once the risk is 
estimated, different methods for enhancing SPS reliability are tested, such as using more 
reliable components and reducing the test interval. The same authors also argue that 
modelling based on reliability block diagrams (also known as network modelling) is an 
appropriate modelling technique to consider the reliability of system protection 
schemes, even though it may produce conservative results [55].  
3.1.2.1.1 Reliability block diagrams 
The reliability block diagrams technique represents SPS as a number of functional 
interconnected boxes, showing the effect of each box on the overall reliability of the 
scheme. A network model is drawn with boxes that represent the elements that comprise 
the scheme. Lines connect boxes to indicate operational dependencies. The resulting 
networks consist of components in series, in parallel, or in combination of 
configurations. A reliability network may be viewed as showing the “success paths”. If 
the viewer can find a path from left to right through the reliability network, those 
components are sufficient to allow the system to operate. The key step in the procedure 
of network reliability modelling is to convert from a physical system into a network 
model. Once the reliability network has been prepared, the rules of probability are used 
to evaluate success and failure probabilities [56].  
3.1.2.2 Cascading outages modelling 
SPS failures may have severe impacts which are often associated with a sequence of 
cascading outage events (see section 2.4.4). With this in mind, this section reviews works 
that have been mainly devoted to the cascading outage phenomena. The IEEE PES 
Computer and Analytical Methods Subcommittee (CAMS) Task Force on understanding, 
prediction, mitigation and restoration of cascading failures put together the methods and 
tools for evaluating the risk of blackouts as a result of cascading failures [57]. As specified 
in this review, “cascading outage risk assessment is the estimation of the risk associated 
with blackouts that could result from the range of all disturbances that could initiate a 
cascading outage”. The uncertainties are associated with three primary sources: (1) the 
initiating events, (2) the sequence of dependent events that could unfold as a result of 
the initiating events, and (3) the ultimate costs of a blackout with a known size.  
Several utilities in the U.S have already incorporated methods to address risks stemming 
from cascading outages. For example, Con Edison has developed an automated approach 
to predict cascading failures for anticipating the ability of the power system to withstand 
cascading caused by thermal overloads [58]. Another example is Idaho Power which has 
 51 
developed a methodology for ranking contingencies based on the size of the secure 
operating region, thereby identifying the most limiting contingencies. The effect of 
actions to mitigate violations such as thermal and voltage stability can be measured by 
monitoring the change on the size of the secure operating region [59]. New England 
performs steady-state and transient stability tests on severe contingencies to test 
vulnerability to major disturbances [60]. Similarly, in Europe there is a growing interest 
to comprehend the consequences of unplanned outage events beyond those stipulated 
by the classic deterministic security standard. For example, tools such as SICRE in Italy 
and Assess in France not only account for the initiating events of cascading failures but 
also the automatic corrective actions associated with them [57]. 
Cascading is a very complicated problem and there are necessarily compromises and 
limitations in assessing cascading risk. In general, there are two general approaches to 
study cascading outages, which can be complementary. A first group of methods 
attempts to capture the cascading phenomena based on detailed power system 
modelling and simulations. In this group we can find the cluster-based approach [61], 
enumeration of likely cascade paths [62], the uniform sampling approach [63-66] and 
the enumeration technique including operator intervention and automatic protection 
characteristics [67]. Overall, cascading outages modelling within this group include the 
essential features of tripping overloaded transmission lines in a domino effect. These 
methodologies use steady state AC or DC power flow calculations, rather than full 
dynamic simulations. However, based on studies of past cascading failures, it is 
noticeable that dynamic phenomena (voltage collapse, rotor instability, etc.) are 
important contributors to cascading failure [57]. A second collection of techniques seek 
to characterise cascading outages without a detailed system model. Amongst this group 
, we find historical blackout data [68-70] and high–level statistical models [71, 72]. This 
group typically ignores the detail of the cascading phenomena and describes the overall 
propagation of cascades based on historical observations. 
3.1.3 Main conclusions and challenges  
Previous research foresees huge benefits of corrective security, under the assumption 
that system protection schemes always perform as intended. This review indicates that 
the traditional security constraint power flow (SCOPF) models do not consider SPS 
failure modelling and its corresponding impact in terms of cascading failure outages. Yet, 
numerous authors [8, 17] emphasise that upcoming SCOPF will have to include such 
characteristics in order to cover the different range of SPS malfunction scenarios and 
their consequent impacts. 
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The literature shows many efforts to develop models for SPS risk assessments. The last 
studies in the field fairly reproduce SPS failure modes including dependability and 
security-based misoperations. However, such works are less precise to estimate impacts 
based on large range of outcomes that can result from an initial disruption. On the 
contrary, models aimed to characterised sequence of cascading failures have been 
restricted to modelling traditional protection system malfunctions [66, 73-75], mainly 
related to the detection of power system faults.  
It is generally accepted that this novel research area presents multiple characteristics 
that make it especially challenging [76]. One is the total number of possible system states, 
interactions and potential stages of the resulting optimisation problem (e.g. malfunction 
of SPS and cascading failure problem). Another is the dependency on accurate models 
and data. For example, if societal and political responses are taken into account, the 
apparent impact of large disturbances per MWh of unsupplied energy is larger than that 
of small disturbances (nonlinear impact on network users). In general the resulting 
optimisation problem is non-algebraic and admits no closed form solutions; therefore 
multiple stages may be required to embed complex impact assessments [17]. 
3.2 Problem formulation  
This thesis focuses on developing operational cost-benefit models and methods 
considering extreme cascading failures from dependability-based misoperations of SPS. 
In particular, it is analysed one of the most common types of SPS: the generation rejection 
scheme. In this section, the network operator’s problem of taking operational decisions 
considering unreliable SPS operation is defined, as it is used in this thesis.  
3.2.1 Three-phase problem statement 
The time frame for SPS actions is shorter than the time in which human operators can be 
expected to act; therefore it is a requisite that the network operator pre-programs SPS 
actions to respond automatically and appropriately when the system is triggered. 
Furthermore, in case of SPS malfunction cascading failure mechanisms may occur, 
resulting in large amounts of emergency load shedding. It is assumed that when this 
occurs the system operator does not enjoy sufficient time to take control actions, other 
than pre-programmed automatic settings (e.g. frequency response), and thus must rely 
on its anticipatory decisions to somewhat manage cascading failure risks.  
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As illustrated in Figure 12, the problem can be divided in three phases, each of these with 
different costs associated. The ultimate objective is to minimise the overall cost of 
operation by taking anticipatory operational decisions. 
 
Figure 12: Illustration of the problem 
It is possible to differentiate between two different types of anticipatory decisions that 
will directly affect the course of the power system model: 
 Dispatch decisions are related to how generating units are dispatched, and are 
directly linked to the concept of preventive security in which generators are 
dispatched out of their merit order to comply with security constraints (see 
chapter 2).  
 SPS decisions are related to the provision of corrective security to respond to 
sudden outages. In this group, the decisions that affect the SPS configurations and 
spinning reserve purchases (i.e. reserve capacity from online generating units or 
demand response) are considered. Even though corrective actions take place 
effectively in further phases, the system operator should make their provision at 
this stage.  
Let us name the base phase steady-state operation which takes place before any outage 

























has two types of costs associated. First are the generation costs (£/MW/h): the variable 
costs from burning fuel at the power plants to produce power, which are the main driver 
to considering corrective security [3], as seen in chapter 2. The second type of costs are 
the protection availability associated with the operational provision of security and 
include spinning reserve and SPS availability fees (£/MW/h). 
A second phase named SPS action and response occurs when the SPS automatically acts 
upon activation (e.g. in respond to a line outage), trips a number of selected generators 
and spinning reserve services are deployed to neutralise the resultant generation 
shortage (no decisions are left for the system operator at this phase, and everything is 
automated). The costs associated with this phase are the protection utilisation costs 
(£/MWh/event) that account for the execution of the SPS. These are the result of the SPS 
configuration decision by the operator. Note that it is assumed that there are not costs 
associated with the utilisation of frequency services. This phase is characterised by 
uncertainties, relating to the stochastic occurrence of faults and the potential for SPS 
malfunctions. 
Occasional SPS malfunctions may cause cascading failure events which may result in an 
impact to the power system users. We may refer to this phase as impact assessment. At 
this stage, the power system may repeatedly violates its technical limits (e.g. transient 
instability, thermal overloading, etc.), suffer from further failures in a domino effect and 
terminate divided into multiple islands, which is often associated with large amounts of 
generation and load disconnected from the network. In the worst case scenario SPS 
malfunctions can lead to a total blackout of the power system. It is noted that this thesis 
quantifies this impact exclusively in terms of Value of Lost Load (£/MWh); therefore it 
does not consider any cost associated with the disconnection of generators in the impact 
assessment stage. 
As indicated in section 3.3.1, the generation (𝐺) and the protection availability costs (𝑃𝑎) 
are deterministic (not dependent on probabilistic events such as contingencies). 
However, protection utilization costs and unsupplied demand costs are stochastic, as 
they are dependent on the occurrence of contingencies and the reliability of corrective 
actions. 
From a system perspective, the system operator objective is to minimise the total 
operating cost (£/hour) by appropriately setting the anticipatory decision variables 
before the steady-state phase occurs. Therefore, the objective function is 
 min 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐺 + 𝑃 + 𝑋     (1) 
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where 𝐺 denotes the generation costs, 𝑃 the protection costs and 𝑋 the operational risk 
associated with a certain operational time frame. Note that the objective function 
includes the risk term, and thus the optimal solutions may include a certain acceptance 
of risk. This is consistent with the latest cost-benefit frameworks for power system 
operation presented in section 3.1.1. 
3.3 Modelling conventions  
This section presents the modelling framework used in this thesis for solving the 
aforementioned system operator’s problem. The section is divided in subsections related 
to conventional power system components, SPS failure and response and impact 
assessment. Network flows are analysed using DC power flows and energy losses are 
ignored. Additional assumptions exclusively related to the model of a particular 
component will be discussed when explaining the specific modelling of the component. 
Power system component parameters are particular for each case study, and therefore 
will be provided in further chapters. The default SPS parameters are provided in this 
section as they are not specific of each case study. 
3.3.1 Conventional power system components 
3.3.1.1 Generators 
All generating units are assumed to be available, thus eligible to be dispatched by the 
system operator. Generator have linear cost functions and generation levels are 
constrained between the minimum and maximum generation technical limits. As the 
power system is simplified to DC power flow, generating units only provide active power. 
Two types of generators are considered:  
 Intertripping generators are part of an SPS and therefore can be selected to trip 
upon activation. As per the SPS model in section 3.3.2 of this chapter, if a 
generator has been selected for intertripping and receives a trip signal, its power 
output becomes zero (i.e. SPS action phase). Intertripping generators are 
qualified as must run, meaning that the system operator must dispatch them. The 
set of intertripping generators is denoted by 𝒢𝐼. 
 Response generators are generators that are not part of an SPS. They are 
eligible to provide frequency response services. If a generator has been allocated 
a certain frequency response capacity, it can provide up to this capacity. Unlike 
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intertripping generators, response generators may not be dispatched. The set of 
responsive generators is denoted by 𝒢𝑅. 
This thesis does not intend to model the dynamics of power systems to rebalance 
generation and demand. Instead, it is considered a unique post-SPS action balancing 
service here referred as frequency response. It is important to note that intertripping 
generators cannot provide frequency response services, even if they have not been 
selected for SPS actions for a particular operating time-frame. 
3.3.1.1.1 Notation 
Variables: 
𝑢𝑖 ∈ {0,1} is a binary variable that models the commitment of the generating unit 𝑖  
𝑔𝑖 is a continuous variable that models the output of a generating unit 𝑖 (MW/h) 
𝑟𝑖
𝑔
 is a continuous variable that denotes the frequency response allocated at a generating 
unit 𝑖 (MW) 
∆𝑔𝑖 is a continuous variable which models the response that generating unit 𝑖 provides 
(MW/event). Note that it is deployed during post-fault scenarios after the SPS operates 
Parameters: 
∝𝑖 is the constant production costs of generating unit 𝑖 (£/MWh) 
𝜋𝑎 is the availability fee for frequency response capacity (£/MW/h) 
𝜋𝑢 is the utilisation fee for disconnecting generation linked to the SPS (£/MW/event). 
Note that the utilisation fees are only paid in case of successful disconnection  
𝑔𝑖 denotes the minimum production level of generating unit 𝑖 (MW) 
𝑔𝑖  signifies the maximum production level of generating unit 𝑖 (MW) 
∆𝑔𝑖 is the maximum response (ramping limit) that can be provided by generating unit 𝑖 
(MW) 
3.3.1.2 Transmission lines  
Transmission lines have assigned a unique maximum power flow, for both pre and post-
contingency states. This may be a thermal limit, but it can also represent an effective limit 
derived from dynamical studies. They suffer from outages according to an average failure 
rate dependent on two types of weather conditions, fair and bad. As per the SPS model 
in section 3.3.2 of this chapter, transmission line contingencies are the initiating events 
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for corrective actions. They also play an important role in the cascading phase (see model 
in section 3.3.3). In particular, a transmission line trips when its power flow exceeds its 
maximum power flow. 
3.3.1.2.1 Notation 
Variables: 
𝑓𝑙 is a continuous variable that models the power flows on line 𝑙 (MW)  
Parameters: 
𝑓𝑙 is the power flow limit on line 𝑙 (MW)  
𝜆𝑐  is the failure rate of a transmission circuit (occurrences/year). Failures in 
transmission circuits are referred as contingencies. Note that contingencies can affect 
single or double circuits. Also note that it is dependent on weather conditions (i.e. fair or 
bad) 
3.3.1.3 Buses 
Buses have aggregated generation and demand. As specified in section 3.3.3, if a bus or a 
group of buses gets disconnected from the transmission network (there are no 
remaining connections to other buses), then the bus(es) become(s) an island. In such 
case, generation and demand is balanced in each island. Buses contain an aggregate 
demand response available for frequency response services for the studies performed in 
Chapter 6. 
Variables: 
𝛿𝑛 is a continuous variable that denotes the voltage angle at node 𝑛 (degrees)  
𝑟𝑛
𝑑  is a continuous variable which models the frequency response allocated at a node 𝑛 
(MW) 
∆𝑑𝑛 is a continuous variable which represents the amount of response deployed at node 
𝑛 (MW/event). Note that it is deployed during post-fault scenarios after the SPS operates 
∆𝐷𝑛 is a continuous variable that signifies the amount of load shed at node 𝑛 (MW). Load 
shed occurs in post-fault scenarios as a consequence of cascading overloads and 
islanding, as described in section 3.3.3. 
Parameters: 
𝐷𝑛 is the amount of demand at node 𝑛 (MW)  
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3.3.2 SPS reliability block diagram 
This thesis analyses generation rejection schemes based on a common functional model. 
The scheme is event-based and can be linked to a set of transmission line contingencies. 
The SPS is design to trip a number of pre-selected generators upon activation from any 
contingency on the set.  
 
Figure 13: Illustrative SPS example 
Based on the generic properties of such corrective systems [10, 31, 77], it is proposed a 
reliability block diagram illustrated in Figure 13. The components of the SPS are of the 
type: 
 Relay (R): connected to a particular line, it identifies when a fault occurs in its 
line and transmits a fault signal (fs) to a logic control 
 Logic control(LC): makes the remote trip decision of generation. It acts as an OR 
logic gate, and broadcasts a trip signal (ts) to the remote breakers upon receiving 
a fault signal from a  relay.  
 Communication channel(C): transmits the trip signal to the remote breakers.  
 Circuit Breaker(CB): opens a circuit upon receiving a trip signal.  
The system operator can arm the SPS so that the scheme is ready to act in case of line 
outage event. The scheme can also be configured to include a certain set of generators 
that should trip in case of activation. Both actions are performed by the logic control and 
are exclusively executed before the steady-state phase (i.e. anticipatory pre-programmed 
control actions. It is assumed that system operator has no control over the SPS in further 
phases. 
Malfunctioning of SPS components can result in abnormal operation. For the 
communication channels, it is considered an illustrative average dependability (e.g. 
0.95), which will be varied for sensitivity analysis in the forthcoming case study chapters. 
The dependability of the other components is modelled using a hidden failure model. 
Their average availability is determined using a constant failure rate and regular 
inspections at intervals 𝑇𝑖 during which any faulty component is repaired [78]. Average 
availabilities are therefore computed as: 












𝑎𝑖  is the availability of component i 
?̅?𝑖  is the unavailability of component i 
𝜆𝑖 is the failure rate of component type i (failures/year) 
𝑇𝑖 is the time between maintenance inspections of component type 𝑖 (years) 
For this model it will be assumed a time between inspections of 6 months (see Table 2). 
It must be noted that any event that triggers SPS activation also constitutes an inspection, 
as malfunctioning components will be identified by their failure to operate. Therefore, if 
the SPS is triggered at or above the inspection frequency, the value 𝑇𝑖 should be adjusted 
for these activations. 
Table 2: SPS component availability 
Component Failure rate (events/year) Availability 
Relay 𝜆𝑟 = 0.075 0.981 
Logic control 𝜆𝑙𝑐 = 0.03 0.9925 
Breaker 𝜆𝑏 = 0.008 0.9980 
Relay and breaker failure rates are as in Allan and Adraktas [78]. The availability of the 
controller is for illustration purposes only. 
The SPS actions result in an imbalance between generation and demand, which is 
restored by using available frequency response capacity. This can only be deployed if it 
has been allocated before the steady-phase, either from the generators or the demand 
side.  
3.3.3 Impact assessment 
SPS malfunctions scenarios may cause an impact in the power system which is commonly 
valued in terms of amounts of lost load. In keeping the simple conceptual modelling 
framework, this thesis considers impact assessments based on DC power flows 
considering four concepts: line overloading, frequency response, formation of electrical 
islands and emergency load shedding. In chapter 4 and 5, this thesis considers 4-node 
power system in which the impact assessment has only two possible outcomes: no load 
shedding or a complete loss of the transmission network. For such a simple system it is 
possible to algebraically characterise impacts related to cascading failure outages. 
Chapter 6 tackles the assessment of impacts in larger networks in which the cascading 
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profile resulting from SPS malfunctions are not obvious. A basic cascading is then utilised 
to capture a range of post-fault scenarios. 
3.4 Software architecture  
This thesis makes use of two commercial applications available at the department of 
electrical and electronic engineering at Imperial College London, namely MATLAB 
R2001a and FICO Xpress 7.7. Both applications can be connected by the FICO Xpress 
MATLAB Interface [79]. 
In Chapter 4 and 5, the SPS modelling and impact assessments are simple and can be 
directly embedded in FICO Xpress. Therefore, MATLAB is only used to set up the 
parameters of the optimisation problem and perform cost-benefits analysis based on 
optimal solutions obtained from FICO. The optimisation problem is solved in FICO Xpress 
using the function xprsmip that is available on its interface with MATLAB. The 
optimisation problem is a Mixed Integer Linear Programming Model (MILP). 
 
Figure 14: Software architecture used in Chapter 4 and 5 
 
Figure 15: Software architecture used in Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 aims to solve problems applicable to large systems where the optimisation 
problem cannot be directly solved in a closed form. As illustrated in Figure 15, all related 
to SPS modelling, impact assessment computations and cost-benefit analysis reside in 
MATLAB. In this case, FICO Xpress is exclusively used to solve the salient MILP 
optimisation problems. Likewise, the function xprsmip is used to communicate MATLAB 
and FICO.
Matlab R2014a
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 4 SYSTEM PROTECTION SCHEME 
OPERATION IN A SIMPLE SYSTEM 
This chapter presents a bottom-up analysis of the impact of SPS reliability on system 
operations, taking into account transmission constraints and the dispatch of low cost 
generating units (e.g. wind). This analysis is performed in the context of a simple model 
system that is inspired by the situation in the Anglo-Scottish corridor. This minimal 
model serves to illustrate the salient properties of the problem at hand and allows us to 
identify the optimal solutions analytically. The failure modes of the proposed generation 
rejection SPS are enumerated and their associated impacts are computed. The optimal 
SPS configuration is always part of a finite set of candidate solutions that are associated 
with the provision of security against specific outcomes scenarios of the SPS (including 
its failure modes). These ‘partial security’ candidates may inform heuristic optimisation 
methods in more complex systems, as will be presented in chapter 6.  Besides, this 
chapter studies the problem of co-optimising SPS configurations and the dispatch of 
generators (G+P+X), considering variations on parameters such as wind capacity, 
weather conditions and SPS reliability. This exercise illustrates that the optimal solutions 
highly depend on the reliability of the SPS, especially when bad weather conditions are 
considered.  
Section 4.1 presents the specific models and methods used in this study. Firstly, it is 
described a minimal 4-bus DC network inspired by the Great Britain system. A 
component-based model for the SPS is introduced and analysed to determine its failure 
modes and associated probabilities. Secondly, the details of the power system response 
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for assessing the impact from SPS malfunction scenarios are shown. Next, it is explained 
the procedure to compute operational risk and present a mixed integer linear 
programming model for co-optimizing constraint costs and expected fault costs. Section 
4.5 is devoted to the analysis of results and discussion. At first, it is demonstrated the 
existence of solutions which avoid cascading overloading in particular SPS scenarios for 
a given pre-defined dispatch. Section 4.5 analyses the results from the co-optimisation 
of dispatch and SPS configurations.  
4.1 Case-study description 
 
Figure 16: Four bus representation of the GB network. An SPS is connected to increase the 
power transfer. 
The electricity network model is inspired by the situation in the GB power system, where 
most demand is situated in England and Wales, whereas Scotland offers the best 
locations for wind power generation. The two regions are connected by two double 
circuits. The model power system is shown in Figure 16; it has two major busbars, 
labelled North and South.  The North bus has a large amount of installed wind capacity 
and only limited local demand, creating an economic incentive for a net North-South 
power flow. The power flows downstream through two identical double circuits, each 
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divided in two sections. The representation then has a total of eight identical lines 
(L1…L8), each with a circuit rating of 1700MW [6]. In the absence of an SPS, it will be 
assumed that these are subject to an ‘N-2’ security standard, where the system must be 
able to continue normal operations after the loss of two circuits. Assuming identical 
double circuits, this implies that the transmission lines can be utilised at most at 50% of 
their capacity. This limits the network capacity that can be released to transport wind 
generation and may require investments in reinforcement of the transmission network. 
A generation rejection scheme is connected to two intermediate buses, named West and 
East. After any line fault (single or double), this SPS aims to disconnect the faulted lines 
and remotely trip a predetermined amount of wind generation in North. These actions 
have the objective of isolating the faulted lines and reducing the load on remaining lines. 
Frequency services from generators located in South are relied on to restore the balance 
between load and generation (see also section 4.3). The amount of generation to be 
tripped may therefore not exceed the frequency response capability of the network. This 
has a minimum of 1800MW to deal with large generator outages [22], but we additionally 
permit the system operator to acquire up to 1000MW of extra capacity, if needed to 
support the SPS. The SPS can be triggered by single and double contingencies but does 
not differentiate between them. 
In order to focus on generic problems related to SPS reliability this illustration considers 
a basic SPS that disconnect a defined amount of wind power 𝑠, equally distributed across 
𝑛 independent sites. It is further assumed a centrally operated system where a system 
operator dispatches generators and may arm and configure the SPS to manage system 
risks. If the system operator decides to arm the SPS, it must select an SPS configuration, 
defined by the total SPS capacity committed to trip in North and on how many wind farms 
it is allocated.  
4.2 SPS failure model 
Let us consider the case where the SPS is not 100% dependable (i.e. can fail to operate 
when called upon). Fig. 17 shows the internal structure of the basic SPS model, based on 
generic properties of such corrective systems as presented in section 3.3.2. 
As illustrated in Fig.17, the scheme includes physical connections to the eight lines of the 
corridor and  N wind farms. It consist of mirrored systems connected to the west and 
east corridors. It is constituted of eight relays, two logic controls, eight communication 
channels and twelve breakers. 
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Figure 17: Connection diagram of the SPS components. Relays (connected to transmission 
lines) are in green, breakers in red, control in grey and communication channels in 
yellow. 
The system operator arms the SPS (i.e. ready to act in case of activation) and equally 
configure both logic controls through two parameters: 
 𝑛 is the number of wind farms selected intended for intertripping in case of 
activation   
 𝑠 is the intertripping capacity equally distributed across the  𝑛 sites selected 
In case of receiving a fault signal, the logic controls broadcast the trip signal only to the 
sites that have been pre-selected by the system operator. The SPS can be activated upon 
both single (L1…L8) and double circuit contingencies from the same site of the corridor 
(L1&L2, L3&L4, L5&L6 and L7&L8).  
Let us suppose that a fault occurs on line L1. In a normal operation of the SPS, the 
respective relay (R1) identifies the fault and sends an open signal to its local breaker (B1). 
This action then trips the faulted line (L1). At the same time, R1 sends a signal to the logic 










































































associated with the generators that had been previously selected (Cw,1 ... Cw,n). The trip 
signals reach the remote breakers which finally trip the generators targeted (BG1 ... BGn).  
However, SPS component failures can result in abnormal operation. For example, the 
malfunction of the communication channel associated with one of the n  selected 
generators results in a loss of a fraction 1/n of the scheduled response. For a detailed 
description of the functionality and failure modelling the SPS components please see 
section 3.3.2. 
It is assumed that the SPS has a protective back-up system that after a predetermined 
delay clears the faulted lines if the main breakers (B1…B8) fail to do so [80]. This, 
however, always involves the loss of the whole bus to which the faulted lines are 
connected. Returning to our example, should B1 fail to isolate L1 from the system, the 
back-up system would actuate and isolate the eastern intermediate bus.  
4.2.1 Simplifications 
The preceding section has introduced the component-level SPS model. However, because 
of the model’s inherent symmetry there is no need to consider all possible line outages 
and malfunctions of the SPS components individually. Instead, it is sufficient to consider 
one single and one double line outage and convert the original SPS topology to a 
simplified reliability block diagram [56]. Then, the rules of probability are used to 
evaluate the SPS outcomes probabilities. This is justified because: 
 all SPS components of the same type have identical availabilities 
 the SPS acts in the same way for any line outage of the same order, namely single 
and double faults  
 single line contingencies are equivalent, completely independent from each 
other and are assumed not to occur at the same time 
 the same applies to double contingencies  
 the system operator selects the same generators in the two logic controllers (i.e. 
LCw and LCE) 
The complexity of the initial SPS may be further reduced by integrating the availability 
of the circuit breaker block with that of its respective communication channel block. 
Finally, the simplified SPS model includes exclusively the 𝑛 generators that the system 
operator selects from the scheme at a given time (𝑛 ≤ 𝑁). 
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Figure 18: Simplified SPS model 
4.2.2 Probabilistic outcome table 
The outcomes of the SPS are characterized by the loss of one or two lines (local actions) 
as well as the number of generators that successfully trip (remote actions). The local 
result is indicated by the label 𝑙 ∈ {𝑠, 𝑑}, where 𝑠 and 𝑑 represent single or double circuit 
outages, respectively. Because the intertripping capacity is allocated evenly to the 
selected generators, the remote actions can be summarised by the number 𝑚 ∈ {0,… , 𝑛} 
of generators that was successfully tripped. The 2(𝑛 + 1)  possible outcomes of SPS 
action can thus be represented by the pair {𝑙,𝑚}.  
The SPS can be triggered by single and double line faults so that the outcomes are 
conditional on these events. Table 3 lists the conditional probabilities  𝑝𝑚/𝑛
𝑙 |𝑒 for an 
initiating event 𝑒 ∈ {𝑒𝑠, 𝑒𝑑} (single or double line fault). Note that the loss of two lines 
can be triggered directly by a double contingency or by a single contingency followed by 
the failure of the local breaker to isolate the faulted line. The opposite – loss of a single 
circuit as a result of a double line fault – does not occur. 
Table 3: Probabilistic outcome table 
  Remote actions (generators tripped) 












𝑑 |𝑒𝑑  … 𝑝𝑛/𝑛
𝑑 |𝑒𝑑 
The probabilities of the different SPS outcomes upon the occurrence of a single line fault 
(𝑒𝑠) are computed. We first analyse the cases in which none of the selected generators 





















circuit (i.e. due to the failure of main protective system to isolate the circuit initially 
affected). Therefore, 
 𝑝0/𝑛
𝑠 |𝑒𝑠 = 𝑎𝑅𝑎𝐵(?̅?𝐿𝐶+𝑎𝐿𝐶?̅?𝐶𝐵
𝑛 )   (3) 
 𝑝0/𝑛
𝑑 |𝑒𝑠 = 𝑎𝑅?̅?𝐵(?̅?𝐿𝐶+𝑎𝐿𝐶?̅?𝐶𝐵
𝑛 ) + ?̅?𝑅 (4) 
For 𝑚 ≠ 0 we find: 
 𝑝𝑚/𝑛





(𝑛−𝑚)  (5) 
 𝑝𝑚,𝑛







Next, the probabilities of SPS outcomes upon a double line fault event (𝑒𝑑) are computed. 
After the occurrence of a double line fault the response from the local breaker is 
irrelevant, because the power system always loses the whole bus, either by correct 
operation of the local breakers or by operation of the back-up breakers. To clarify the 
computations, the probability that a signal is successfully sent from the logic control is 
first calculated. This requires at least one of the relays and the logic controller to function 
correctly: 
 𝑝(𝑡𝑠)|𝑒𝑑 = (𝑎𝑟1𝑎𝑟2 + 𝑎𝑟1?̅?𝑟2 + ?̅?𝑟1𝑎𝑟2)𝑎𝑙𝑐 (7) 
Likewise, we treat individually the case in which none of the generators selected trip 
from a general case associated with the trip of at least one generator. Having computed 
𝑝(𝑡𝑠)|𝑒𝑑 the probabilities of each SPS outcome upon a double line fault can be expressed 
as: 
 𝑝0/𝑛
𝑑 |𝑒𝑑 = ?̅?(𝑡𝑠) + 𝑝(𝑡𝑠)?̅?𝐶𝐵
𝑛  (8) 
 𝑝𝑚/𝑛





(𝑛−𝑚)  ;   𝑚 ≠ 0 (9) 
4.3 Impact of SPS failures 
From the power system perspective, unintentional SPS outcomes can result in a 
sequence of events that are ultimately associated with a cost to the operators or users of 
the system. In keeping with our basic model it is considered only active power flows 
(ignoring losses and using a quasi-steady state assumption), and SPS driven system 
balancing actions supported by generation in the south and – if necessary – emergency 
load and generator shedding driven by system splitting.  
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The operation of the SPS results in a net power imbalance whenever at least one of the 
generators trips. In such a situation, frequency-sensitive generators will restore the 
power balance within seconds. Frequency services are assumed to be deployed in the 
South node with a minimum capacity of 1800MW that is required to protect the system 
against the sudden loss of the largest generating unit. It is assumed that response and 
reserve capacity is purchased at a price 𝜋𝑎 [£/MW/h], and additional capacity beyond 
1800MW can be purchased to provide headroom for additional SPS intertripping 
capacity. In the latter case, 𝜋𝑎  represents the availability fee for frequency regulation 
driven by the SPS. 
After the generation-demand balance is restored the power is optimally rerouted over 
the remaining lines. The total post-SPS transfer capacity is thus equal to 𝑡?̅? = 𝑁𝑙 ×
1700𝑀𝑊, where 𝑁𝑙  is the number of parallel lines that remain in service, which depends 
on the local actions 𝑙 ∈ {𝑠, 𝑑}: 𝑁𝑠 = 3 for a single circuit disconnection and 𝑁𝑑 = 2 for a 
double-circuit disconnection. If the net post-SPS power flow exceeds the capacity this 
will trigger a disconnection of the remaining lines.  
Disconnection of the corridor separates the north from the south and requires a second 
restoration of balance between generation and demand within each node (electrical 
island). Frequency services are exhausted before emergency defense plans are invoked, 
triggering involuntary load and generator shedding. The capacity for emergency 
generation and load shedding is assumed to be unlimited and of the required granularity. 
Table 4 shows the utilisation costs associated with scheduled tripping of generators 𝜋𝑢 
(utilisation fee) and load 𝜋𝑥  (demand shedding fee). There is no cost associated with 
emergency generator disconnection. Note that the high cost of demand shedding (i.e. 
involuntary customer disconnections) strongly favours allocating redundant SPS 
capacity despite SPS failures being rare. 
Table 4: Costs associated with faults 
Parameter Explanation Cost 
𝝅𝒂 Cost of frequency response availability 30 £/MW/h 
𝝅𝒖 Cost of generator disconnection 1000 £/MW/event 
𝝅𝒙 Cost of customer disconnection 30000£/MW/event 
System prices as used in Moreno et al.[6] and assuming interruption durations of 1 hour.  
The loss of the corridor following incorrect operation of the SPS in our basic model will 
lead to system splitting and necessary demand curtailment. This is special case of a more 
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general phenomenon where an initial fault is compounded by an inappropriate 
corrective response. As a result, the power system can find itself significantly outside the 
range of safe operating conditions, which may lead to an uncontrollable cascading outage 
that can result in a complete blackout.  
 
4.4 Minimisation of power system operational cost: G+P+X 
Ultimately, the SPS is part of the system operator’s toolbox that provides additional 
options to reduce risk or operational costs. The SPS failure and impact models thus form 
part of an optimisation problem that determines the optimal dispatch of generators 
jointly with an SPS configuration, as formulated in section 3.2. This system level cost 
benefit analysis is represented by a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model 
that is sequentially solved for different number of wind farms committed in the SPS (𝑛). 
This is a MILP problem because it has both binary and continuous variables as specified 
in section 3.3. The model minimises the generation cost 𝐺, system protection cost 𝑃 and 
loss-of-load cost 𝑋: 
 min𝑢𝑖,𝑔𝑖,Δ𝑔𝑖,𝑟,𝑠,𝑛
𝐺 + 𝑃 + 𝑋  (10) 
This minimisation is subject to the definitions and constraints listed below. 
 
4.4.1 Cost of generation 
The generation cost 𝐺  is defined as a linear function of the dispatched output 𝑔𝑖  of 
generator 𝑖: 




The installed capacity and cost parameters ∝𝑖 of different types of generating units are 
shown in Table 5. To simplify the optimisation model, an average generation unit size of 





Table 5: Generation data 
Technology 
No. of units 
North 










Wind 3 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 5 20 0 450 0 
Base gas 0 24 30 200 200 
Base coal 1 27 35 200 200 
Interconn. 0 4 50 0 0 
Water 2 0 80 50 200 
Marginal 
gas 
3 21 90 200 200 
Marginal 
coal 
6 23 100 200 200 
Pump 
storage 
1 3 200 50 200 
Oil 0 7 210 200 200 
Peakers 0 2 300 200 200 
 
The dispatched generating capacity should equal the total demand in the North (𝐷𝑁) and 
South (𝐷𝑆) nodes: 
 ∑𝑔𝑖
𝑖
= 𝐷𝑁 + 𝐷𝑆 (12) 
subject to physical constraints on the North-South flow 𝑡: 
 𝑡 = ∑ 𝑔𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ
− 𝐷𝑁 (13) 
 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡̅ (14) 
The commitment of generating units is modelled as follows: 
 𝑔𝑖 ≥ 𝑔𝑖𝑢𝑖 (15) 
 𝑔𝑖 + ∆𝑔𝑖 ≤ 𝑔𝑖𝑢𝑖 (16) 
 71 
where 𝑢𝑖 represents the binary status of each generator and Δ𝑔𝑖 the reserve capability 
from part-loaded generators. It is assumed that this is provided by generators in the 
South, and it is constrained by 
 0 ≤ Δgi ≤ ∆gi    ∀g ∈ South (17) 
 Δ𝑔𝑖 = 0     ∀𝑔 ∈ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ (18) 
 ∑Δ𝑔𝑖
𝑖
= 𝑟 (19) 
 1800 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 2800𝑀𝑊 (20) 
where 𝑟 is the allocated frequency response and reserve capacity and ∆𝑔𝑖 represents the 
ramp limits of the units. The minimum value of 𝑟 is 1800𝑀𝑊, but the system operator 
may decide to contract additional intertripping and reserve capacity if this is beneficial 
for the overall cost minimisation to a maximum of 1000 MW. The additional capacity may 
be used to relax constraints on the intertripping capacity 𝑠, given by  
0 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 𝑟 (21) 
4.4.2 Cost of system protection 
The second term of the objective function 𝑃 represents the expected hourly costs of 
system protection services, consisting of frequency response and SPS availability fees 
and SPS utilisation fees. The availability fee is determined in advance by purchasing a 
response capacity 𝑟 at a cost 𝜋𝑎 of £30/MW/h. The SPS utilisation fees are probabilistic, 
as they depend on the occurrence of outages and the actual amount of generation tripped 
in response to these outages. Successfully tripped generation capacity is compensated 
with an utilisation fee 𝜋𝑢  of £1000/MW/event. The system protection cost 𝑃 includes 
the expected utilisation cost.  
Table 6: Fault rates probabilities from [8] 
Weather scenario Outage order Fault rate (occ/h) 
fair 
single 3 × 10−5 
double 3 × 10−6 
bad 
single 1 × 10−3 
double 1 × 10−4 
Let 𝜆𝑠  be the rate of single circuit fault events in any one of the eight lines 
(occurrences/hour) and 𝜆𝑑  the common rate of double circuit fault events 
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(occurrences/hour) in lines that are connected to the SPS on the same side of the 
intermediate buses (L1 and L2, L3 and L4, L5 and L6, L7 and L8). Representative values for 
fair and bad weather are shown in Table 5. The total rates (occurrences/hour) for each 
type of occurrence become 𝜆𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 8𝜆𝑠 and 𝜆𝑒𝑑
𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 4𝜆𝑑.. Therefore 








Note that considering the values presented in Table 5, the total activation rate of the SPS 
upon a contingency in the transmission system per hour in bad weather conditions is 
0.0084 whereas that of fair weather conditions is 2.52 × 10−4. 
4.4.3 Risk 
The third term of the objective function 𝑋 represents the expected cost resulting from 
emergency load shedding, i.e. the risk. The risk is computed as the price of emergency 
customer disconnections multiplied by the frequency of occurrence and the expected 
amount of load shed. It can be expressed as  
𝑋 ≡ 𝑋(𝑡, 𝑟, 𝑠, 𝑛) = 𝜋𝑥 ∑ 𝜆𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡 ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑚/𝑛
𝑙 |𝑒 ⋅ Δ𝐷𝑙,𝑚(𝑡, 𝑟, 𝑠, 𝑛) 
𝑚∈{0…𝑛}𝑙∈{𝑠,𝑑}𝑒∈{𝑒𝑠,𝑒𝑑}
 (23) 
where Δ𝐷𝑙,𝑚(𝑡, 𝑠, 𝑛)  represents the (deterministic) demand that will be shed in a 
particular scenario. It may be defined as 
Δ𝐷𝑙,𝑚(𝑡, 𝑟, 𝑠, 𝑛) = 𝜃 (𝑡 −
𝑚
𝑛
𝑠 − 𝑡?̅?) ⋅ max (𝑡 − 𝑟, 0) 
The first factor determines whether or not an overload occurs, and the second factor the 
extent of the load shedding.  𝜃(𝑥) represents the unit step function that returns 1 when 
𝑥 > 0 and 0 otherwise. Recall that the post-SPS transfer capacity is denoted by 𝑡?̅?. The 
amount of load shed is the north-south transfer capacity that cannot be offset by 
response/reserve services. Note that whereas for the minimal model that is the focus of 
this chapter Δ𝐷𝑙,𝑚(𝑡, 𝑠, 𝑛)  may be computed explicitly, in more complex systems an 
algebraic expression is generally not available and this cost must be evaluated using a  
simulation of the power system response, including possible cascading outages. Within 
the linear optimisation framework, the value of Δ𝐷𝑙,𝑚(𝑡, 𝑠, 𝑛) is computed using binary 
auxiliary variables: 𝛿𝑙,𝑚 reflects the presence of post-SPS overload conditions and 𝜂 that 
has the value 1 only if (𝑡 − 𝑟) is positive. The value of Δ𝐷𝑙,𝑚(𝑡, 𝑠, 𝑛) is determined by the 









𝑠 − 𝑡?̅? ≥ −(1 − 𝛿𝑙,𝑚)𝐾 ∀𝑙,𝑚 (25) 
 𝑡 − 𝑟 ≤ 𝜂𝐾  (26) 
 𝑡 − 𝑟 ≥ −(1 − 𝜂)𝐾  (27) 
 Δ𝐷𝑙,𝑚 ≥ 0 ∀𝑙,𝑚 (28) 
 Δ𝐷𝑙,𝑚 ≤ 𝛿𝑙,𝑚𝐾 ∀𝑙,𝑚 (29) 
 Δ𝐷𝑙,𝑚 ≤ 𝜂𝐾 ∀𝑙,𝑚 (30) 
 Δ𝐷𝑙,𝑚 ≥ 𝑡 − 𝑟 − (2 − 𝛿𝑙,𝑚 − 𝜂)𝐾 ∀𝑙,𝑚 (31) 
 Δ𝐷𝑙,𝑚 ≤ 𝑡 − 𝑟 + (1 − 𝛾)𝐾 ∀𝑙,𝑚 (32) 
where 𝐾 is a large positive number (constant). Note that 𝛿𝑙,𝑚  and 𝜂 are undefined for 
exact equalities, but the lower associated costs will prefer 𝛿𝑙,𝑚 = 0 and/or 𝜂 = 0 in such 
cases. Note that the optimisation problem defined by Equations (10)-(32) is not a linear 
problem, due to the appearance of 𝑛 in the denominators in (22), (24) and (25). Because 
the realistic range of 𝑛 is small (each site requires a separate communications channel 
and intertripping contract), Equations (10)-(32) are solved sequentially for each 
permissible value of 𝑛 and select the best solution. In the following, this illustration uses 
𝑛 = 1,… ,4.  
4.4.4 Constraint cost 
The model defined by Equations (10)-(32) computes an optimal trade-off between the 
cost of generation and protection services and risk. It is instructive to compare the 
resulting cost of generation 𝐺∗ with the hypothetical scenario where fault-related costs 
are not considered. The cost of this unconstrained dispatch is computed as  
 G0 = min𝑢𝑖,𝑔𝑖,Δ𝑔𝑖,𝑟
𝐺,       s.t. (11)-(20) (33) 
The difference 𝐺∗ − 𝐺0 is the constraint cost: the additional generation cost incurred in 
the interest of security. 
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4.5 Results and Discussion 
4.5.1 Optimal SPS configuration 
Having established the basic SPS model previously this section proceeds to analyse its 
properties. To start, the restricted problem where the operator must select an optimal 
SPS configuration for a given dispatch – and thus for a given pre-fault transfer condition 
𝑡 is considered. Note that this is a sub problem of the problem statement presented in 
section 3.2 in which the dispatch is fixed. The objective is to reduce the complexity of the 
problem to focus on the analysis of different SPS configurations whilst the space of 
solutions is reduced.  
This results in the formal optimisation 
min
s,n
[P(s, n|r) + X(s, n|t, r)] 
s.t. (21)-(32) 
(34) 
The objective function for a representative case is shown in Figure 19, which plots 𝑃 + 𝑋 
as a function of 𝑠, using different panels for each of the cases 𝑛 = 1,… ,4. The example 
uses the fault rates associated with bad weather conditions from Table 6, and local 
demands of 6600MW and 48400MW in North and South respectively. The chosen 
dispatch results in a pre-fault transfer of 6100MW and the minimum reserve capacity 
requirement of 1800MW. Note that in this illustration no additional reserve capacity is 
purchased and therefore the cost of increasing the SPS capacity committed does not 
augment the cost of available reserve capacity. The global minimum is found for (𝑠, 𝑛) =
(1500𝑀𝑊, 3).  
In our model, the protection costs 𝑃(⋅) (equation (22)) have two regimes: 𝑠 ≤ 1800 𝑀𝑊 
where no availability fee is directly attributable to 𝑠  and 𝑠 > 1800 𝑀𝑊  where SPS 
capacities require the system operators purchase additional reserve capacity. In both 
regimes P(⋅) is linearly increasing in s. The lost load cost X(⋅) (equation (23)), on the 
other hand, is dependent on whether load shedding is required. In our power system 
there are only two possible scenarios: no load shedding (ΔDl,m = 0), or a complete loss 
of transmission in the corridor resulting in the formation of two islands. When this 
happens, the southern node may have insufficient reserve capacity to restore the 
balance, so that load must be shed at a cost of X = πx ⋅ (t − r). The function X(t, r, s, n) is 
therefore piecewise linear in s, with discontinuities at s =  sm/n
l  where (l, m) defines the 
post-SPS scenario. The implication is that the minimum of X(t, r, s∗, n) with respect to s 
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is attained at one of these discontinuities, or at the domain boundaries of s: {s, s}. We will 
refer to this set of possible values of  s∗ as “candidate solutions”.  
 
Figure 19: Expected protection and lost cost depending on capacity committed and 
number of generators selected. Labels for the discontinuities show the relation to the set 
of post-SPS scenarios. Green circles show the locations of the minimums for each panel 
 




















The value  sm/n
l  can be interpreted as the SPS capacity that just prevents load shedding 
for a loss of load of l  lines followed by the response of m-out-of-n  generators. This 
statement has a significant implication: the optimal SPS configuration is always one that 
just prevents cascading in a particular outcome scenario. Usually, the optimum is found 
for a scenario is one in which additional SPS capacity committed, compared to required 
amount for a 100% dependable SPS.  
Table 7 summarises the final set of candidate solutions in our example. The minimum 
cost solution (bold) is achieved using three generators (n = 3), committing 1500 MW in 
total. Specifically, this configuration corresponds to the solution s2/3
s  in which the system 
just remains within the transfer limits if one line is lost and one out of three generators 
fail to trip. This corresponds to an overprovision of 500MW of intertripping capacity to 
hedge against SPS malfunction. Note that a candidate solution may implicitly include 
prevention against overloading in other scenarios.  For example the candidate solution 
𝑠2/3
𝑠  also implies that there is no cascading when one line is lost and all three generators 
are successfully disconnected (𝑠, 3). 
Table 7: Properties of candidate solutions 
n Solution label Included scenarios s (MW) P+X (£/h) 
1 𝑠1/1
𝑠  ∅ 1000 188500 
2 𝑠2/2
𝑠  ∅ 1000 235800 
3 
𝑠3/3
𝑠  ∅ 1000 280700 
𝒔𝟐/𝟑
𝒔  (𝒔, 𝟑) 1500 149900 
4 
𝑠4/4
𝑠  ∅ 1000 323200 
𝑠3/4
𝑠  (𝑠, 4) 1334 155600 
0 s ∅ 0 1092000 
4.5.2 Optimal power system operation and SPS configuration 
This section returns to the larger problem of co-optimising dispatch costs and protection 
and lost load costs according to the optimization model in section 4.4. In particular, it is 
investigated the way cost-benefit trade-offs are affected by weather conditions and SPS 
reliability. The weather conditions affect the fault rates, as presented in Table 6, and 
therefore the overall risk levels. The SPS reliability is modulated by the availability of the 
communication channels, using three scenarios: 90%, 95% and 99%. These different 
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availabilities affect the optimal degree of overprovisioning and the number of units 
committed. Other component availabilities are modelled as specified in in section 3.3.2. 
Finally, a hypothetical 100% dependable SPS is included for comparison.  
The cost-benefit trade-off is also impacted by the generation side, which determines the 
constraint costs that drive the willingness to take risks. To investigate this, studies for 
different available wind output levels in North (maximum value of wind output), ranging 
from 1.8 GW to 11 GW, are performed. It is worth noticing that the system operator may 
perform wind curtailments, therefore reducing the actual power produced at the wind 
farms. 
Figure 20 shows the optimal SPS configuration as a function of available wind output. 
Different curves correspond to different reliability levels: black: 80%; red: 95%; blue: 
99% (communications availability); green: 100% availability of all components. The four 
curves correspond to bad weather conditions. The upper panel shows the number of 
committed sites, whereas the SPS capacity committed is shown in the middle. Note that 
the former plot does not include a green line because for a 100% dependable SPS, the 
number of sites committed does not affect the risk of load shedding. As the available wind 
output increased, so did the cost of constraining transmission, thus providing an 
incentive to increase the SPS capacity committed. Whereas the reliable SPS (green curve) 
is used from available wind output levels of 3900MW upwards, the less reliable SPSs are 
only employed for higher wind penetration levels. For available wind output above 
8000MW it becomes increasingly desirable to contract additional reserve and SPS 
capacity, for all reliability levels. In general it should be noted that the optimal SPS 
configuration depends on the parameters in non-trivial ways. The bottom panel shows 
the sequence of candidate solutions associated with the SPS configurations as a function 
of available wind output. Note that the selection varies significantly according to the 
particulars of each scenario. Also note that some solutions explicitly secure the power 
system against the failure of one or two generator trips. 
In addition to committing redundant SPS capacity, when the SPS configuration is co-
optimised with the dispatch the system operator may also constrain generators out of 
their merit order, in order to limit the transfer in the corridor. By this action, the system 





Figure 20: Optimal SPS configurations as a function of available wind output. Top: number 
of generators selected 𝒏. Middle: intertripping capacity (𝒔). Bottom: optimal candidate 
solutions for different values of SPS reliability. Different curves correspond to different 
reliability levels: black: 80%; red: 95%; blue: 99% (communications availability); green: 
100% availability of all components. 
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In Fig. 21 the resulting pre-fault transfer capacity for bad (top) and good (bottom) 
weather conditions is plotted. The bad weather scenario corresponds to that analysed in 
Fig. 20, confirming that an unreliable SPS constrains the optimal transfer capacity even 
for large available output of wind generation. However, for fair weather conditions the 
occurrence of faults is significantly less likely, and in this case the reliability level of the 
SPS hardly impacts the optimal power transfer. In dashed cyan, it is plotted the transfer 
associated with the ‘N-2’ preventive security constraint, associated with traditional 
deterministic security standards. For this security strategy the transfer is limited to 
3400MW, independently of weather conditions and SPS unreliability. 
 
 
Figure 21: Optimal transfer in the corridor for different values of SPS reliability and two 
weather conditions, as a function of available wind output. 











































Figure 22: Left: Generation, protection and lost load costs for different values of SPS 
reliability, as a function of available wind output in North. Right: Total operating costs, 
constraint costs and wind curtailments for different values of SPS reliability, as a function 
of available wind output. 
On the left side of Fig. 22, it is plotted the different cost components involved in the 
objective function of the optimisation (equation (10)) for the different SPS reliabilities 
and bad weather conditions. As expected, generation costs decrease with available wind 
output. When the N-2 security standard is considered and the SPS is not used they reach 
a plateau from 6900MW. It is possible to infer that after reaching this limit there is no 
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value from incorporating more wind without additional transmission capacity. However, 
when the SPS is considered the power system is able to use up to about 10 GW of wind 
depending on the reliability of the SPS. In such case, the protection costs start escalating 
above the minimum reserve requirement (1800MW) for available wind output from 
about 8200MW, as expected from the analysis of Fig. 20. Finally, expected load shedding 
costs highly depend on the reliability of the SPS. Note that the shape evolves in a non-
trivial way as the available wind output increases. For example, it is observed that the 
most unreliable SPS considered (the black line) has associated lower expected fault costs 
when compared to more reliable SPS (red or blue lines) for high values of available wind 
output (above 9750MW). 
On the right side of Fig. 22, it is plotted the total operating costs 𝐺 + 𝑃 + 𝑋 (upper panel) 
and the constraint cost G∗ − G0 (middle panel) for bad weather conditions. It is possible 
to confirm that the overall cost of the solutions decreases smoothly as a function of 
available wind output, regardless of the non-trivial shape of the cost components. As 
expected, increasingly reliable SPS always result in decreased operating costs. 
Importantly, the traditional ‘N-2’ deterministic security standard presents the highest 
operating cost by far, even when compared with the very unreliable SPS case. Moreover, 
it demands more transmission capacity earlier than if the SPS operation is considered. 
The shape of the constraint costs corroborate that the optimal operation of the system 
includes a complex mix between preventive and corrective security, augmented by the 
consideration of SPS unreliability. Finally, wind curtailment in North (bottom-right) is 
plotted. As shown in this figure, up to 3.5 GW of wind curtailment are observed when the 
use of the SPS is neglected in the traditional N-2 security standard. As all preceding 
results had suggested, the use of the SPS helps to facilitate absorbing more wind 
generation, only curtailing wind energy for very high values of available wind output 
(about 10 GW) and low/medium SPS reliability. 
4.6 Conclusions  
This chapter has introduced a simple 4-node representation of the GB network to 
illustrate the issues involved in the operation of power systems with unreliable SPS. 
Using bottom-up modelling of SPS failure modes and a basic palette of power system 
responses a mixed-integer linear programming model has been proposed based on the 
problem statement and modelling conventions of Chapter 3. This model minimises the 
generation cost G, system protection cost P and loss-of-load costs X.  
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As a first stage, it has been considered the restricted problem of choosing an optimal SPS 
configuration (i.e. the number of generators selected n and the SPS intertripping capacity 
S) for a given dispatch. It has been demonstrated that if the dispatch is fixed the optimal 
SPS configuration is one of a discrete set of solutions that correspond precisely to 
prevention of a cascading outage of the transmission corridor for a particular SPS 
outcome scenario. Even for the simple model system used in the present work it is not 
obvious immediately which of these candidates is optimal for a particular transfer 
condition. It is interesting to note that in many cases the optimal SPS configurations 
commit additional intertripping capacity to hedge against partial malfunctioning of the 
SPS.  
This chapter subsequently co-optimises SPS configurations with the dispatch of 
generators, considering variation on parameters such as available wind output, weather 
conditions and SPS reliability. The results corroborated that optimal operational 
strategies provide security against a particular SPS outcome scenario by means of either 
committing redundant SPS capacity or constraining generators out of their merit order.  
Even unreliable SPS can produce large operational cost savings with respect to the ‘N-2’ 
security standard, by reducing constraint costs. This is especially true in good weather 
scenarios (low fault rate), where the optimal generator dispatch was insensitive to SPS 
performance. For higher fault (e.g. bad weather conditions), the savings with respect to 
‘N-2’ are still substantial, but depend more sensitively on SPS dependability. It bears 
mentioning that the balance between risks and constraint costs is highly variable, and 
one may find scenarios where a 100% dependable SPS has a higher risk level than a less 
reliable SPS, in exchange for significantly lower constraint costs. However, as expected, 
the overall operation costs always decrease with increased reliability.  
This chapter aimed to illustrate the risk-based cost-benefit analysis of unreliable SPS and 
the properties of the resulting solutions. To this end, a simple model system was used for 
which analytical results could be obtained. Nevertheless, the models and concepts 
explored in this chapter may be applied to larger and more complex systems. For such 
systems it is unlikely that the cost-benefit optimisation can be cast in algebraic form. The 
fundamental difficulty is that the power system response to SPS malfunction may involve 
multi-component interactions between large numbers of components, including 
cascading outages. These can be simulated for particular parameter values, but not easily 
embedded in an optimisation framework. The number of decision variables and 
constraints provides an additional challenge, leading to prohibitive memory and CPU 
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time requirements. These restrictions suggest the use of heuristic methods for 
identifying (near-) optimal operational strategies. 
In particular, the properties of candidate solutions identified in section 4.5.1 may be 
valuable for the study of larger systems, even if the linearity assumptions that are used 
in the present work no longer hold. The observation that the optimal SPS configuration 
precisely prevents expensive involuntary load shedding for one SPS outcome scenario 
(fully operational or partial failure) may be extrapolated to larger systems. This property 
may then be used to select starting points for heuristic optimization, or to restrict the 
search space. This is investigated in Chapter 6.
 5 COST-BENEFIT ASSESSMENT OF 
UNRELIABLE SYSTEM PROTECTION 
SCHEME OPERATION  
In this chapter the electrical network and SPS model from Chapter 4 is used to investigate 
SPS operational benefits and risks in a year-round basis. For such a system, it is assumed 
that the system operator can arrange yearly intertripping contracts with a number of 
wind farms to be connected to the SPS. Wind farms under an intertripping agreement 
receive an annual capability fee for this service. Considering failure modes related to the 
SPS, this chapter seeks to answer the question of how many intertripping schemes the 
network operator should arrange for a whole operating year, taking into account a set of 
different operating conditions in terms of weather conditions, demand and wind 
availability levels. One may expect that increasing the number of intertripping schemes 
would reduce the expected load not served (i.e. risk) in the year; however, this case study 
shows evidence that this is not necessarily true, as the system operator’s willingness to 
take risk increases with the number of intertripping schemes connected to the SPS.    
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5.1 Case-study description 
 
Figure 23: Left: Four bus representation of the GB north-south transmission network. 
Right: SPS model 
The electrical network presented in chapter 4 is assumed to have ten wind farms of 2GW 
each, all installed in North. The total wind availability therefore amounts to a maximum 
of 20 GW of generation. The system operator may arrange 𝑁  yearly individual 
intertripping contracts with such wind sites to be connected to the system protection 
scheme, being 𝑁 ≤ 10 . It is assumed that connected wind farms receive an annual 
capability fee of £70000/contract for this service.  
At any time throughout the year, the system operator can select a number of wind 
farms 𝑛 from the set of wind farms under the annual agreement. Selected wind farms are 
expected to trip upon a line outage and receive an utilisation fee of 1000 £/MW/event 
for this. As in the previous chapter, SPS failures to operate can overload the transmission 
system. In this case, the system splits in two islands resulting in load disconnections in 
South, valued at £30000/MW. Note that the number of wind sites 𝑛  that can be 
committed in operational timescales is not the same as the number of wind farms 
contracted for a year 𝑁, being 𝑛 ≤ 𝑁. 
A year is represented by 200 representative operating conditions [8]. Each operating 
condition is characterised by a global demand factor (% of system peak demand) and 
wind availability factor (% of peak wind generation), weather conditions (fair or bad) 
and the number of hours in which each operating condition occurs during the year (see 
the Appendix for a detailed listing). 
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It is assumed that in operational timescales wind availability is equally distributed across 
the ten wind sites. The unreliability of the relays, breakers and logic controls correspond 
with those presented in section 3.3.2. 
5.2 System operator’s problem statement and methodology 
The system operator seeks to minimise the summation of the annual operational costs 
and the intertripping contract payments, as formulated in equation (35).  
min
N,ui,gi,Δgi,r,s,n
C +∑(Gk + Pk + Xk)
k
× hk  (35) 
The first term 𝐶 represents the costs associated with the decision of contracting a certain 
number of intertripping schemes for a year of operation. It is computed as the number 
of intertripping schemes contracted (0 ≤ 𝑁 ≤ 10) times the annual capability fee  𝜋𝑖. The 
second term corresponds to the summation of the annual operational costs associated 
with each of the 200 system operating conditions. As in the previous chapter, this term 
is characterised by the sum of 𝐺 + 𝑃 + 𝑋, where 𝐺 represents the generation costs, 𝑃 the 
protection costs and 𝑋 the loss-load costs (i.e. the risk) during an operational timeframe 
of one hour. Note that the costs of each operating condition are multiplied by the hours 
in which that operating condition occurs across the year (i.e. ℎ𝒌).  
For each operating condition 𝑘, the minimal operational costs are determined using the 
"𝐺 + 𝑃 + 𝑋" operational model described in the previous chapter (equations (10)-(32)), 
considering that the intertripping capacity assigned to a wind site cannot be larger than 
its actual wind availability. Therefore, 
 s ≤ n × wk × 2GW (36) 
where wk is the wind availability factor for contingency 𝑘, n is the number of wind sites 
committed and 𝑠 the SPS capacity assigned in operational time scales. 
The optimisation considering the 200 operating conditions provides the total annual cost 
associated with a given number 𝑁  of yearly intertripping contracts. This exercise is 
repetitively solved for values of 𝑁 from 1 to 10 from which the solution with the lowest 
total annual cost is selected. 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Optimal number of intertripping contracts 
Let us consider the base case scenario in which the system operator is subject to the ‘N-
2’ security standard and thus it is not allowed to use the SPS. The annual operational 
costs of the power system amount to £8391.4 million. Figure 24 shows the percentage of 
annual savings with respect to the total annual cost in the base case scenario for the 
different number of possible intertripping contracts. The bottom plot in Figure 24 shows 
the benefits for 𝑁 ≥ 2. 
 
Figure 24: Percentage of annual savings for the different number of SPS installations 
If the system operator decides to contract intertripping services with only one wind 
farm, the total annual system costs are reduced by 4.98% with respect to the base case 
scenario as shown in the upper plot of Figure 24. In absolute terms this translates into 
operational savings of £417.9 million. The second contract provides extra savings of 
0.57%, which in total amount to £462.36 million. Additional intertripping contracts 
















































until the seventh where the tendency changes and the total annual costs increase with 
additional intertripping arrangements. The optimal solution is therefore the acquisition 
of intertripping services from seven wind farms. The total annual savings with respect 
to the N-2 base case amount to £468.8 million. As will become clear in the next sections, 
these large operational savings are directly related to the possibility for the system 
operator to release further transmission capacity, when compared to the N-2 base case, 
under partial security operational strategies. 
 



































































5.3.2 Cost component shapes 
Figure 25 shows the different components of the annualised costs depending on the 
number of intertripping contracts, namely 𝐶 , 𝐺 , 𝑃 and 𝑋. The share of total operating 
costs is dominated by the generation costs in all cases. For example, in the optimal 
solution for = 7 , 𝐺 accounts for 93.5%, 𝑃 to 6.03%, 𝐶 to 0.004% and 𝑋 to 0.00006% of 
total annual operating costs. 
The different cost components are characterised by an oscillatory shape (apart from 𝐶 
that is a linear function of the number of contracts) until the fifth contract, when the cost 
shapes stabilised. It is particularly interesting to note that contracting more intertripping 
schemes does not guarantee lower values of annual risk. In the next section, it is analysed 
the different hourly risk terms (i.e. 𝑋) of each operating condition throughout the year 
for five possible amounts of annual intertripping contracts: 𝑁 = 1,2,3,4,7. 
5.3.3 Critical operating conditions 
The operational risks are divided in nine groups depending on their values (£/hour). 
These groups are “zero risk”, (0,20000] (20000,40000], (40000,60000], (60000,80000], 
(80000,100000], (100000,120000], (120000,140000], and (140000,160000], which are 
respectively labelled as A, B, C, D, E, F, G. Table 8 shows the annual hours for one, two, 
three, four and seven intertripping contracts associated with each risk group: 
Table 8: Annual risk profile for different number of intertripping contracts 
N A B C D E F G H I 
1 4109 4007 496 122 0 0 0 0.87 0.65 
2 4109 4624 0.98  1.1     
3 4109. 4455 43.5   127.7    
4 4109 4455 43.5   127.7    
7 4109 4455 43.5   127.7    
The number of operating hours with no risk associated (4109 hours) is the same for any 
number of annual intertripping contracts, and therefore there is no added value from 
contracting more intertrippings for the operating conditions in which it is not 
economically beneficial to load the lines above the N-2 security limit. 
However, it is possible to observe different number of yearly hours with certain 
operational risk (i.e. 𝑋 ≥ 0). The solution with one intertripping contracted presents the 
highest hourly risk values with 0.87 hours between 120000 and 140000 £/hour, and 
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0.65 hours between 140000 £/hour and 160000 £/hour (this solution had also shown 
the largest annual risk in Figure 25). This may be interpreted as the decision of the 
system operator to use the SPS, even if it is not possible to commit redundant 
intertripping schemes. The lowest annual risk corresponded with the solution with two 
intertripping schemes (see Figure 25). As to its annual risk spectrum, this solution shifts 
operating hours from large risks intervals into lower risk (i.e. between 20000 £/hour 
and 40000£/hour), based on the availability that the second intertripping scheme 
provides to commit redundant SPS configurations. Contracting three, four and seven 
intertripping schemes present the same risk profile, which shows larger total annual risk 
when compared to contracting two intertrippings. Note that the main difference with 
respect to contracting exclusively two intertrippings resides in the operating conditions 
with risks between £80000/hour and £100000/hour. Therefore such scenarios are 
selected for further investigation. 
5.3.4 Cost-benefit trade-off in critical operating conditions  
Eleven operating conditions enter in our interest interval of analysis. These operating 
conditions amount to 127.724 hours (1.5% of the year). They are characterised by bad 
weather conditions, high demand and high wind availability, and thus are associated 
with stressed operational conditions.  
This section now analyses operating conditions for each  𝑁 = 1,2,3,7. The objective is to 
investigate their associated optimal operating strategies. For this exercise, we refer back 
to the previous chapter to recall the “candidate solutions” which correspond to 
preventing a cascading outage of the transmission corridor for a particular post-SPS 
outcome scenario, including partial SPS malfunction scenarios and the conventional N-2 
and N-1 security levels. 
Table 9 shows the properties of each operating condition (% of peak demand and % of 
peak wind availability), the optimal operational strategy summarised by the transfer “T”, 
SPS capacity “S” and wind sites committed “n” selected by the system operator and its 
associated candidate solution. The decision of the system operator to contract 
exclusively one intertripping generation results in operational strategies based on three 
candidate solutions. Four operating conditions are operated under  𝑠1/1
𝑑  (secure against 
double circuit loss if the wind farm trips), five under 𝑠1/1
𝑆 (secure against single outage 
loss if the wind farm trips) and two on the N-1 limit (i.e. 5100 MW) with no use of the 
SPS. Different transfers and intertripping capacities are selected to comply with these 
candidate solutions.  
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Table 9: Data associated with operating conditions with risk between £80000/hour and 







T(MW) S(MW) n Solution 
73 0.76 0.45 5100 0 0 N − 1 
78 0.76 0.55 5100 0 0 N − 1 
79 1 0.55 6200 1100 1 𝑠1/1
𝑠  
83 0.76 0.65 4700 1300 1 𝑠1/1
𝑑  
84 1 0.65 6400 1300 1 𝑠1/1
𝑠  
88 0.76 0.75 4900 1500 1 𝑠1/1
𝑑  
89 1 0.75 6600 1500 1 𝑠1/1
𝑠  
93 0.76 0.85 5100 1700 1 𝑠1/1
𝑑  
94 1 0.85 6800 1700 1 𝑠1/1
𝑠  
98 0.76 0.95 5100 1700 1 𝑠1/1
𝑑  
99 1 0.95 6800 1700 1 𝑠1/1
𝑠  
The average transfer, SPS capacity and sites committed in these particular scenarios are 
5027.2 MW, 718.47 MW and 0.48 respectively. The decision of contracting one annual 
intertripping scheme allows for an increase of 1627.2 MW in the average utilisation of 
the transfer with respect to the N-2 security standard, during these particular conditions. 
As shown in Table 10, for 𝑁 = 2 the system operator sets different operational strategies 
based on three candidate solutions: 𝑠2/2
𝑑  (secure against double line loss when both 
intertrippings trip), 𝑠1/1
𝑑  (double line loss when one generator trips (out of one) and 𝑠1/2
𝑠  
(secure against single line loss when one generator trips out of two). Different transfer 
conditions and SPS capacities are then selected for each particular operating condition. 
When two generators are available for commitment, the SPS is utilised in all the 
operating conditions under consideration. When compared to the previous case, there is 
an increase of average transfer, SPS capacity and number of sites committed of 85.4 MW, 
991.63 MW and 1.34 sites respectively. As the transmission capacity is used further, the 
system faces lower constraint costs. Yet, the reliability levels also improve since the 
power system is operated to be resilient against a double circuit outage, except for 
operating condition number 79. 
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Table 10: Data associated with operating conditions with risk between £80000/hour and 







T(MW) S(MW) n Solution 
73 0.76 0.45 5100 1700 2 𝑠2/2
𝑑  
78 0.76 0.55 5100 1700 2 𝑠2/2
𝑑  
79 1 0.55 6200 2200 2 𝑠1/2
𝑠  
83 0.76 0.65 5100 1700 2 𝑠2/2
𝑑  
84 1 0.65 6000 2600 2 𝑠2/2
𝑑  
88 0.76 0.75 5100 1700 2 𝑠2/2
𝑑  
89 1 0.75 6200 2800 2 𝑠2/2
𝑑  
93 0.76 0.85 5100 1700 1 𝑠1/1
𝑑  
94 1 0.85 6200 2800 2 𝑠2/2
𝑑  
98 0.76 0.95 5100 1700 1 𝑠1/1
𝑑  
99 1 0.95 6200 2800 2 𝑠2/2
𝑑  
If the system operator arranges three annual intertripping contracts (Table 11), the 
operational strategies are exclusively based on 𝑠2/3
𝑠 , in which the power system is 
resilient against the loss of a single circuit when one generator fails to respond (out of 
three). Depending on the demand and wind availability factors, the tool selects two 
operational strategies with different transfers and SPS capacity associated: transfer of 
6300 MW with SPS capacity at 1800 MW, and transfer of 6800 MW with SPS capacity at 
2550 MW. Note that the level of security is the same in both cases. However, the tool 
releases more transfer capacity for peak demand conditions (i.e. demand factor of 1) at 
the expense of committing more SPS capacity. Note that the power system is operated to 
be resilient to the loss of a single circuit in all operating conditions. The average transfer 
becomes 6306 MW which is an increase of 1193 MW from the previous example. Based 
on the transfer values and the level of security selected, it is possible to conclude that the 
system operator is willing to take more risks when compared to contracting two annual 
intertrippings, which explains the annual risk shape in Figure 25. The average SPS 
capacity and number of intertrippings committed for these particular scenarios are 1809 
MW and 3 sites respectively which shows a considerable increase in the utilisation levels 
of the SPS. 
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Table 11: Data associated with operating conditions with risk between £80000/hour and 







T(MW) S(MW) n Solution 
73 0.76 0.45 6300 1800 3 𝑠2/3
𝑠  
78 0.76 0.55 6300 1800 3 𝑠2/3
𝑠  
79 1 0.55 6800 2550 3 𝑠2/3
𝑠  
83 0.76 0.65 6300 1800 3 𝑠2/3
𝑠  
84 1 0.65 6800 2550 3 𝑠2/3
𝑠  
88 0.76 0.75 6300 1800 3 𝑠2/3
𝑠  
89 1 0.75 6800 2550 3 𝑠2/3
𝑠  
93 0.76 0.85 6800 1800 3 𝑠2/3
𝑠  
94 1 0.85 6800 2550 3 𝑠2/3
𝑠  
98 0.76 0.95 6300 1800 3 𝑠2/3
𝑠  
99 1 0.95 6800 2550 3 𝑠2/3
𝑠  
Table 12: Data associated with operating conditions with risk between £80000/hour and 







T(MW) S(MW) n Solution 
73 0.76 0.45 6385.71 1800 7 𝑠5/7
𝑠  
78 0.76 0.55 6385.71 1800 7 𝑠5/7
𝑠  
79 1 0.55 6800 2380 7 𝑠5/7
𝑠  
83 0.76 0.65 6385.71 1800 7 𝑠5/7
𝑠  
84 1 0.65 6800 2380 7 𝑠5/7
𝑠  
88 0.76 0.75 6385.71 1800 7 𝑠5/7
𝑠  
89 1 0.75 6800 2380 7 𝑠5/7
𝑠  
93 0.76 0.85 6385.71 1800 7 𝑠5/7
𝑠  
94 1 0.85 6800 2380 7 𝑠5/7
𝑠  
98 0.76 0.95 6385.71 1800 7 𝑠5/7
𝑠  
99 1 0.95 6800 2380 7 𝑠5/7
𝑠  
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As shown in Table 12, in the optimal annual solution of contracting seven intertripping 
schemes, the system operator makes use of the candidate 𝑠5/7
𝑠 , in which the power 
system is resilient against the loss of a single circuit followed by failure of two 
intertripping schemes (out of seven). Similarly to the previous case, the system operator 
selects the maximum transfer (i.e. 6800 MW) for peak demand operating conditions, at 
the expense of contracting 2380 MW of SPS capacity. The average transfer, SPS capacity 
and number of generators committed is 6391 MW, 1807 MW and 7 respectively. The 
system operator achieves higher levels of transmission utilisation (+84.69 MW). 
Importantly, this is achieved whilst the levels of risk are reduced with respect to the 
results when N = 3, as the power system is resilient against the failure of one additional 
intertripping scheme. This analysis matched with the annual risk values observed in 
Figure 25 where contracting three annual intertrippings is more risky than contracting 
seven. 
5.3.5 Annual utilisation of the system protection scheme 
In the optimal solution, the system operator may arm the SPS with up to seven 
intertripping schemes in operational timescales during the year. This section shows the 
annual percentages (i.e. considering the 200 operating conditions) associated with the 
different number of intertrippings committed. 
 
Figure 26: Annual percentages of time for the different number of sites committed 
As shown in Figure 26, the SPS is not armed 47% of the time, which corresponds with 
operating conditions with wind availabilities of 25% downwards (see Appendix for the 
detailed values). Therefore, the system operator’s tool opt to not arm the SPS during low 
levels of available wind output (47% of the year). However, the SPS is armed during 
operating conditions involving larger wind availability. In such cases, the number of 


















to the particulars of each scenario. For example, the SPS is operated with two 
intertripping schemes 24% of the time. Such cases correspond with two types of 
operational strategies:  
1. Transfer of 6800 MW and SPS capacity of 1700 MW in fair weather 
conditions, medium/high demand and medium/high wind availabilities. 
2. Transfer of 5100 MW and SPS capacity of 1700 MW in bad weather 
conditions, medium demand and medium/high wind availability.  
These operational strategies are related to the candidate solutions 𝑠2/2
𝑠  and 𝑠2/2
𝑑  
respectively. Note that the weather and demand levels determine whether the power 
system is operated as resilient to a single or a double circuit loss. 
The rest of the year the SPS is operated in other configurations with up to seven wind 
sites committed (18% of the time). Such operations are related to complex and highly 
non-trivial implications in the selection of SPS configurations, as observed in the 
previous chapter.  
5.4 Conclusions 
This chapter considers the system operator’s decision of connecting redundant 
intertripping schemes to an SPS in a year-round basis. The models and methods from 
Chapter 4 have been considered, together with 200 representative operating conditions, 
in order to minimise the sum of intertripping capability fee payments, annual generation, 
protection and loss-of-load costs for a whole operating year.  
Contracting multiple intertripping schemes is associated with important annual benefits 
when compared with system operation under the N-2 security standard. The decision of 
the system operator to contract one intertripping scheme reports large operational 
savings. Additional intertripping contracts continue to report further annual savings 
until optimal solution of 7 contracts. The total annual savings with respect to the N-2 
base case amount to £468.8 million.  
One may expect that contracting more intertrippings would reduce the levels of 
operational risk exposure. However, the inspection of the different cost components 
reveals that this is not always the case. This chapter analyses the different hourly risk 
terms in each operating condition throughout the year for four relevant numbers of 
annual intertripping contracts, namely one, two, three and seven. This exercise has 
shown that the main operational benefits from contracting redundant intertrippings are 
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linked to critical operating conditions characterised by bad weather conditions, high 
demand and wind availability levels. The analysis of such scenarios has shown that 
multiple intertripping schemes permit the system operator to release further 
transmission capacity with partial security profiles. It is therefore concluded that 
contracting more intertripping schemes does not necessarily reduce the operational 
risks, as the system operator’s disposition to take risks increases due to the possibility 
to operate the SPS under partial security configurations. 
 6 HEURISTIC METHOD FOR THE OPERATION 
OF SYSTEMS WITH UNRELIABLE SPS  
The optimisation of power system operation considering SPS unreliability presents two 
major difficulties. First, the computation of the load-shedding impact may require the 
analysis of complex dynamic mechanisms. For the simple system analysed in Chapter 4 
and 5, this can be expressed by linear equations, but for more realistic systems may 
require the analysis of complex impact scenarios (e.g. cascading outages). In such a case, 
the impact can only realistically be evaluated by explicit simulation of sequential events. 
The second barrier is that the number of possible SPS outcomes is potentially large, and 
depends on the decision variables such as the generator’s dispatch and SPS 
configurations. This can be overcome only at the cost of including all possible SPS 
outcomes for all possible SPS configurations – an approach that is prohibitive for large 
systems.  
This chapter proposes a new heuristic method that specifically addresses these two 
barriers to optimising system operation with unreliable SPS. The method is tested on the 
RTS 24-Bus IEEE System [53]. An SPS is connected to a critical set of contingencies in 
order to increase the utilisation of the network. The SPS presents a common 
communication failure per node, which increases the probability that all generators at a 
node fail to trip simultaneously. The method presents satisfactory results to balance 
operational benefits and risks. 
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6.1 Method description 
As described in Chapter 3, the system operator solves a risk-sensitive optimal power 
flow problem that seeks to minimise the total operating cost by setting two classes of 
decision variables: the generator dispatch 𝒟 and the SPS configuration 𝒮: 
min
𝒟,𝒮
𝐺(𝒟) + 𝑃(𝒟, 𝒮) + 𝑋(𝒟, 𝒮) ≡ 
min
𝒟,𝒮




subject to  ℎ(𝒟, 𝒮) ≤ 0 ; 𝑔(𝒟, 𝒮) = 0 
(37) 
The optimisation is subject to the usual equalities and inequalities related to DC power 
flow and generation constraints, described in [17] and denoted by ℎ(⋅) ≤ 0 and 𝑔(⋅)=0. 
Note that he objective function consists of the elements described in Chapter 3. The 
generation cost is denoted by 𝐺 and the availability fee of protection services by 𝑃𝑎. The 
third term signifies the expectation value of the variable costs due to contingencies. It is 
a summation over the possible contingencies 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞, weighted by their respective rates 
𝜆𝑐 , followed by a summation over the possible SPS outcomes 𝑜 ∈ 𝒪(𝑐, 𝒮) , (working, 
partial failures, etc.) also weighted by the probability 𝑝𝑜 of each outcome occurring. For 
each contingency-SPS-outcome pair, the utilisation costs 𝑃𝑐,𝑜
𝑢  and load-shedding impact 
𝑋𝑐,𝑜 are included. 
From an optimisation perspective, equation (37) presents two major difficulties. First, 
the computation of the load-shedding impact 𝑋𝑐,𝑜 may require the analysis of a sequence 
of failure events in a complex system. For anything but the simplest systems this cannot 
be captured by linear equations, and in many cases, for example when cascading 
processes are included, this may not have an algebraic representation at all. In that case 
the impact can only realistically be evaluated by explicit simulation of individual events 
and operating points. The second barrier is that the set of possible SPS outcomes 𝒪𝑐,𝑜 is 
potentially large, and depends on the decision variables (generator dispatch and SPS 
configuration). This circular dependence can be overcome only at the cost of including 
all possible SPS outcomes for all possible SPS configurations – an approach that is 
prohibitive for large systems. The next section discusses a novel heuristic method that 
specifically addresses these two barriers to optimising system operation with unreliable 
SPS.  
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6.2 Two-Stage iterative Solution Method 
The heuristic method consists of three components: 1) a restricted enumeration of a 
finite set of candidate solutions; 2) a method to generate such candidate solutions; 3) a 
procedure for iterative improvement of the set of candidate solutions. These components 
are described below.  
6.2.1 Selection among candidate solutions 
If the load-shedding impact 𝑋𝑐,𝑜  cannot be expressed algebraically in terms of the 
dispatch and SPS configuration, simulations are required to evaluate its value for 
individual scenarios. This restricts the optimisation procedure to the evaluation of a 
finite set of scenarios. For this reason, the high-level optimisation is implemented as an 
enumeration across a set of ‘candidate solutions’. The construction of this set of solutions 
is the subject of further sections. 
Let 𝒦 = {𝜅1, … , 𝜅𝑁} be a set of candidate solutions 𝜅𝑖 ≡ (𝒟𝑖, 𝒮𝑖) with representing pairs 
of dispatch and SPS configuration. The optimisation takes the form 
 min𝑖∈{1,…,𝑁}
𝐺(𝜅𝑖) + 𝑃(𝜅𝑖) + 𝑋(𝜅𝑖) (38) 
For each of the candidate solutions, all SPS outcome scenarios (partial failures) are 
enumerated explicitly and the load-shedding impact may be computed by means of 
simulation, or using an independent optimisation procedure. This point-by-point 
analysis guarantees the ‘true’ best candidate is selected from the set 𝒦. 
6.2.2 Defining candidates 
The challenge is thus transformed to the generation of suitable candidates. To this end it 
is solved a simplified version of equation (37), replacing the true load-shedding function 
𝑋 by an approximate function. In Chapter 4, it has been observed that load-shedding 
costs, if present, are very large and increase in a step-wise fashion when critical 
thresholds are exceeded. Indeed, it is intuitive that exceeding post-fault flow limits can 
trigger line disconnections, which may directly trigger customer disconnections, or 
further overloads. When disconnections occur, these often result in significant costs.  
In this light the concept of partial security candidate solutions is introduced. These are 
solutions that are guaranteed to prevent load shedding for one or more scenarios 𝑞 ≡
(𝑐, 𝑜), where each scenario consists of a contingency 𝑐 and a subsequent SPS outcomes 
𝑜. A partial security candidate for the set 𝒬 = {𝑞1, 𝑞2, … , 𝑞𝑘} is defined as a solution that 
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has no post-SPS constraint violations – and thereby prevents load-shedding – for all 
scenarios in 𝒬 . This is enforced by a set of constraints ℎ𝒬(𝒟, 𝒮) ≤ 0 that replaces the 
load-shedding impact term 𝑋  in the objective function. Note that this approach is 
equivalent to replacing the load-shedding impact by ?̃?𝒬  where the value of ?̃?𝒬  is zero, 
unless an overload occurs in one of the post-SPS scenarios 𝑞 ∈ 𝒬 , in which case the 
impact is assumed to be infinite. 
In the context of a generation rejection scheme, each SPS outcome 𝑜𝑖 is characterised by 
a collection of generators. Without further restrictions the partial security constraints ℎ𝒬 
would simply result in the use of generators that will not be impacted by the failures a 
clairvoyant solution. To counteract this, the method simultaneously restrict the set of 
permissible SPS configurations to those that are affected by each of the scenarios in 𝒬. 
This is denoted by the constraint 𝒮 ∈ 𝛴(𝒬). 
The above approximations address the complexity of load-shedding dynamics included 
in 𝑋 . The final step in defining the partial security candidates addresses the second 
barrier, related to the utilisation costs 𝑃𝑢. Because utilisation payments are only made 
to generators that actually trip, computing the expected utilisation payment involves 
evaluating all possible SPS outcomes within the optimisation. To avoid an exponential 
growth in the number of terms in the objective function it will be assumed that the SPS 
works as configured, corresponding to a utilisation fee 𝑃𝑢∗(𝑐, 𝒟, 𝒮) . This is an 
overestimate of the true expected utilisation cost, but the gap between the true value and 
this upper bound is guaranteed to be smaller than Pr(𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙) × 𝑃𝑢∗, where Pr (𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙) is the 
probability of SPS malfunction – which is usually small.  
Summarising the above, the partial security candidate for a set of scenarios 𝒬 is defined 
as the solution  
𝜅(𝒬) ≡ 𝜅(𝒟, 𝒮) = arg min
𝒟,𝒮
𝐺(𝒟) + 𝑃𝑎(𝒟, 𝒮) +∑𝜆𝑐
𝑐∈𝒞
𝑃𝑢∗(𝑐, 𝒟, 𝒮) 
subject to  𝑓(𝒟, 𝒮) ≤ 0 
𝑔(𝒟, 𝒮) = 0 
ℎ𝒬(𝒟, 𝒮) ≤ 0 
𝒮 ∈ 𝛴(𝒬) 
(39) 
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6.2.3 Iterative optimisation: 
The procedure outlined above generates partial security candidates 𝜅𝑖  for scenarios 
collections 𝒬𝑖, and selects the best of those candidates through explicit simulation and 
enumeration. The number of possible scenario sets grows exponentially with the 
number of contingencies and generators, making it impractical to evaluate all possible 
partial security candidates. Instead, it is proposed an iterative algorithm to select 
suitable candidates. 
Initially, the algorithm starts with the set 𝒬0 that contains all scenarios corresponding to 
correct SPS operation: one scenario for each contingency, paired with the outcome in 
which the SPS operates correctly. The corresponding candidate solution 𝒦0 = 𝜅(𝒬0) 
reflects the regular ‘dependable SPS’ approach to operation.  
Next, the set of secure scenarios is expanded in a stepwise fashion using a steepest 
descent algorithm. The initial set 𝒬0 is combined sequentially with each single credible 
SPS failure scenarios to generate trial sets ?̃?1
𝑖 , where 𝑖  runs over all included failure 
scenarios. Partial security candidates ?̃?1
𝑖  are generated for each trial set and the best 
candidate is selected through enumeration and explicit simulation, according to equation 
(38). The winning candidate solution and its corresponding secure scenario set are 
labelled 𝜅1 and 𝒬1, respectively. The process proceeds analogously in subsequent stages: 
single credible failure scenarios are added to 𝒬1 to generate ?̃?2
𝑖  and associated candidate 
solutions ?̃?2
𝑖 , and the winning candidate solution is denoted by 𝜅2. This steepest descent 
algorithm continues until the objective function of 𝜅𝑗 at iteration 𝑗 ceases to improve on 
the previous iteration. In each iteration 𝑗 , several candidates may achieve the best 
improvement of the objective function; in such case the first candidate is selected. 
The list of credible SPS failure scenarios that is used in the algorithm consists of all 
combinations of SPS-triggering contingencies and SPS outcomes resulting from a single 
component failure – those being the most likely failure modes. For the SPS model used 
in this chapter (Fig. 28), these failures either affect a single generator (breaker failure), 
all generators in a node (communication link failure) or the whole SPS (logic control 
failure). The number of credible failure scenarios is therefore |𝒞| × (𝑁 + 𝐺)+1, where 
|𝒞| is the number of SPS-triggering contingencies, and 𝑁 is the number of SPS-linked 
nodes and 𝐺 is the total number of generators connected to those nodes. 
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6.3 Illustration on the 24-Bus IEEE RTS System 
This section presents an illustration of the proposed method on the 24-node IEEE RTS 
[53]. This network is characterised by dominant north-south power flows, as the 
cheapest generating units are located at nodes 18, 21, 22 and 23. The costs associated 
with one hour of operation using an unreliable SPS are investigated. 
 
Figure 27: Illustration of the case study on the 24-node RTS IEEE system. Contingencies 
and nodes involved in the operation of the SPS are coloured: green for triggering 
contingencies, black for the nodes where the control of the SPS is located and red for 
nodes connected to the SPS. 
6.3.1 Case study description 
It is assumed that the system operator is subject to the ‘N-d’ security standard, and 
therefore the network must be operated so that no single or double circuit can cause an 
overload of the remaining transmission lines. It is also assumed that the power system 
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must be operated with a minimum requirement of frequency response capacity of 350 
MW (biggest generation unit in the network). To reduce generation curtailments in the 
north area, an SPS is linked to the single contingencies in line 27 and transformer 7 as 
well as to the double circuit failure in lines 25 and 26. Note these contingencies 
highlighted in green in Fig. 27. The SPS is therefore intended to respond to three different 
contingency events. The SPS logic is located at node 15 (highlighted in black in Fig. 27) 
where the trip signals are remotely broadcast to the intertripping generators that are 
part of the SPS and have been previously selected. Any contingency from this set triggers 
the same SPS actions. It is assumed that all generators located at nodes 18, 21, 22 and 23 
can be selected to be part of the SPS, as highlighted in red in Fig. 27.  
6.3.2 Modifications and parameters on the network  
To diversify the generation resources, the two original generators of 400 MW at nodes 
18 and 21 are separated in two units with capacities of 160 MW and 240 MW (node 18) 
and 110 and 290 MW (node 21) respectively. Also, the capacity of all transmission lines 
is reduced by a factor of 5% in order to create additional stress in the network. In order 
to simulate bad weather conditions, the outage rates [53] are multiplied by a factor of 
15. The double outage is assumed to be 0.925% less frequent than the sum of the rates 
of the single circuits that constitute it [53]. It is finally assumed that 4% of the demand 
at each node is available to provide frequency response. Table 15, 16 and 17 contain the 
case study parameters. Generation costs are based on a simple linear function derived 
from the quadratic costs functions from Georgia Institute of Technology [81].  
Table 13: Contingencies failure rates (occ/hour) 
Contingency Failure rates (occ/hour) 
7 3.43 × 10−5 
27 0.0013 
25 and 26 1.69 × 10−4 
Table 14: Properties of generators connected to the SPS 
Bus Generators[capacity(MW)] 
18 𝑔1[160], 𝑔2[240] 
21 𝑔3[110], 𝑔4[290] 
22 𝑔5[50], 𝑔6[50], 𝑔7[50], 𝑔8[50], 𝑔9[50], 𝑔10[50] 
23 𝑔11[155], 𝑔12[155], 𝑔3[350] 
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Table 15: Costs associated to faults 
Parameter Explanation Cost 
𝝅𝒂 Cost of frequency response availability $30 /MW/h 
𝝅𝒖 Cost of generator disconnection $1000 MW/event 
𝝅𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒍 Cost of customer disconnection $30000MW/event 
6.4 Power system model 
6.4.1 Functional SPS model and response  
Fig. 28 shows the SPS model at the component level according to the structure described 
in chapter 3. Note that the diagram corresponds with the functionality of the system, 
rather than its exact component topology.  
 
Figure 28: SPS modelling of the case study 
The SPS has three relays: R1 that identifies a contingency on line 25, R2 which senses a 
contingency on line 26 and R3 that identifies a contingency on line 7 or line 27. These 
relays send the trips signals TS1, TS2 and TS3 to the logic control LC15, respectively. The 
logic control is programmed to send the trip signals to the generators that have been 
previously selected when it receives either TS1 and TS2 or TS3.The SPS actions result in 
































been acquired at the dispatch stage) are activated in order to re-store the generation 
shortage. Frequency services are assumed to respond optimally so that line overloads 
are minimised. For a detailed description of the frequency response model, please see 
Appendix 6.7.2. 
6.4.2 Impact modelling 
After the balance between generation and demand has been restored, updated 
transmission line flows are computed. If any flow limits are violated, a basic cascading 
algorithm is initiated. The algorithm does not intend to model the dynamics of a 
cascading sequence, but rather aims to capture the large range of outcomes that can 
result from an initial disruption. For this simplified model all generators in a node are 
aggregated into a nodal generation value with an associated response capability, 
resulting in a network graph described by lines and nodes with associated load and 
generation values. 
The cascading starts by identifying and disconnecting all overloaded lines. If a 
disconnection creates islands, the generation and demand must be balanced for each 
island individually. In islands with a generation surplus the generator output is reduced 
proportionally. In an island with a generation shortfall the generator response capability 
is used where possible (proportionally, subject to response limits). If the response 
capability is insufficient, load is shed proportionally until it can be met by the generation 
in the island. When all lines in the initial batch of overloaded lines have been 
disconnected, the flows in remaining lines are again compared to their limits. If any 
further overloads are identified, the procedure is repeated. When no further overloads 
are found, the aggregate amount of disconnected load (in MW) is multiplied by the Value 
of Lost Load to determine the impact 𝑋 . For a detailed description of the cascading 
outages model, please see Appendix 6.7.3. 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Optimisation of SPS configuration: P+X 
Firstly, this section proceeds to solve the sub-problem of optimising the SPS 
configuration 𝒮  for a given dispatch ?̂?. When the dispatch is fixed, it is achievable to 
enumerate all possible SPS configurations and their corresponding outcomes. The 
objective of this exercise is to verify the performance of the method by comparing its 
results to a global optimum obtained amongst the enumeration of all possible solutions. 
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The dispatch utilised is a security unconstrained dispatch (none of the post-contingency 
constraints are included) with a minimum frequency response requirement of 350 MW.  
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} 𝑡1, 𝑡8, 𝑡9,𝑡10 310 51655 10903.1 1687.2 74745.3 105.4 
Global 
optimum 
n/a 𝑡1, 𝑡3, 𝑡5 320 51655 10916.1 1568.8 74639.9 n/a 
 
Table 16 shows the different properties of the solutions obtained in two iterations of the 
method: the secure scenarios 𝒬  include in each candidate solution, the generators 
selected and the different cost components of the solution. Additionally it shows 𝜀 which 
is the deviation with respect to the global solution. Note the notation to refer to the 
different SPS failure modes: ook  denotes the scenario in which the SPS works as 
expected, og𝑖  signifies the failure mode at generator 𝑖 and ob𝑛  represents the failure of 
the communication link at bus 𝑛. Also note that c𝑙 denotes a contingency on line 𝑙 and 
that 𝒞 signifies all set of contingencies connected to the SPS. 
The method converges to the global optimum in two iterations. The winning candidate 
in each iteration is highlighted. The base case 𝒦0 = 𝜅(𝒬0) has low protection costs but 
carries large risk. This happens because all generators selected are located at node 22, 
increasing the risk from a common mode failure of the SPS. In the first iteration, the 
method discovers five different proposals for configuring the SPS. All of them represent 
 107 
an improvement with respect to 𝜅0 . The method finds ?̃?1
1  to be the best candidate 
solution in the set related to the first iteration. This ‘partial security solution’ implies a 
total cost reduction of 2512.6$/h. In the second iteration, the method reaches two SPS 
configurations, being one of them equivalent to the best solution found in the first 
iteration (𝜅1). The second solution is characterised by securing against the additional 
scenario when the communication failure at bus 21 fails to operate upon the occurrence 
of contingency 21. This new solution includes 𝑡3 in the set of generators selected at the 
expense of removing 𝑡7 and 𝑡8 from such set. The additional profit gained in this iteration 
is 105.4$/h. This candidate solution corresponds to the global optimum obtained 
through the full enumeration of solutions. It is worth noticing that there are solutions 
with larger SPS capacity committed that present higher risks. These counter intuitive 
results underline the importance of committing SPS capacity at specific locations in the 
network. 
 
Figure 29: Cost evolution in the different iterations for different reliabilities of the SPS 
Fig 29 shows the evolution of the total costs for different availabilities of the 
communication links. In addition, the figure shows in which iteration the method 
achieves the global optimum (yellow diamonds). As expected, SPS unreliability penalises 
the base case ‘low security solution’. For all SPS reliability values considered, the method 
is able to achieve the global optimum. Low reliability (0.8 and 0.9) requires two 
iterations to arrive to the optimal solution, whereas high reliability (0.95 and 0.99) only 

























6.5.2 Co-optimisation of SPS configuration and dispatch: G+P+X 
The problem of co-optimising generation, protection and loss-of-load costs is analysed 
in this section. In this case, the theoretical space of possible solutions is not restricted to 
a finite set of scenarios, as the generator’s outputs do not correspond to discrete 
variables. Hence, it is no longer possible to compare the candidate solutions to a global 
optimum, as in the previous section.  
Table 17 shows the properties of the solutions obtained. The control of the dispatch 
constitutes a new degree of freedom for the optimisation and the method has more 
options to find new solutions in each iteration. Note that the table includes a new column 
to show the generation curtailments in the exporting area (north) where the SPS is 
connected. For simplicity in each iteration only three different solutions are shown. 
The method starts with the 𝜅0 in which the risk amounts to the 6% of total operating 
costs with no generation curtailments involved. In the first iteration, the trial ?̃?1
1 
configures the SPS considering that 𝑡4  may not trip upon contingency 7. This solution 
proposes an overprovision of SPS capacity of 40 MW and has associated no extra 
generation costs. The solution affords additional 52$/h of protection costs for reducing 
2380$/h of risk, which is clearly economically beneficial. ?̃?2
1 achieves a fairly low-risk 
solution at the expense of incurring in 42 MW of generation curtailments and committing 
68 MW of extra SPS capacity. Note that further response capacity beyond the minimum 
requirement is purchased (+28 MW) with a corresponding increase in the protection 
costs term. This solution presents a share of 82.2%, 17.2% and 0.6% of generation, 
protection and risk respectively. The last solution of the first iteration ?̃?1
3 is not efficient 
as it heavily relies on extra 150 MW of SPS capacity and 2 MW of curtailments, yet it 
cannot reduce the risk term in the same proportions. ?̃?1
1  is therefore the winning 
candidate and ?̃?1
1 becomes the set of secure-configured SPS failure scenarios.  
In the second iteration, the set of post-contingency scenarios are sequentially added to 
?̃?1
1 , one by one, obtaining both better and worse solutions. For instance, the second 
candidate makes use of 2 MW of preventive security (generation curtailments) in order 
to reduce the risk term by 136.5$/h, which in overall presents an improvement of 41$/h. 
However, the other two candidates present larger operational costs than the winning 
candidate of the first iteration due to their inefficient SPS configurations (large SPS 
capacity commitment with no corresponding reduction in the risk term). Therefore, ?̃?2
2 
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} 𝑡4, 𝑡11 445 2 53173 13928.6 1644.5 68746 


















} 𝑡4, 𝑡5 340 0 53077.4 10942.1 1927.7 65570 





















































𝑡3, 𝑡5, 𝑡6, 𝑡7, 
𝑡8, 𝑡9, 𝑡10 





𝑡1, 𝑡3, 𝑡5, 𝑡7 
𝑡8 




} n/a n/a 292 72746.6 10500 0 83246.6 
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In the third iteration the method continues to find new solutions. Note that ?̃?3
2 and ?̃?3
3 
present larger operational costs. However, ?̃?3
1  improves the objective function by 2$ 
through configuring the SPS for (c27, og5). This candidate does not require an increase in 
the generation and protection costs terms, but rather a re-allocation of response capacity 
to remedy the new malfunction scenario. Therefore, this shows that the operational costs 
of a candidate solution are also determined by specific location of frequency response 
capacity. No better solutions are found in the fourth iteration and thus ?̃?3
1  is the best 
solution found. 
The table also shows three additional: 1) ‘G-1’ for which the system must be configured 
to be resilient against the failure of any generator, ‘B-1’ denoting that the system must 
be configured to be resilient against the failure of any bus linked to the SPS and 3) ‘Fail’ 
in which the SPS must be resilient against a total failure driven by the common mode 
failure in the logic control, as illustrated in Fig.28 (note that this is equivalent to not using 
the SPS). Due to the possibility of the method to curtail generation and/or commit more 
SPS capacity beyond the minimum frequency capacity requirements, these three 
solutions become feasible unlike in the previous section; yet all of them present a worse 
balance between benefits and risks. For the ‘B-1’ solution, the risk term is reduced by 
1122.7$ when compared with 𝒦3 . However, larger generation curtailments and 
protection costs are needed which do not compensate the reduction in risk. If the SPS is 
not used at all (no risk accepted), the network operator must curtail 292 MW of cheap 
generation in the northern area, which results in operational extra costs of 17796.6$/h. 
Obviously, this solution does not have associated any risk. ‘G-1’ does not provide better 
costs either. 
 

































To finalise, risk is expressed in terms of an insightful profile. Fig. 30 shows the risk profile 
(complementary cumulative distribution function) associated with 𝒦0  (assumed 
dependable SPS), 𝒦3 (optimum found by the iterative procedure), ‘G-1’ and ‘N-1’. The 
risk exposure is different for all candidates. ‘B-1’ presents the closest shape, followed by 
𝒦3, ‘G-1’ and the base case. This observation is in line with the average values of risks 
from Table 17. It is also possible to observe that ‘G-1’ shows the largest event loss, which 
is not presented in any other solution (including the base case). As summarised in Table 
18, it is concluded that the iterative method arrives to a solution that achieves an 
attractive balance between operational costs and risk exposure. 
Table 18: Summary of costs of the different solutions 
Solution G($/h) P($/h) X($/h) Total($/h) 
Assumed 
dependable SPS 
53077.4 10890.1 3853.8 67821.3 
Iterative 53173 10942.1 1335 65450 
G-1 53077.4 12833.12 1570.96 67481.5 
N-1 55749.85 11455.62 212.26 67417.72 
6.6 Conclusions 
The optimisation of power system operation considering SPS unreliability presents two 
major difficulties. First, the computation of the load-shedding impact may require the 
analysis of complex dynamical (e.g. cascading outages). The second barrier is that the set 
of possible SPS outcomes is potentially large, and depends on the decision variables 
(generator dispatch and selection). This circular dependence can be overcome only at 
the cost of including all possible SPS outcomes for all possible SPS configurations – an 
approach that is prohibitive for large systems. 
This chapter have proposed a novel heuristic method that specifically addresses these 
two barriers to optimising system operation with unreliable SPS. The heuristic method 
consists of three components: 1) a restricted enumeration of a finite set of candidate 
solutions; 2) a method to generate such candidate solutions; 3) a method for iterative 
improvement of the set of candidate solutions.   
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This chapter has relied on the concept of partial security candidate solutions introduced 
in Chapter 4 in order to address the complexity of load-shedding dynamics. Based on this 
concept, the method restricts the optimisation to a finite set of candidate solutions in 
which the true load-shedding impact function is replaced by an approximate function 
that enforces no post-SPS constraint violations for particular post-fault scenarios.  
The candidate solution method presents on its own a very important implication: 
solutions can be evaluated point-wise to select the best amongst them, and thereby it 
permits to embed complex impact assessments based on power system dynamics into 
cost-benefit operational frameworks. However, the optimisation procedure grows 
exponentially with the size of the power system network and the potential SPS 
configurations. To address this difficulty, this method proposes to simplify the objective 
function by assuming that the SPS works as expected. This is a conservative 
approximation to considering the large burden of post-contingency outcomes, including 
SPS configurations and failures. In addition, it has have proposed an iterative method to 
gradually incorporate ‘secure scenarios’, starting with an initial solution associated with 
the regular ‘dependable SPS’ approach. Each iteration has associated a winning 
candidate that is included to the set of ‘secure scenarios’. This steepest descent algorithm 
iterates until it cannot find any solutions with lower operational costs. 
This method has been tested on the RTS 24-Bus IEEE System which is characterised by 
heavy north-south power flows. To reduce generation curtailments, an SPS is linked to 
the single contingencies The SPS model includes a novelty with respect to Chapter 4 and 
5, as it includes a common mode failure for all generators in a node (communication link 
failure). 
The method has been tested within a finite set of possible solutions (dispatch given). The 
objective of this exercise was to verify the performance of the method by comparing its 
results to a global optimum obtained amongst the enumeration of all possible solutions. 
This exercise has provided satisfactory results as the method achieves the global 
optimum after two iterations at most (depending on the reliability of the SPS).  
Next, the performance of the method in solving the optimisation including the dispatch 
decisions have been checked. The theoretical space of possible solutions is not restricted 
to a finite set of scenarios, as the generator’s outputs do not correspond to discrete 
variables. Hence, it was no longer possible to compare the candidate solutions to a global 
optimum. However, the iterative method has been compared with the ‘regular assumed 
SPS dependable’ and three more solutions: 1) ‘G-1’ the system must be configured to be 
resilient against the failure of any generator, 2) ‘B-1’ the system must be configured to 
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be resilient against the failure of any bus linked to the SPS, 3) ‘Fail’ equivalent to not using 
the SPS. The iterative method has resulted in lower operational costs compared to the 
above solutions based on dispatch decisions and localised SPS and frequency response 
capacity. In particular, it has been observed that the method achieves an appropriate 
balance between risk and generation plus protection costs, when compared to the other 
solutions investigated. 
6.7 Appendix 
6.7.1 Generation of candidate solutions 
The generation of solutions is based on a mixed integer linear programming model 
where the variables and parameters correspond with those introduced in Chapter 3. It is 
set in MATLAB 2014a and solved in FICO Xpress 7.7 as described in section 3.5. Specific 
variables exclusively associated with this model are explained in this section. 𝒢𝑅 refers 
to the set of frequency sensitive generators whereas 𝒢𝐼 denotes the set of intertripping 
generators.  
There are four types of states: the pre-contingency state 𝑠0, post-contingencies states 
that are not connected to the SPS denoted by 𝑃¬𝑆𝑃𝑆, post-SPS scenarios included in 𝒬 and 
post-SPS scenarios that are not included in 𝒬, denoted by ¬𝒬. Therefore, 𝒫 = 𝒫¬𝑆𝑃𝑆 ∪ 𝒬 
refers to the set of post-fault scenarios in which no post-contingency overloading is 
ensured, which is achieved exclusively by preventive security actions for 𝒫¬𝑆𝑃𝑆 and may 
include the utilisation of the SPS for the scenarios in 𝒬. Note that scenarios in the set ¬𝒬 
are not included in the generation of candidate solutions.  
6.7.1.1 Objective function: 
In accordance with the method described in section 6.2, the system operator solves a risk 
sensitive optimal power flow as follows:  












As this model includes discrete selection of intertripping generators, we define 𝑡𝑖 that is 
a binary variable that equals 1 if generator 𝑖 is included in the selection of intertripping 
generators, and 0 otherwise. In order to ensure the equivalence between the capacity 
dispatched and tripped in a generator, we define 𝑡𝑖
∗ which is a continuous variable that 
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equals 𝑔𝑖 when generator 𝑖 is selected to be tripped. The relation between 𝑔𝑖 , 𝑡𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖
∗ is 
defined as 𝑡𝑖
∗=𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖  that can be linearised with the following set of constraints: 
𝑔𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝑔𝑖(1 − 𝑡𝑖)    ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒢
𝐼 
𝑡𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖     ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒢
𝐼 
0 ≤ 𝑡𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝑔𝑖     ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒢
𝐼 
Generators must be dispatched within their minimum and maximum technical limits, 
considering the spare capacity assigned to frequency response:  
𝑔𝑖 ≥ 𝑔𝑖𝑢𝑖           ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒢
𝐼 ∪ 𝒢𝑅 
𝑔𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖
𝑔 ≤ 𝑔𝑖𝑢𝑖           ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒢
𝐼 ∪ 𝒢𝑅 
Intertripping generators must be dispatched and do not provide frequency response. 
Therefore,  
𝑢𝑖 = 1 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒢
𝐼 
𝑟𝑖
𝑔 = 0     ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝐼 
The system operator can purchase frequency response provided by loads on the network 
(responsive demand). It is assumed that each node can provide a portion 𝛽 of its demand 
as response.  
𝑟𝑛
𝑑 ≤ 𝛽 ∙ 𝐷𝑛         ∀𝑛 











In all of the scenarios the power flows must respect the limits, 
−𝑓?̅? ≤ 𝑓𝑙







          ∀𝑠 ∈ {𝑠0} ∪ 𝒫   
Of course power flows in faulted lines associated post-fault states are set to zero: 
𝑓𝑙(𝑠)
𝑠 = 0          ∀𝑙, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒫 
The DC power balance in the steady-state operation and contingencies not connected to 





𝑠 − ∑ 𝑓𝑙
𝑠
𝑙∈𝐿:𝑛𝑜(𝑙)=𝑛
= 𝐷𝑛       
𝑙∈𝐿:𝑛𝑒(𝑙)=𝑛
∀𝑛, ∀𝑠 ∈ {𝑠0} ∪ 𝒫
¬𝑆𝑃𝑆       
where 𝑔(𝑛) contains the set of generators located at node 𝑛, 𝑛𝑒(𝑙) is the ending node of 
line 𝑙 and 𝑛𝑜(𝑙) is the origin node of line 𝑙. 
The scenarios in 𝒬  include the actions of the SPS and the corresponding frequency 
response deployment. Note the parametric function 𝑤𝑖(𝑠) which determines whether a 



















∀𝑛, 𝑠 ∈  𝒬    
The single generator failures in 𝒬 are included in the selection of tripping generators in 
order to force that the system operator chooses the faulted breakers: 
𝑡𝑖 = 1       ∀𝑖 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝒬  
As for communication failure links, at least one of the generators linked to each link 
included in 𝒬 has to be selected: 
∑ 𝑡𝑖 ≥ 1    ∀ 𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝒬  
𝑖∈𝑔(𝑛)
 




𝑠      ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑅 , 𝑠 ∈ 𝒬       
∆𝑑𝑛
𝑠 ≤ 𝑟𝑛 
𝑑        ∀𝑛, 𝑠 ∈ 𝒬       





𝑠 ≥ 0    ∀𝑖, 𝑛, 𝑠 ∈ 𝒬    
6.7.2 Optimal frequency response 
The optimal frequency response model is used to simulate deployment of frequency 
response to restore the balance between generation and demand in all post-SPS action 
scenarios: 𝒫 ∪ ¬𝒬. For the set of scenarios 𝒫 it returns the trivial solution associated 
with no overloading at all. As for the set the ¬𝒬 (post-SPS scenarios not included in the 
generation of the candidate), it computes potential remaining overloads, if there is any. 
Note that this model is executed before performing the impact assessment that includes 
cascading outages and returns the impact in terms of lost load.  
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The model is based on mixed-integer linear programming. The variables and parameters 
correspond with those introduced in Chapter 3. Specific variables exclusively associated 
with this model are explained in this section. It is set in MATLAB 20014a and solved in 
FICO Xpress 7.7 as described in section 3.5. 
6.7.2.1 Objective function 
The objective function seeks to minimise remaining overloads relatively to the capacity 





where 𝑂𝑣𝑙  denotes the overload in line 𝑙 (MW). 
6.7.2.2 Constraints 
There is a certain amount of response capacity (previously scheduled in the dispatch) 
from frequency sensitive generating units and demand response:  
0 ≤ ∆𝑔𝑖 ≤ 𝑟𝑖
𝑔   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑅 
0 ≤ ∆𝑑𝑛 ≤ 𝑟𝑛 
𝑑        ∀𝑛 
The power balance after the response is deployed must be satisfied. Note that the 
generation levels 𝑔𝑖  and intertripping capacity at generating units are parameters as 
they are set at the dispatch level. The parametric function  𝑤𝑖(𝑠) where 𝑠 ∈ 𝒫 specifies 










∑ 𝑓𝑙 − ∑ 𝑓𝑙
𝑙∈𝐿:𝑛𝑜(𝑙)=𝑛
= 𝐷𝑛   
𝑙∈𝐿:𝑛𝑒(𝑙)=𝑛
∀𝑛 
𝑔(𝑛) contains the set of generators located at node 𝑛, 𝑛𝑒(𝑙) is the ending node of line 𝑙 
and 𝑛𝑜(𝑙) is the origin node of line 𝑙. 




          ∀𝑙 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠 
𝑓𝑙 = 0          ∀𝑙 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠 
The overloading of is modelled based on the absolute value of the power flows with the 
equation: 
𝑂𝑣𝑙 = max {|𝑓𝑙| − 𝑓?̅? , 0} 
Which is transformed into the following set of equations: 
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𝛿𝑙
− = 0 ↔ 𝑓𝑙 ≥ −𝑓?̅?        ∀𝑙  
𝛿𝑙
+ = 0 ↔ 𝑓𝑙 ≤ 𝑓?̅?        ∀𝑙  
𝑖𝑓 𝛿𝑙
− + 𝛿𝑙
+ = 0 →   𝑂𝑣𝑙 = 0    ∀𝑙  
𝑖𝑓 𝛿𝑙
− = 1 → 𝑂𝑣𝑙 = −𝑓𝑙 − 𝑓?̅?      ∀𝑙   
𝑖𝑓 𝛿𝑙
+ = 1 → 𝑂𝑣𝑙 = 𝑓𝑙 − 𝑓?̅?        ∀𝑙   
where 𝛿𝑙
+ and 𝛿𝑙
− are auxiliary binary variables. This relation is linearised with the set of 
equations below, where a new binary variable 𝛿𝑙
∗ is used. Note that 𝐾 is a large positive 
number (constant) and 𝜀 a small error term (e.g. 0.0001). 
𝑓𝑙 ≥ −𝑓?̅? − 𝐾𝛿𝑙
−       ∀𝑙 
𝑓𝑙 ≤ −𝑓?̅? − 𝜀 + (𝐾 + 𝜀)(1 − 𝛿𝑙
−)      ∀𝑙 
𝑓𝑙 ≤ 𝑓?̅? + 𝐾𝛿𝑙
∓       ∀𝑙 
𝑓𝑙 ≥ 𝑓?̅? + 𝜀 + (−𝐾 − 𝜀)(1 − 𝛿𝑙
+)     ∀𝑙 
𝑂𝑣𝑙 ≤ 𝛿𝑙
∗𝐾     ∀𝑙 
𝑂𝑣𝑙 ≥ −𝛿𝑙
∗𝐾      ∀𝑙 
𝛿𝑙
− + 𝛿𝑙
+ ≥ 𝜀 + (−𝐾 − 𝜀)(1 − 𝛿𝑙
∗)      ∀𝑙 
𝑂𝑣𝑙 + 𝑓𝑙 ≤ −𝑓?̅? +𝐾(1 − 𝛿𝑙
−)       ∀𝑙 
𝑂𝑣𝑙 + 𝑓𝑙 ≥ −𝑓?̅? − 𝐾(1 − 𝛿𝑙
−)       ∀𝑙  
𝑂𝑣𝑙 − 𝑓𝑙 ≤ −𝑓?̅? +𝐾(1 − 𝛿𝑙
+)       ∀𝑙 
𝑂𝑣𝑙 − 𝑓𝑙 ≥ −𝑓?̅? − 𝐾(1 − 𝛿𝑙
+)       ∀𝑙  
6.7.3 Efficient DC power flow method for the simulation of cascading 
outages 
This section outlines a quasi-steady state simulation method for the evaluation of 
cascading outages developed by Simon Tindemans (unpublished personal 
communication).  
A number of simplifying assumptions are made both in the network model and its 
evaluation. Specifically, all generators in a node are aggregated into a nodal generation 
value with an associated response capability, resulting in a simple network graph 
described by lines and nodes with associated load and generation values. A quasi-steady 
state (QSS) simulation approach is used to simulate cascading dynamics, using a DC 
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power flow model and (thermal) flow limits on lines, and simplifying assumptions on 
generator responses.  
The cascading starts by identifying and disconnecting all overloaded lines. If a 
disconnection creates islands, the generation and demand must be balanced for each 
island individually. In islands with a generation surplus the generator output is reduced 
proportionally. In an island with a generation shortfall the generator response capability 
is used where possible (proportionally, subject to response limits). If the response 
capability is insufficient, load is shed proportionally until it can be met by the generation 
in the island. When all lines in the initial batch of overloaded lines have been 
disconnected, the flows in remaining lines are again compared to their limits. If any 
further overloads are identified, the procedure is repeated. When no further overloads 
are found, the aggregate amount of disconnected load (in MW) is multiplied by the cost 
of involuntary disconnection (£/MW/event) to determine the impact X.  
6.7.3.1 Implementation procedure 
Let us assume we have a connected network with 𝑁 buses labelled 𝑛 ∈ 𝒩 = {1,…𝑁} and 
𝐿  lines with indices 𝑙,𝑚 ∈ {1,…𝐿} . The line flow limits are given by 𝑓?̅?  (in either 
direction) and the nodal generation limits by ?̅?𝑛 (the lower limit is assumed to be zero).  
The cascading proceeds in discrete stages, indexed by 𝑘 = 0,1,…. The simulation starts 
from a given initial condition with generation levels 𝑔𝑛
(0)
 and load levels 𝑑𝑛
(0)
, and an 
initial set of line outages 𝔗. The lines in 𝔗 are removed one by one, and added to the cut 
line set 𝒞(𝑘); whenever islands are formed the supply and demand is rebalanced in each 
island. When the set 𝔗  is exhausted, a DC power flow is used to identify remaining 
overloaded lines, and any such lines are added as a batch to the overload queue 𝒪. The 
lines in 𝒪 are taken out of service one by one and added to 𝒞(𝑘); when the queue is empty, 
the process is repeated until no further overloads are found.  
1. Set the initial contingency set 𝒞(0) = ∅  
2. Initialise the overload queue 𝒪 = 𝔗.  
3. Initialise the simulation step counter 𝑘 = 1 
4. While 𝒪 ≠ ∅  (i.e. while there are contingencies to be processed), do the 
following: 
a. Let 𝑙 be the first element from 𝒪 and remove 𝑙 from 𝒪. 
b. Set 𝒞(𝑘) = 𝒞(𝑘−1) + {𝑙}. 
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c. If removing line 𝑙  causes the network to be split, it is necessary to 
enforce the supply-demand balance in each island separately, ensuring 
that no power flows along line 𝑙. 
i. Identify islands with positive and negative generation balance 
and assign nodes to the sets 𝒩+and 𝒩− , respectively. Note 
that the slack bus may be part of one of these sets, and is 
manipulated along with the other quantities in the steps that 
follow. 
ii. Compute the total active generation 𝐺+ in the generation 
surplus island, and the total demand 𝐷− , active generation 
𝐺−and reserve capacity 𝑅−in the generation deficit island as 
follows: 

















iii. For the generation surplus island, regulate the active 

















iv. For the generation deficit island, ramp up the generation and 
shed load only if necessary. If the reserve generation capacity 



































d. Compute updated power flows 𝑓𝑙
(𝑘)
, subject to the set of outaged lines 
𝒞(𝑘). 
e. If the previous batch of line outages has been processed (𝒪 ≠ ∅): 
Identify the set of overloaded lines 𝒪 = {𝑙: |𝑓𝑙
(𝑘)
| > 𝑓?̅?, 𝑙 ∉ 𝒞
(𝑘)} 
f. Increase 𝑘 by 1, and repeat item (4). 
5. Compute the total amount of load shed 





and report this number as a proxy for the severity of the event. 
 7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Conclusions 
This thesis considers the operation of corrective System Protection Schemes (SPS) in 
electricity networks. Such systems have the potential to greatly enhance the utilisation 
of the network, but malfunctions may expose the system to large risks, including 
blackouts. Choosing the optimal operational strategy is therefore subject to a cost-
benefit trade-off between the benefits of increased system utilisation and the risk of 
(high-impact) outages.  
This chapter proposes to state the problem in three different phases, namely steady-
state, SPS action and response and impact assessment. This is used to formalise the 
objective of the network operator from a system perspective: minimising the operational 
costs, considering unreliable SPS operation. The operational cost is divided in three 
components: generation (𝐺), protection (𝑃) and load shedding risk (𝑋). This chapter also 
presents a general modelling framework for SPS failure modes and related impact 
assessments. In general the resulting optimisation problem is non-algebraic and admits 
no closed form solutions.  
A simple 4-node representation of the GB network is presented in Chapter 4 in order to 
investigate the issues involved in the operation of power systems with unreliable SPS, 
considering variation on parameters such as wind availability, weather conditions and 
SPS reliability, thus obtaining conclusions as follows:  
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1. If the dispatch is fixed the optimal SPS configuration is one of a discrete set of 
solutions that correspond to prevention of a cascading outage of the 
transmission corridor for a particular SPS outcome scenario. 
2. The optimal operational strategies provide security against a particular SPS 
outcome scenario by means of either committing redundant SPS capacity or 
constraining generators out of their merit order.  
3. The results indicate that unreliability of the SPS may result in a reduction of 
optimal transfer, and thus an increase in constraint costs. However, this 
finding is very sensitive to the rate of faults occurring on the network.  
4. Even unreliable SPS can produce large operational cost savings with respect 
to the ‘N-2 ‘ security standard. 
5. It is hypothesised that partial security candidates that avoid violating 
operating constraints in a particular scenario may thus serve starting points 
for a multistage heuristic optimisation procedure for the operation of SPS in 
full-scale systems. This is investigated in Chapter 6. 
This system is then used in Chapter 5 to investigate SPS operational benefits and risks in 
a year-round basis, concluding as follows: 
6. Contracting multiple intertripping schemes is associated with important 
annual benefits when compared with system operation under the ‘N-2’ 
security standard.  
7. The main operational benefits from contracting redundant intertrippings are 
linked to critical operating conditions characterised by bad weather 
conditions, high demand and wind availability levels. 
8. The analysis of such scenarios has shown that multiple intertripping schemes 
permit the system operator to release further transmission capacity with 
partial security profiles. 
9. One may expect that increasing the number of intertripping schemes will 
reduce the expected load not served (i.e. risk) in the year. However, this is not 
necessarily true, as the system operator’s willingness to take risk increases 
with the number of intertripping schemes added to the SPS. 
In chapter 6, it has been presented a heuristic method to optimise large systems and 
conclude: 
10. The proposed candidate solution method has a crucial property for the 
application to complex failure scenarios: solutions can be evaluated point-
wise to select the best amongst them, thereby permitting to embed complex 
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impact assessments based on power system dynamics into cost-benefit 
operational frameworks. 
11. Because the enumeration optimisation procedure grows exponentially with 
the size of the power system network and the potential SPS configurations, the 
method proposes an iterative procedure to gradually incorporate ‘secure 
scenarios’, starting with an initial solution associated with the regular 
‘dependable SPS’ approach. 
12. The performance of the method has been tested on a case study with a finite 
set of possible solutions (dispatch given). This exercise has provided 
satisfactory results as the method achieves the global optimum after two 
iterations at most (depending on the reliability of the SPS). 
13. Also, the performance of the method in solving the optimisation including the 
dispatch decisions has been checked. The solution obtained using the iterative 
method has been compared with the solution representing a dependable SPS 
and three more solutions: 1) ‘G-1’, where the system is configured to be 
resilient against the failure of any generator, 2) ‘B-1’, where the system is 
configured to be resilient against the failure of any bus linked to the SPS, 3) 
‘Fail’, i.e. resilient against total SPS malfunction, which is equivalent to not 
using the SPS. The iterative method has resulted in lower operational costs 
compared to the above solutions based on dispatch decisions and localised SPS 
and frequency response capacity. It is concluded that the iterative method 
arrives to a solution that achieves an appealing balance of operational costs 
and risk exposure. 
7.2 Suggestions for future research 
7.2.1 Comprehensive System Protection Scheme modelling 
As presented in Chapter 2, all types of SPS involve acquiring measurements, 
communicating signals, processing such signals and taking actions on to the power 
system. This thesis focus on the modelling and cost-benefit analysis of generation 
rejection schemes. However, the three-state problem formulation presented in 3.3.1 can 
be easily generalised to other types of SPS because it is independent from the corrective 
actions set under consideration. Accordingly, the models and methods developed in this 
thesis may be adapted to the operation of other types of SPS because.  
 124 
1. The component-based SPS modelling proposed in this thesis can be also 
extended to other SPS actions, which would simply require modifying the 
corrective action that the SPS takes into the power system. Previous work [8, 82] 
considers corrective actions such as optimal tapping of quadrature boosters and 
automatic demand shedding schemes, which can be included in the SPS 
modelling framework introduced in this thesis. 
2. Moreover, the same works consider the use of other SPS in the context of an 
optimisation framework that is defined as a mixed integer linear programming 
model (MILP), similarly to that of this thesis. This suggests that other types of 
SPS could be considered in the heuristic method proposed here.  
3. Finally, it is worth noticing that the general impact assessment introduced in this 
thesis is independent from the types of SPS actions being considered, and 
therefore could be directly embedded in studies associated with SPS actions 
other than generation rejection schemes. Of course this applies to the cascading 
model that Simon Tindemans has provided to perform complex impact 
assessments in Chapter 6.  
Furthermore, Chapter 2 has classified SPS failures in dependability-based misoperations 
and security-based misoperations. The former implies a failure to operate when 
requested, whereas the latter implies accidental operations when the system is not 
intended to act. This thesis has focused on the modelling and analysis of dependability-
based malfunctions, as they are related to more severe consequences. However, a more 
comprehensive risk analysis would also include security-based misoperations and their 
impacts in power system operation. 
7.2.2 Complex power system dynamics  
The scope of this thesis has been to explore SPS malfunction scenarios and their impact 
on optimal decisions in power system operation. The heuristic method described in 
Chapter 6 decouples the generation of “candidate solutions” from the impact evaluation 
of these solutions. An advantage of this design is that the impact evaluation procedure 
can take the form of an arbitrarily complex ‘black box’. This allows for replacing the basic 
cascading model that was used for the studies in Chapter 6 by more detailed and realistic 
dynamical models of power system failures. This is a promising area of further study.  
As shown in Chapter 6, risk can be expressed in terms of risk profiles rather than as an 
average impact term. The objective functions considered in this thesis are risk neutral, 
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but further work may consider risk-averse operation in order to avoid very large failure 
events.  
In Chapter 3, the problem of operating power systems with unreliable SPS has been 
formulated based on three-phases: the steady-state phase, SPS actions and response, and 
impact assessment. It has been assumed that the system operator has no control actions, 
other than automatic, after it makes the initial operational decisions. In some context this 
may be too conservative as, depending on the severity of the initiating event, the system 
operator could have time to neutralise some of the impacts [17].  
7.2.3 Year-round assessment in large networks 
In Chapter 5, it has been performed an annual assessment of the benefits and risks 
associated with an unreliable SPS. The results have shown interesting trade-offs between 
the provision of redundant intertripping schemes and its effects in terms of exposure to 
load shedding risk. The case study was performed on the simple system introduced in 
Chapter 4, and it will be worthwhile repeating these studies on larger systems, in 
combination with the heuristic optimisation method introduced in chapter 6.  
7.2.4 Planning studies 
In Chapter 2 it has been seen that traditional security standards are associated with low 
utilisation rates of transmission the transmission lines. This thesis has investigated the 
problem exclusively in operational time scales. Nonetheless, the long term impact of 
traditional security standards is that they require large investments on transmission 
infrastructure. To this end the models and methods introduced in this thesis may be 
embedded into decision modelling for the planning time frame. 
7.2.5 Enhancement of the heuristic method 
Chapter 6 has described a heuristic optimisation method to operate large systems. This 
method relies on the generation of partial security candidate solutions that are 
guaranteed to prevent post-SPS constraint violations for particular post-fault scenarios. 
As mentioned in 7.2.2, the heuristic method could be enhanced by the use of dynamic 
power system simulations to measure impacts more accurately. In addition, dynamic 
analysis could also enhance the generation of candidate solutions: constraints derived 
from simulations can be used to generate candidate solutions that respect dynamic 
limits. 
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The heuristic optimisation method for SPS operation is based on an iterative approach. 
In each iteration a winning candidate is selected, which constitutes the base case for the 
next iteration. The algorithm therefore traces a single ‘steepest descent path’ from the 
initial solution, and may end up in a local minimum. Although good solutions were found 
in case studies – much improved from the regular dependable or N-k scenarios – the 
search process can potentially be enhanced using search techniques such as swarm 
algorithms. In fact, some works have successfully used such techniques for solving 
problems related to optimal power system operation [83-86]. This thesis therefore 
encourages new research in this field to explore new search solutions jointly with the 
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Weather ID G (£/h) P (£/h) X (£/h) 
Total cost 
(£/h) 







with N-2 (£/h) 
1 0.56 0.05 1 736823.20 54000.00 0.00 790823.38 1800.00 0.00 0 0 491.86 0 
2 0.67 0.05 1 1024416.00 54000.00 0.00 1078416.18 1800.00 0.00 0 0 98.37 0 
3 0.76 0.05 1 1400699.20 54000.00 0.00 1454699.38 1800.00 0.00 0 0 804.39 0 
4 1.00 0.05 1 2820000.00 54000.00 0.00 2874000.18 1800.00 0.00 0 0 13.32 0 
5 0.70 0.05 1 1162976.00 54000.00 0.00 1216976.18 1800.00 0.00 0 0 163.95 0 
6 0.56 0.15 1 611759.20 54000.00 0.00 665759.41 2120.80 0.00 0 0 361.63 0 
7 0.67 0.15 1 861904.00 54000.00 0.00 915904.20 1987.20 0.00 0 0 72.33 0 
8 0.76 0.15 1 1220699.20 54000.00 0.00 1274699.45 2459.20 0.00 0 0 591.42 0 
9 1.00 0.15 1 2620000.00 54000.00 0.00 2674000.25 2500.00 0.00 0 0 9.79 0 
10 0.70 0.15 1 992312.00 54000.00 0.00 1046312.18 1842.40 0.00 0 0 120.54 0 
11 0.56 0.25 1 541759.20 54204.08 325.59 596289.28 4120.80 901.00 5 24698.26 253.38 6257925.00 
12 0.67 0.25 1 769432.80 54027.65 224.39 823685.19 3487.20 122.08 7 4079.15 50.68 206711.09 
13 0.76 0.25 1 1071510.40 54056.47 236.47 1125803.70 3578.08 249.31 7 1528.64 414.37 633427.25 
14 1.00 0.25 1 2420000.00 54298.99 389.46 2474688.90 4500.00 1320.00 6 10311.44 6.86 70759.60 
15 0.70 0.25 1 870320.00 54119.23 262.80 924702.41 3776.00 526.40 7 11617.92 84.46 981230.69 








Weather ID G (£/h) P (£/h) X (£/h) 
Total cost 
(£/h) 







with N-2 (£/h) 
17 0.67 0.35 1 699432.80 54153.48 2020.30 755607.13 5487.20 677.60 7 72157.21 35.53 2563713.37 
18 0.76 0.35 1 946510.40 54189.50 2070.09 1002770.55 5578.08 836.64 7 109133.79 290.53 31706430.92 
19 1.00 0.35 1 2224000.00 54396.38 3343.44 2281740.47 6500.00 1750.00 5 69759.87 4.81 335635.18 
20 0.70 0.35 1 775324.00 54149.04 2014.16 831487.75 5476.00 658.00 7 98632.59 59.22 5840619.36 
21 0.56 0.45 1 447987.20 54385.06 6171.44 508544.38 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 153.57 17267568.50 
22 0.67 0.45 1 653484.80 54385.06 6171.44 714041.98 6800.00 1700.00 2 113722.36 30.71 3492802.30 
23 0.76 0.45 1 848404.00 54385.06 6171.44 908961.18 6800.00 1700.00 2 202943.16 251.15 50968397.04 
24 1.00 0.45 1 2047000.00 54407.71 3769.96 2105178.33 6600.00 1800.00 6 246322.01 4.16 1024479.94 
25 0.70 0.45 1 721984.00 54385.06 6171.44 782541.18 6800.00 1700.00 2 147579.16 51.19 7554433.81 
26 0.56 0.55 1 447987.20 54385.06 6171.44 508544.38 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 145.75 16388751.39 
27 0.67 0.55 1 653484.80 54385.06 6171.44 714041.98 6800.00 1700.00 2 113722.36 29.15 3315039.32 
28 0.76 0.55 1 848404.00 54385.06 6171.44 908961.18 6800.00 1700.00 2 202943.16 238.36 48374407.10 
29 1.00 0.55 1 1963500.00 54385.06 6171.44 2024057.18 6800.00 1700.00 2 327443.16 3.95 1292560.41 
30 0.70 0.55 1 721984.00 54385.06 6171.44 782541.18 6800.00 1700.00 2 147579.16 48.58 7169957.81 
31 0.56 0.65 1 447987.20 54385.06 6171.44 508544.38 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 90.30 10153900.32 
32 0.67 0.65 1 653484.80 54385.06 6171.44 714041.98 6800.00 1700.00 2 113722.36 18.06 2053883.06 
33 0.76 0.65 1 848404.00 54385.06 6171.44 908961.18 6800.00 1700.00 2 202943.16 147.68 29971100.05 








Weather ID G (£/h) P (£/h) X (£/h) 
Total cost 
(£/h) 







with N-2 (£/h) 
35 0.70 0.65 1 721984.00 54385.06 6171.44 782541.18 6800.00 1700.00 2 147579.16 30.10 4442256.47 
36 0.56 0.75 1 447987.20 54385.06 6171.44 508544.38 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 74.46 8372514.30 
37 0.67 0.75 1 653484.80 54385.06 6171.44 714041.98 6800.00 1700.00 2 113722.36 14.89 1693552.70 
38 0.76 0.75 1 848404.00 54385.06 6171.44 908961.18 6800.00 1700.00 2 202943.16 121.77 24713012.32 
39 1.00 0.75 1 1963500.00 54385.06 6171.44 2024057.18 6800.00 1700.00 2 327443.16 2.02 660329.78 
40 0.70 0.75 1 721984.00 54385.06 6171.44 782541.18 6800.00 1700.00 2 147579.16 24.82 3662913.23 
41 0.56 0.85 1 447987.20 54385.06 4497.53 506870.47 6800.00 1700.00 1 114117.07 80.16 9147998.82 
42 0.67 0.85 1 653484.80 54385.06 4497.53 712368.07 6800.00 1700.00 1 115396.27 16.03 1850108.74 
43 0.76 0.85 1 848404.00 54385.06 4497.53 907287.27 6800.00 1700.00 1 204617.07 131.10 26825373.20 
44 1.00 0.85 1 1963500.00 54385.06 4497.53 2022383.27 6800.00 1700.00 1 329117.07 2.17 714542.42 
45 0.70 0.85 1 721984.00 54385.06 4497.53 780867.27 6800.00 1700.00 1 149253.07 26.72 3988205.32 
46 0.56 0.95 1 447987.20 54385.06 4497.53 506870.47 6800.00 1700.00 1 114117.07 21.65 2470803.37 
47 0.67 0.95 1 653484.80 54385.06 4497.53 712368.07 6800.00 1700.00 1 115396.27 4.33 499699.99 
48 0.76 0.95 1 848404.00 54385.06 4497.53 907287.27 6800.00 1700.00 1 204617.07 35.41 7245324.78 
49 1.00 0.95 1 1963500.00 54385.06 4497.53 2022383.27 6800.00 1700.00 1 329117.07 0.59 192992.35 
50 0.70 0.95 1 721984.00 54385.06 4497.53 780867.27 6800.00 1700.00 1 149253.07 7.22 1077183.25 
51 0.56 0.05 2 736823.20 54000.00 0 790823.38 1800.00 0 0 0 67.07 0 








Weather ID G (£/h) P (£/h) X (£/h) 
Total cost 
(£/h) 







with N-2 (£/h) 
53 0.76 0.05 2 1400699.20 54000.00 0 1454699.38 1800.00 0 0 0 109.69 0 
54 1.00 0.05 2 2820000.00 54000.00 0 2874000.18 1800.00 0 0 0 1.82 0 
55 0.70 0.05 2 1162976.00 54000.00 0 1216976.18 1800.00 0 0 0 22.36 0 
56 0.56 0.15 2 611759.20 54000.00 0 665759.41 2120.80 0 0 0 49.31 0 
57 0.67 0.15 2 861904.00 54000.00 0 915904.20 1987.20 0 0 0 9.86 0 
58 0.76 0.15 2 1220699.20 54000.00 0 1274699.45 2459.20 0 0 0 80.65 0 
59 1.00 0.15 2 2620000.00 54000.00 0 2674000.25 2500.00 0 0 0 1.34 0 
60 0.70 0.15 2 992312.00 54000.00 0 1046312.18 1842.40 0 0 0 16.44 0 
61 0.56 0.25 2 541759.20 60705.51 10697.82 613162.94 4120.80 901.00 5 7824.60 34.55 270349.07 
62 0.67 0.25 2 773764.00 54000.00 0 827764.34 3400.00 0 0 0 6.91 0 
63 0.76 0.25 2 1073332.00 54000.00 0 1127332.34 3400.00 0 0 0 56.51 0 
64 1.00 0.25 2 2431000.00 54000.00 0 2485000.34 3400.00 0 0 0 0.94 0 
65 0.70 0.25 2 882320.00 54000.00 0 936320.33 3276.00 0 0 0 11.52 0 
66 0.56 0.35 2 507487.20 66651.90 20079.69 594219.30 5100.00 1700.00 3 26768.24 24.22 648452.48 
67 0.67 0.35 2 712984.80 66651.90 20079.69 799716.90 5100.00 1700.00 3 28047.44 4.84 135888.14 
68 0.76 0.35 2 960761.14 67396.13 15360.38 1043518.15 4942.86 1800.00 7 68386.19 39.62 2709287.62 
69 1.00 0.35 2 2236142.86 67396.13 15360.38 2318899.86 4942.86 1800.00 7 32600.48 0.66 21388.70 








Weather ID G (£/h) P (£/h) X (£/h) 
Total cost 
(£/h) 







with N-2 (£/h) 
71 0.56 0.45 2 507487.20 66651.90 18240.87 592380.48 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 20.94 599059.36 
72 0.67 0.45 2 712984.80 66651.90 18240.87 797878.08 5100.00 1700.00 2 29886.26 4.19 125169.41 
73 0.76 0.45 2 869118.29 67396.13 86610.14 1023125.20 6385.71 1800.00 7 88779.14 34.25 3040437.42 
74 1.00 0.45 2 2063750.00 95477.85 26537.94 2185766.38 5950.00 2550.00 3 165733.96 0.57 93996.20 
75 0.70 0.45 2 786620.00 66651.90 18240.87 871513.28 5100.00 1700.00 2 58607.06 6.98 409096.11 
76 0.56 0.55 2 507487.20 66651.90 18240.87 592380.48 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 19.88 568570.79 
77 0.67 0.55 2 712984.80 66651.90 18240.87 797878.08 5100.00 1700.00 2 29886.26 3.98 118799.03 
78 0.76 0.55 2 869118.29 67396.13 86610.14 1023125.20 6385.71 1800.00 7 88779.14 32.50 2885697.14 
79 1.00 0.55 2 1965500.00 89112.66 83480.31 2138093.65 6800.00 2380.00 7 213406.69 0.54 114873.94 
80 0.70 0.55 2 786620.00 66651.90 18240.87 871513.28 5100.00 1700.00 2 58607.06 6.63 388275.54 
81 0.56 0.65 2 507487.20 66651.90 18240.87 592380.48 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 12.31 352266.68 
82 0.67 0.65 2 712984.80 66651.90 18240.87 797878.08 5100.00 1700.00 2 29886.26 2.46 73603.74 
83 0.76 0.65 2 869118.29 67396.13 86610.14 1023125.20 6385.71 1800.00 7 88779.14 20.14 1787877.58 
84 1.00 0.65 2 1965500.00 89112.66 83480.31 2138093.65 6800.00 2380.00 7 213406.69 0.33 71171.90 
85 0.70 0.65 2 786620.00 66651.90 18240.87 871513.28 5100.00 1700.00 2 58607.06 4.10 240562.02 
86 0.56 0.75 2 507487.20 66651.90 18240.87 592380.48 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 10.15 290465.51 
87 0.67 0.75 2 712984.80 66651.90 18240.87 797878.08 5100.00 1700.00 2 29886.26 2.03 60690.81 








Weather ID G (£/h) P (£/h) X (£/h) 
Total cost 
(£/h) 







with N-2 (£/h) 
89 1.00 0.75 2 1965500.00 89112.66 83480.31 2138093.65 6800.00 2380.00 7 213406.69 0.27 58685.60 
90 0.70 0.75 2 786620.00 66651.90 18240.87 871513.28 5100.00 1700.00 2 58607.06 3.38 198358.16 
91 0.56 0.85 2 507487.20 66651.90 16301.40 590441.01 5100.00 1700.00 1 30546.53 10.93 333914.98 
92 0.67 0.85 2 712984.80 66651.90 16301.40 795938.61 5100.00 1700.00 1 31825.73 2.19 69579.67 
93 0.76 0.85 2 869118.29 67396.13 86610.14 1023125.20 6385.71 1800.00 7 88779.14 17.88 1587133.43 
94 1.00 0.85 2 1965500.00 89112.66 83480.31 2138093.65 6800.00 2380.00 7 213406.69 0.30 63180.67 
95 0.70 0.85 2 786620.00 66651.90 16301.40 869573.81 5100.00 1700.00 1 60546.53 3.64 220618.56 
96 0.56 0.95 2 507487.20 66651.90 16301.40 590441.01 5100.00 1700.00 1 30546.53 2.95 90187.84 
97 0.67 0.95 2 712984.80 66651.90 16301.40 795938.61 5100.00 1700.00 1 31825.73 0.59 18792.93 
98 0.76 0.95 2 869118.29 67396.13 86610.14 1023125.20 6385.71 1800.00 7 88779.14 4.83 428672.40 
99 1.00 0.95 2 1965500.00 89112.66 83480.31 2138093.65 6800.00 2380.00 7 213406.69 0.08 17064.61 
100 0.70 0.95 2 786620.00 66651.90 16301.40 869573.81 5100.00 1700.00 1 60546.53 0.98 59587.36 
101 0.45 0.05 1 454679.40 54000.00 0 508679.58 1800.00 0 0 0 151.68 0 
102 0.57 0.05 1 750288.20 54000.00 0 804288.38 1800.00 0 0 0 21.67 0 
103 0.67 0.05 1 1023088.00 54000.00 0 1077088.18 1800.00 0 0 0 227.40 0 
104 0.63 0.05 1 906160.40 54000.00 0 960160.58 1800.00 0 0 0 54.05 0 
105 0.58 0.05 1 779871.60 54000.00 0 833871.78 1800.00 0 0 0 65.00 0 








Weather ID G (£/h) P (£/h) X (£/h) 
Total cost 
(£/h) 







with N-2 (£/h) 
107 0.57 0.15 1 623617.20 54000.00 0 677617.41 2087.80 0 0 0 15.93 0 
108 0.67 0.15 1 860672.00 54000.00 0 914672.20 1989.60 0 0 0 167.19 0 
109 0.63 0.15 1 758798.40 54000.00 0 812798.59 1911.60 0 0 0 39.74 0 
110 0.58 0.15 1 649273.60 54000.00 0 703273.80 2016.40 0 0 0 47.79 0 
111 0.45 0.25 1 300871.20 54385.58 435.42 355692.69 4818.60 1702.32 6 44975.05 78.13 3514113.58 
112 0.57 0.25 1 553617.20 54194.74 320.96 608133.30 4087.80 859.75 5 23557.24 11.16 262948.34 
113 0.67 0.25 1 768570.40 54028.41 224.71 822823.87 3489.60 125.44 7 3828.47 117.14 448469.98 
114 0.63 0.25 1 688798.40 54098.81 254.23 743151.81 3711.60 436.24 7 10552.93 27.84 293834.93 
115 0.58 0.25 1 579273.60 54174.52 310.94 633759.46 4016.40 770.50 5 21088.48 33.49 706175.32 
116 0.45 0.35 1 241429.20 54385.06 7758.46 303573.40 6800.00 1700.00 3 97094.34 54.78 5319046.04 
117 0.57 0.35 1 483617.20 54391.55 2349.38 540358.74 6087.80 1728.65 7 91331.80 7.83 714765.94 
118 0.67 0.35 1 698570.40 54154.43 2021.61 754746.99 5489.60 681.80 7 71905.35 82.13 5905612.95 
119 0.63 0.35 1 618798.40 54242.43 2143.25 675184.65 5711.60 1070.30 7 78520.09 19.52 1532876.13 
120 0.58 0.35 1 509273.60 54363.25 2310.26 565947.70 6016.40 1603.70 7 88900.24 23.48 2087209.17 
121 0.45 0.45 1 241429.20 54385.06 6171.44 301986.38 6800.00 1700.00 2 98681.36 47.36 4673189.69 
122 0.57 0.45 1 458690.20 54385.06 6171.44 519247.38 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 6.77 760699.77 
123 0.67 0.45 1 652706.40 54385.06 6171.44 713263.58 6800.00 1700.00 2 113388.76 71.00 8050302.99 








Weather ID G (£/h) P (£/h) X (£/h) 
Total cost 
(£/h) 







with N-2 (£/h) 
125 0.58 0.45 1 481847.60 54385.06 6171.44 542404.78 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 20.30 2282099.30 
126 0.45 0.55 1 241429.20 54385.06 6171.44 301986.38 6800.00 1700.00 2 98681.36 44.95 4435351.97 
127 0.57 0.55 1 458690.20 54385.06 6171.44 519247.38 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 6.42 721984.65 
128 0.67 0.55 1 652706.40 54385.06 6171.44 713263.58 6800.00 1700.00 2 113388.76 67.38 7640590.18 
129 0.63 0.55 1 580704.40 54385.06 6171.44 641261.58 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 16.02 1800994.67 
130 0.58 0.55 1 481847.60 54385.06 6171.44 542404.78 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 19.26 2165953.94 
131 0.45 0.65 1 241429.20 54385.06 6171.44 301986.38 6800.00 1700.00 2 98681.36 27.85 2747989.81 
132 0.57 0.65 1 458690.20 54385.06 6171.44 519247.38 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 3.98 447316.58 
133 0.67 0.65 1 652706.40 54385.06 6171.44 713263.58 6800.00 1700.00 2 113388.76 41.75 4733843.92 
134 0.63 0.65 1 580704.40 54385.06 6171.44 641261.58 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 9.92 1115833.66 
135 0.58 0.65 1 481847.60 54385.06 6171.44 542404.78 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 11.93 1341949.73 
136 0.45 0.75 1 241429.20 54385.06 6171.44 301986.38 6800.00 1700.00 2 98681.36 22.96 2265886.33 
137 0.57 0.75 1 458690.20 54385.06 6171.44 519247.38 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 3.28 368839.98 
138 0.67 0.75 1 652706.40 54385.06 6171.44 713263.58 6800.00 1700.00 2 113388.76 34.42 3903344.98 
139 0.63 0.75 1 580704.40 54385.06 6171.44 641261.58 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 8.18 920073.36 
140 0.58 0.75 1 481847.60 54385.06 6171.44 542404.78 6800.00 1700.00 2 112443.16 9.84 1106519.95 
141 0.45 0.85 1 241429.20 54385.06 4497.53 300312.47 6800.00 1700.00 1 100355.27 24.72 2480823.15 








Weather ID G (£/h) P (£/h) X (£/h) 
Total cost 
(£/h) 







with N-2 (£/h) 
143 0.67 0.85 1 652706.40 54385.06 4497.53 711589.67 6800.00 1700.00 1 115062.67 37.06 4264361.46 
144 0.63 0.85 1 580704.40 54385.06 4497.53 639587.67 6800.00 1700.00 1 114117.07 8.81 1005293.00 
145 0.58 0.85 1 481847.60 54385.06 4497.53 540730.87 6800.00 1700.00 1 114117.07 10.59 1209008.77 
146 0.45 0.95 1 241429.20 54385.06 4497.53 300312.47 6800.00 1700.00 1 100355.27 6.68 670051.05 
147 0.57 0.95 1 458690.20 54385.06 4497.53 517573.47 6800.00 1700.00 1 114117.07 0.95 108847.96 
148 0.67 0.95 1 652706.40 54385.06 4497.53 711589.67 6800.00 1700.00 1 115062.67 10.01 1151770.88 
149 0.63 0.95 1 580704.40 54385.06 4497.53 639587.67 6800.00 1700.00 1 114117.07 2.38 271521.83 
150 0.58 0.95 1 481847.60 54385.06 4497.53 540730.87 6800.00 1700.00 1 114117.07 2.86 326543.87 
151 0.45 0.05 2 454679.40 54000.00 0 508679.58 1800.00 0 0 0 4.69 0 
152 0.57 0.05 2 750288.20 54000.00 0 804288.38 1800.00 0 0 0 0.67 0 
153 0.67 0.05 2 1023088.00 54000.00 0 1077088.18 1800.00 0 0 0 7.03 0 
154 0.63 0.05 2 906160.40 54000.00 0 960160.58 1800.00 0 0 0 1.67 0 
155 0.58 0.05 2 779871.60 54000.00 0 833871.78 1800.00 0 0 0 2.01 0 
156 0.45 0.15 2 365871.20 54000.00 0 419871.48 2818.60 0 0 0 3.45 0 
157 0.57 0.15 2 623617.20 54000.00 0 677617.41 2087.80 0 0 0 0.49 0 
158 0.67 0.15 2 860672.00 54000.00 0 914672.20 1989.60 0 0 0 5.17 0 
159 0.63 0.15 2 758798.40 54000.00 0 812798.59 1911.60 0 0 0 1.23 0 








Weather ID G (£/h) P (£/h) X (£/h) 
Total cost 
(£/h) 







with N-2 (£/h) 
161 0.45 0.25 2 300871.20 66669.17 14306.70 381847.55 4818.60 1702.32 6 18820.19 2.42 45479.70 
162 0.57 0.25 2 553617.20 60398.51 10545.70 624561.82 4087.80 859.75 5 7128.72 0.35 2460.97 
163 0.67 0.25 2 772652.00 54000.00 0 826652.34 3400.00 0 0 0 3.62 0 
164 0.63 0.25 2 699704.40 54000.00 0 753704.74 3400.00 0 0 0 0.86 0 
165 0.58 0.25 2 579273.60 59734.29 10216.58 649224.87 4016.40 770.50 5 5623.07 1.04 5823.58 
166 0.45 0.35 2 292429.20 66651.90 20079.69 379161.30 5100.00 1700.00 3 21506.44 1.69 36438.29 
167 0.57 0.35 2 518190.20 66651.90 20079.69 604922.30 5100.00 1700.00 3 26768.24 0.24 6479.05 
168 0.67 0.35 2 712206.40 66651.90 20079.69 798938.50 5100.00 1700.00 3 27713.84 2.54 70396.34 
169 0.63 0.35 2 640204.40 66651.90 20079.69 726936.50 5100.00 1700.00 3 26768.24 0.60 16162.02 
170 0.58 0.35 2 541347.60 66651.90 20079.69 628079.70 5100.00 1700.00 3 26768.24 0.73 19437.14 
171 0.45 0.45 2 292429.20 66651.90 18240.87 377322.48 5100.00 1700.00 2 23345.26 1.46 34192.15 
172 0.57 0.45 2 518190.20 66651.90 18240.87 603083.48 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 0.21 5985.53 
173 0.67 0.45 2 712206.40 66651.90 18240.87 797099.68 5100.00 1700.00 2 29552.66 2.20 64891.56 
174 0.63 0.45 2 640204.40 66651.90 18240.87 725097.68 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 0.52 14930.95 
175 0.58 0.45 2 541347.60 66651.90 18240.87 626240.88 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 0.63 17956.60 
176 0.45 0.55 2 292429.20 66651.90 18240.87 377322.48 5100.00 1700.00 2 23345.26 1.39 32451.97 
177 0.57 0.55 2 518190.20 66651.90 18240.87 603083.48 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 0.20 5680.91 








Weather ID G (£/h) P (£/h) X (£/h) 
Total cost 
(£/h) 







with N-2 (£/h) 
179 0.63 0.55 2 640204.40 66651.90 18240.87 725097.68 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 0.50 14171.05 
180 0.58 0.55 2 541347.60 66651.90 18240.87 626240.88 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 0.60 17042.72 
181 0.45 0.65 2 292429.20 66651.90 18240.87 377322.48 5100.00 1700.00 2 23345.26 0.86 20106.11 
182 0.57 0.65 2 518190.20 66651.90 18240.87 603083.48 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 0.12 3519.69 
183 0.67 0.65 2 712206.40 66651.90 18240.87 797099.68 5100.00 1700.00 2 29552.66 1.29 38158.38 
184 0.63 0.65 2 640204.40 66651.90 18240.87 725097.68 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 0.31 8779.89 
185 0.58 0.65 2 541347.60 66651.90 18240.87 626240.88 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 0.37 10559.07 
186 0.45 0.75 2 292429.20 66651.90 18240.87 377322.48 5100.00 1700.00 2 23345.26 0.71 16578.72 
187 0.57 0.75 2 518190.20 66651.90 18240.87 603083.48 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 0.10 2902.20 
188 0.67 0.75 2 712206.40 66651.90 18240.87 797099.68 5100.00 1700.00 2 29552.66 1.06 31463.93 
189 0.63 0.75 2 640204.40 66651.90 18240.87 725097.68 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 0.25 7239.56 
190 0.58 0.75 2 541347.60 66651.90 18240.87 626240.88 5100.00 1700.00 2 28607.06 0.30 8706.61 
191 0.45 0.85 2 292429.20 66651.90 16301.40 375383.01 5100.00 1700.00 1 25284.73 0.76 19331.40 
192 0.57 0.85 2 518190.20 66651.90 16301.40 601144.01 5100.00 1700.00 1 30546.53 0.11 3336.33 
193 0.67 0.85 2 712206.40 66651.90 16301.40 795160.21 5100.00 1700.00 1 31492.13 1.15 36097.00 
194 0.63 0.85 2 640204.40 66651.90 16301.40 723158.21 5100.00 1700.00 1 30546.53 0.27 8322.49 
195 0.58 0.85 2 541347.60 66651.90 16301.40 624301.41 5100.00 1700.00 1 30546.53 0.33 10008.99 








Weather ID G (£/h) P (£/h) X (£/h) 
Total cost 
(£/h) 







with N-2 (£/h) 
197 0.57 0.95 2 518190.20 66651.90 16301.40 601144.01 5100.00 1700.00 1 30546.53 0.03 901.12 
198 0.67 0.95 2 712206.40 66651.90 16301.40 795160.21 5100.00 1700.00 1 31492.13 0.31 9749.52 
199 0.63 0.95 2 640204.40 66651.90 16301.40 723158.21 5100.00 1700.00 1 30546.53 0.07 2247.84 
200 0.58 0.95 2 541347.60 66651.90 16301.40 624301.41 5100.00 1700.00 1 30546.53 0.09 2703.35 
 
